A

FARTHER EXAMINATION

OF

Dr. CLARKE's Notions of

SPACE;

With Some Conſiderations on the Poſſibility of

ETERNAL CREATION.

In REPLY

To Mr. JOHN CLARKE's *Third Defence of* Dr. SAMUEL CLARKE's *Demonſtration* &c.

To which are added

Some REMARKS on Mr. JACKSON's Exceptions to Dr. CLARKE's *Notions of* SPACE *Examined:* in his *Exiſtence and Unity* &c.

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——— Turbatque Notas, & Lumina flexum
Ducit in Errorem variarum Ambage Viarum. *Ovid.*

CAMBRIDGE

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ERRATA

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A FARTHER EXAMINATION &c.

INTRODUCTION.

WHEN I publiſhed Dr. *Clarke*'s *Notions of* SPACE *Examined*, in Anſwer to your *two Defences* of the learned *Doctor*; I told you in the Concluſion, that, if you ſhould afterwards produce any new Arguments, or defend the old ones with new Reaſoning, you might expect a Reply: But that, if you ſhould only repeat over and over again, what has been as often confuted, it would be only triſling, and amuſing the World *.

AND ſince you have now in Reply, publiſhed a *Third Defence*, in which you have produced ſcarce any *new Arguments*, or defended the old ones with *new Reaſoning* (unleſs Sophiſtry may be called Reaſoning) I thought, as it required no Anſwer, ſo it would be unneceſſary to trouble the Publick, who perhaps are already tired of the Controverſy, with any Thing more upon the Subject.

* P. 133.

I therefore, Sir, intended no farther Anſwer, 'till I recollected what you are pleaſed to put me in Mind of in your firſt Page, *viz.* that *Sophiſtry may prevail with a great many Perſons*; which induced me to give you a Reply.

When I heard you proclaiming to the World, in your *Preface*, that you *knew, that Quibbles and wrangling upon Words were endleſs*; I flattered my ſelf, that you would make uſe of no ſuch wrangling Methods; but that you would throughout have kept to the ſtrict Rules of Argument; and I could not therefore forbear wondring, to find the ſame Piece ſo full of fallacious Reaſoning: But, when I recollected, that you not only knew, *Quibbles and Wrangling upon Words are endleſs*, but knew likewiſe, that *Sophiſtry would prevail with a great many Perſons*, my wonder ceaſed.

I cannot find, Sir, that you have advanced any Thing new, or material, in this your *Third Defence*. Your Arguments are for the moſt part dreſſed up in a Sophiſtical Manner; and ſeem as if calculated only to perplex the Subject, to evade the Arguments uſed againſt you, and to deceive the unwary Reader by a Labyrinth of words: So that the chief Thing neceſſary, will be to detect Fallacy, and unravel Sophiſtry. As you have thought proper to put on a Mask, I hope you will excuſe me, if I endeavour to pull it off, and ſhew your Arguments to the World in their true Light.

You are pleaſed in your *Preface* to favour me with ſome Compliments, which being only words of Form and Ceremony are to be taken as ſuch. I ſhall only beg leave to obſerve, that, if that *little Piece, entitled Dr.* Clarke's *Notions of* Space *Examined*, had the good fortune to get any

any *Character* (as you are pleaſed to ſay it did *) *amongſt many learned Men at Cambridge*; I impute it not to any Thing I could ſay worthy their Notice, but to the Force of Truth, which is great and will prevail. And I ſhould be unwilling to think, as you do, that mere *Sophiſtry* could get a *Character amongſt many learned Men at Cambridge:* For, tho' *Sophiſtry may prevail with a great many Perſons*; yet I ſhould be loth to reflect ſo much on the *Learned Men of that Body*, as to reckon them in the Number.

BEFORE I enter into a particular Examination of your Book, I ſhall firſt premiſe a Chapter or two, concerning thoſe main Principles, by which the Controverſy muſt be decided.

* Preface to the Third Defence.

CHAP. I.

Concerning the different Acceptations of the Term Nothing.

THE word *Thing* is by Cuſtom generally applied to whatever we ſpeak about, be it either a real Exiſtence *ad extra*, as a *Man*, a *Temple* &c. or, only an Idea, as *Whiteneſs*, *Extenſion*, *Knowledge* &c. conſidered in the *abſtract*. But, ſtrictly ſpeaking, theſe are not *Things*, but *Ideas*: for, I think, the word *Thing* ought to be applied only to *Exiſtences ad extra*, and not to *abſtract Ideas*, *Modes*, *Properties*, or *Relations*. Abſtract Ideas ſhould be called *Ideas*, not *Things*: for otherwiſe they are confounded together. But, as Cuſtom has given the Name of *Thing*, to whatever we ſpeak about; So we may uſe the word according to this common Acceptation: But then we ſhould diſtinguiſh between *Things Real*, and *Things Ideal*. We ſhould call thoſe *Things Real*, which have an Exiſtence *ad extra*; and thoſe *Ideal*, which are no where, but in the *Mind*.

Now, according to theſe two Senſes of the word *Thing*, the Term *Nothing*, which is the *Negation*, muſt conſequently have two Senſes; as it is ſometimes uſed as a Negation of Things *real* only; and, at other times, as a Negation of Things both *Real*, and *Ideal*.

THE Term *Nothing* is to be underſtood in the former Senſe, when it is uſed concerning *abſtract Ideas*; as when we ſay Extenſion is Nothing: for here the Term *Nothing* only denies Extenſion to be a Thing *Real*, or an Exiſtence *ad extra*; but does not deny it to be an *Ideal Thing*, or an

abſtract

abſtract Idea. We may diſtinguiſh this Senſe of the Term *Nothing*, for brevity ſake, by calling it *Non-Entity*.

NOTHING, in the other Senſe of the Term, is a Negation, not only of all *Real Things*, but alſo of all *Ideal Things*, viz. all *Non-Entities*, all Properties, Modes, Accidents, Relations, in the abſtract; and in ſhort, all *Ideas* whatever; and among the reſt, SPACE, the imaginary Receptacle of all Exiſtences; in this Senſe we may diſtinguiſh it, by giving it the Term of *Nihility*.

THIS is a Diſtinction, which is and ought to be made uſe of by Logicians; and I wiſh you had been ſo converſant with them as to have known this Diſtinction, as well as that common one of *Genus* and *Species*; which you lay ſo much Streſs on to ſo little Purpoſe*. "Metaphyſicians conſider another ſort of Things (ſays one of thoſe Writers) "by *Abſtraction*, which are neither *Beings*, nor *Modes* of Beings, nor yet are they conſidered as mere *Nihility*. Such are Privations, external Denominations, or Relations, and all *Beings of the Mind*, [which are what I call *Ideal Things*] "for theſe properly neither have Exiſtence in themſelves, nor in any other Things; neither can they ſtrictly be ſaid to be mere *Nothing*, or *Nihility*; ſince we form Notions about them, and they are connected to many of our *Ideas* †". Here, you ſee, this Logician makes

* See Third Def. p. 4, 5, 6.

† Præterea quædam alia, per abſtractionem, à Metaphyſicis intelliguntur, quæ *neque* ſunt *Entia*, neque modi Entium, neque tamen ut *merum nihil* concipiuntur. Ejuſmodi ſunt *Privationes, denominationes Externæ* ſeu *relationes*, & *Entia Rationis* omnia. Hæc enim neque *exiſtentiam* habent *propriam*, neque in aliis exiſtunt, neque dici propriè poſſunt

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the Diſtinction of *Non-Ens*, and *Merum Nihil*, i. e. of *Non-Entity*, and *Nihility*—*Neque ſunt Entia*, ſays he, *neque tamen ut merum nihil concipiuntur*. They have neither *real Exiſtence*, neither are they *mere Nihility*; i. e. as he afterwards explains himſelf, they are *Entia Rationis*. In this we agree with this Writer. When we ſay SPACE is *Nothing*, we mean that it is what we call *Non-Ens*, that it has not *real Exiſtence*, or *exiſtentiam propriam*; and, when we ſay SPACE is *Something*, we only mean, that, *neque tamen ut merum nihil concipitur*, becauſe *notiones ejus efformamus, & Ideis variis adjunctum eſt*; that is, that it is an *Ideal Thing*.

AND here I would have it obſerved, that this Diviſion of the Term *Nothing*, into what we call *Non-Entity* and *Nihility*, is no falſe and uſeleſs, but a true and neceſſary Diviſion. For any one, with a little Thinking will find, that the word *Nothing* is often uſed in the two different Senſes I have mentioned; and therefore, to avoid Confuſion, the foregoing Diſtinction will be found neceſſary.

SINCE an abſtract Idea has no *objective Reality*, it may certainly be ſaid to be *Nothing*; that is, no *Thing* exiſting *ad extra*; but yet, ſince it is an *Idea*, it cannot be ſaid to be *Nothing*, in ſuch a Senſe as ſhall exclude *Ideas:* and therefore, in the Term *Nothing* we make a Diſtinction, when it is uſed concerning theſe *Ideas*, and when it is uſed, as a *Negation of all Ideas* as well as *Realities*.

IT is evident, that, when we ſay Whiteneſs or Knowledge is *Nothing*; we muſt not be ſuppoſed

eſſe *merum nihil*; quandoquidem notiones eorum efformamus, & *Ideis* variis adjuncta ſunt. — *Joh. Clerici*, Ontologia c. 1. Sect. 2.

to

to mean that Whiteneſs, and Knowledge, are not *Ideas*; and therefore the Term *Nothing*, does not here exclude *Ideas*; and ſince it does not, we ſhould not confound it with another Senſe of the word, which does exclude them; but we ſhould remember, that when Whiteneſs or Knowledge is ſaid to be *Nothing* (and the ſame is true of all other abſtract Ideas) it is ſaid to be ſo, in that Senſe which only denies it to be a *Reality*, but at the ſame time admits it to be an *Idea*.

When therefore we ſay, that Whiteneſs, Knowledge, Extenſion, or any other abſtract Ideas are *Nothing*; we do not mean, that they are not *Ideas*; but that they are Ideas, which have no *real Archetype* exiſting without the Mind.

I would not have it imagined, that I introduce the words *Non-Entity* and *Nihility*, in order to amuſe the Reader with Scholaſtick Terms; for (as Mr. *Locke* ſays of the word *Idea*) I have no fondneſs for any particular, Articulate Sound; nor do I think there is any Spell, or Faſcination in any of them: But I uſe them only to expreſs briefly the two Senſes, in which the Term *Nothing* is uſed. In ſhort, by *Non-Entity*, I mean a *mere Idea*, which hath no *objective Reality*: and by *Nihility*, I mean a Negation, even of thoſe *Ideas*, as well as of *Realities*.

Since then the Term *Nothing*, may be underſtood in theſe two very different Senſes; if we do not, in the uſe of it, attend to its preciſe Meaning, we ſhall run into Confuſion; as you ſeem to have done in the Piece now before me.

This being obſerved, I ſhall now proceed to remark a few Things concerning Abſtract Ideas, as far as may be of Service in the preſent Queſtion.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of Abſtract Ideas.

ABSTRACT Ideas are formed by that Power of the Mind, which is called the Power of Abſtracting; *i. e.* the Power of ſeparating in *Idea*, what are inſeparable in *Reality*.

By this Act of the Mind, we form our *Univerſal Ideas*; and rank Things into Sorts: Hence come *Genus*, and *Species*, *Subſtance*, *Eſſence*, &c.*

We employ this Act of the mind about Properties, Modes, Relations *&c.* as well as Subſtances; and form general Ideas concerning them, "by "ſeparating them from all other Properties *&c.* "with which they are found in Nature, or from "all particular Subjects, in which they inhere, "and leaving only ſo much as remains in com-"mon, and includes, or may be affirmed of every "Property *&c.* of that Kind. Thus obſerving, "that all Bodies agree in being *Extended*, as well "as *Solid*; tho' they differ never ſo much in *Mag-"nitude* and *Figure*; we take the former of theſe "Properties apart from the latter, as alſo, from "any *particular* Magnitude, or Shape, and call it "*Extenſion* in the abſtract; which being thus "made *general*, will comprehend all *particular* "*Extenſions* &c, †

* For the manner of acquiring theſe, See Mr. *Law*'s Additional Notes to his firſt Edition of *King*'s Origin of Evil Tranſlated. p. 10. *Watts*'s Logic Part 1. c. 3. Sect. 3. *Locke*'s Eſſay on H. U. B. 2. c. 11. §. 9.

† Addit. Notes to *King*- p. 11.

By this Power, which the Mind has, of *Abſtracting*, we ſometimes conſider a Mode or Property of any Being, (whether *Matter* or *Spirit*) without conſidering the Being it ſelf, of which it is a Mode or Property; as when we conſider *Extenſion* without conſidering any particular Extended Body, or *Thought* without any particular Thinking Being. This is abſtracting a *Mode* from the *Subſtance*: but ſometimes likewiſe we abſtract even from *Modes* themſelves; as when we conſider the *Length* of Body without conſidering *Breadth* and *Depth*, (which Geometricians call a *Line*) or when we conſider the *Length* and *Breadth*, without conſidering *Depth*, (which they call a *Surface*.)

There is a Paſſage in Mr. Norris concerning Abſtraction, which will farther explain the Nature of it. "This ſeparate Conſideration where-
"in the Nature of Abſtraction is made to con-
"ſiſt, is to be underſtood, not of different Be-
"ings but of the Parts of the ſame Being; that
"is, Abſtraction is not the conſidering one intire
"and complete Being without another (for they
"being *Numerically* at leaſt diſtinct cannot be
"conſidered otherwiſe, ſince one Idea will not
"include them) but the conſidering one *Part* of
"ſuch a Being without another."

"But farther, Abſtraction is not of ſuch Parts
"neither, as are *really* and *phyſically* diſtinct, ſuch
"as we commonly call *integral* Parts (for I ſup-
"poſe I ſhould not properly be ſaid to abſtract
"in conſidering one Part of a human Body, or
"one Part of a Number without conſidering
"another; ſince theſe, tho' Phyſical Parts, are
"yet Logical Wholes; and ſo the ſeparate Con-
"ſideration of them, would be no proper Ab-

" ſtraction) but of Parts, that are *intelligibly* di-
" ſtinct, and have a *real Sameneſs* in the Nature of
" the Thing. When one of theſe *really Same*, but
" *intelligibly diſtinct* Parts, is conſidered without
" the other, or without that real Whole, whoſe
" intelligible Part it is; then is my Thought *ab-*
" *ſtract*; but when there is no ſuch ſeparate Con-
" ſideration, but all is included together in one
" Idea, and conſidered as really it is; then is my
" Thought *concrete*. So that in ſhort, Abſtra-
" ction, as 'tis a logical Affection of Thought,
" is the conſidering one Thing without another,
" not *abſolutely*, but in Things that are not really
" one without the other, nor yet really deniable
" one of the other. For Abſtraction is as it were
" the drawing of a Thing away from it ſelf. But
" where Things are really ſeparate or diſtinct,
" the conſidering them apart is not *Abſtraction*;
" but only a mere divided Conſideration; nor
" would the joining them in one, be *Concretion*,
" but Confuſion."

" ABSTRACTION then is the ſeparate Conſi-
" deration of Things *intelligibly* diſtinct, *really*
" indiſtinct." *

IT may be proper to explain a Sentence or two in this Quotation. He ſays, that *Abſtraction* is the ſeparate Conſideration of Parts that are *intelligibly* diſtinct, and have a *real Sameneſs in the Nature of the Thing*. But he muſt not here be underſtood to mean, that theſe Parts which he ſays, have *a real Sameneſs in the Nature of the Thing*, are really the *ſame Parts* (by *Parts*, we here mean *Modes*;) as for Inſtance, that *Exten-*

* *Norris*'s Eſſay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World. Part 2. c. 3. Sect. 7.

ſion

ſion and *Figure*, which are Modes of *Body*, are really the *ſame*; *i. e.* that Extenſion is Figure, and Figure Extenſion: He muſt not, I ſay, be underſtood to mean this, when he ſpeaks of their having a *real Sameneſs*; but, that Extenſion and Figure, which are *intelligibly diſtinct*, are not Things *really diſtinct* and *different* in the Being, from whence they are *abſtracted*; (as a Man's Arm is from the reſt of his Body) but are only the *ſame Being*, conſidered in *different Views*. And this is true: For, tho' we can abſtractedly conſider *Figure* without conſidering *Extenſion*, and *Extenſion* without *Figure*, and both of them without conſidering any *particular Extended Figured Being*, i. e. tho' they are *intelligibly diſtinct*; yet in the Nature of the Thing, *i. e.* in the *really Extended Figured Being*, Extenſion is not any Thing really diſtinct from Figure, or Figure any Thing really diſtinct from Extenſion, or either of them any Thing really diſtinct from the *Extended Figured Being*, whence they are abſtracted: But they may both be ſaid to have a *real Sameneſs* in the Nature of the Thing; becauſe both of them, are only the ſame *Thing* conſidered in different Reſpects.

By Parts then, (*i. e.* Modes) *intelligibly diſtinct*, having a *real Sameneſs* in the Nature of the Thing, is meant that the Modes of any Being, tho' they may by the Mind be *conſidered* diſtinctly or ſeparately; yet, are only the *ſame Being*, conſidered in a different Manner.

From what has been ſaid concerning abſtract Ideas, it is evident that they have no real Exiſtence *without* the Mind correſpondent to them; *i. e.* that there is no ſuch real Thing *ad extra*, as Whiteneſs without a white Body; or Length

without a long Body *&c.* but that Whiteneſs and Length in the abſtract are mere Ideas, ariſing from the Conſideration of Body; the one with Reſpect to its Whiteneſs only; the other with Reſpect to its Length only; without conſidering any of its other Modes, or any particular Body, or any real Subject. All *abſtract Ideas* then, are *Non-Entities* or mere *Entia Rationis.*

"But tho' a Non-Entity, or Not-Being, is "really Nothing in it ſelf; yet as it is introduced "by ſome Relation to Being, it may afford Foun- "dation for ſome Sort of Thoughts or Concep- "tions, or ſome relative Affections — We may "alſo form a Sort of Idea of Non-Entities, or "Not-Beings, from their Relation to Beings."*

Thus we have an Idea and can talk of a *Shadow* and Extenſion in the *Abſtract*; not that a Shadow, or Extenſion in the Abſtract, can bear any real Relation to Beings as if they were real Exiſtences; but theſe Ideas are conſidered relatively and with Reſpect to Being: A Shadow is conſidered, as the Repreſentation of a Being; and is therefore thought upon, and conceived as ſuch; it may thence be ſaid to have relative Affections: Thus it may be ſaid to be here, or there, to be near us, or far from us, or to be long or ſhort, great or little *&c.* and Extenſion is conſidered alſo in a relative Manner; that is, as it may be a Mode of Being; and we call it greater, or leſs, or aſcribe to it certain Degrees. And if we look into our Minds, we ſhall find, that we always tacitly refer theſe abſtract Ideas,

* A Brief Scheme of Ontology c. 1. — Subjoined to a late Book, intitled, *Philoſophical Eſſays on Various Subjects*, by *I. W.*

when

whenever we ſpeak or think about them, to *Somewhat*; not to any particular Being, but to ſome *imaginary Subſtratum*: For theſe abſtract Ideas, are Ideas of pure Intellect; *i. e.* are to be underſtood, but cannot be imagined. A Man may *underſtand*, what we mean by Whiteneſs, or Extenſion in the Abſtract; but *Imagination* can lay no hold of them, till the Mind ſupplies an *imaginary Subſtratum*, to ſupport them, *pro hac vice*, ſuch as may ſerve the Purpoſe. The Mind therefore joins the Idea of *Somewhat*, with the Idea of *one Quality only*, either Extenſion, Whiteneſs, or any other abſtract Idea; and then we have an imaginary Subſtratum preſently formed; that is, an *ideal extended Somewhat*, or an *ideal white Somewhat* *.

It is in this View, that we *affirm* Things concerning *abſtract Ideas*. Hence it is, that *Extenſion* is ſaid to have *Parts*, which would be Nonſenſe to ſay of Extenſion it ſelf, conſidered as an *Idea* of *pure Intellect*. Hence *Diſtance* is ſaid to be great or ſmall; which we conceive, by firſt imagining the Space, which we conſider as between, as a *Subſtratum of Extenſion*; Thence conceiving it as *extended*, (which it would be abſurd to ſay of *Extenſion*) and thence conſidering it by *Parts*, as great, or ſmall; long, or ſhort. Hence likewiſe it is, that we ſay Wiſdom is uſeful, that Solidity reſiſts Bodies, that Motion is ſwift or ſlow *&c.*

And we may farther obſerve that ſince Qualities, Modes, and Accidents, are not *Subſtan-*

* See this further Explained in Mr. *Law*'s Notes *&c.* Note 16. p. 40. Edit. 1. or in Dr. *Clarke*'s *Notions of Space Examined* p. 83. &c.

ces,

ces, and yet Things are affirmed of them, which can be only affirmed of *Subſtances*; it is ſufficient to ſhew, that they are conceived *after the Manner* of Subſtances: That is, that altho' they are conſidered abſtractedly from every *particular Subject*, they are yet referred to an *imaginary Subſtratum*.

And as we thus form an imaginary Subſtratum for the Qualities, Modes, Properties *&c.* of *Body*, when conſidered abſtractedly from all *particular Bodies*; ſo we do the ſame, with reſpect to the Properties, Qualities, *&c.* of *Spirit*, when conſidered in the Abſtract. Thus, when we talk of *Knowledge* abſtracted from every *particular knowing Man*; the Mind here ſupplies it with imaginary Subjects *pro hac vice*; whence we have the Idea of an intelligent *Somewhat*; which is ſufficient to bring the general Idea down to a particular Subject: The ſame is done with Relation to Envy, Fear, Love, Hatred, Piety, Virtue, *&c.* when conſidered in the *Abſtract*.

But from conſidering abſtract Ideas in this Manner, and thence accuſtoming ourſelves to ſpeak of them, as *real Things*, ariſe Error and Diſpute. Men are ſo uſed to think, conceive, and talk about them, as *Things real*, that they deceive themſelves, as it were, into a Belief, that they are ſo: Thus, for Inſtance, *Nature*, and *Chance* have ſo long, and ſo much been talked of, that I make no Doubt, but among the more ignorant and common People, they have gained an Exiſtence. *Fortune* has ſo often been ſaid to be kind, or averſe, that I am apt to believe, ſome imagine it as a real Being, in whoſe Power their Welfare is placed. Their Ideas of *Winter*, and *Summer*, *Spring*, and *Autumn*, are generally abſtracted from the Motion of the *Earth*, (or rather from the *Sun*)

and

and are conſidered as *Things diſtinct*. *Time* and *Death* likewiſe, with them, have their *Exiſtences*, but owe them only to the *abſtract Ideas* of the Painter or the Statuary.

HENCE aroſe the numerous *Idols* of the Heathens, *Valour*, *Prudence*, *Truth*, &c.; nor were *Revenge* and *Fear*, without their Temples and their Altars.

SINCE then the cuſtomary way of conſidering, and ſpeaking of Things, which is not always to be avoided, will lead us into Error; we ſhould, when we have a Mind to be undeceived, throw off the Slavery impoſed upon us by Words, and be no longer governed by Sound. We ſhould change thoſe Expreſſions which are apt to miſlead us for others more exact, and which will bring us to the Knowledge of the Truth. We ſhould conſider what the *Senſe* and *Meaning* of an Expreſſion is, when ſtripp'd of its Diſguiſe: This is the only way to detect theſe *Idola Fori*, as Lord BACON calls them, which by a Combination of Words and Names, inſinuate themſelves into the Mind. Men imagine that their Reaſon governs their Words; but ſometimes Words get the better of their Reaſon; and have ſo great a Force upon the Mind, that their Philoſophy lies blended with Error, and their Doctrines become uſeleſs and ſophiſtical *.

* At Idola Fori omnium moleſtiſſima ſunt, quæ ex fœdere verborum & nominum ſe inſinuarunt in Intellectum. Credunt enim Homines, rationem ſuam verbis imperare. Sed fit etiam ut verba vim ſuam ſuper Intellectum retorqueant & reflectant, quod Philoſophiam & Scientias reddidit ſophiſticas & inactivas. *Fran. Bac.* de Verul. Inſtaur. magna. Pars Sec. Aph. LIX.

IN-

INSTEAD then, of ſaying *Extenſion* is *long* or *ſhort*; we ſhould ſay (if we would ſpeak ſtrictly and philoſophically) that an *extended Body* is long or ſhort. Inſtead of ſaying, *Extenſion* hath *Parts*; we ſhould ſay, that an *extended Body* hath Parts. When we ſay, that a Man *has Knowledge*, we mean, that a Man *knows*. When we ſay that he *has Piety*, *Charity* &c.; we mean that *he is pious*, *charitable* &c.

I might multiply Inſtances of this Kind; but theſe already mentioned, are ſufficient to ſhew, that Men, by accuſtoming themſelves to ſpeak, and from thence ſometimes to think inaccurately concerning *Ideas* formed by *Abſtraction*, will be apt to run into great Miſtakes: They may, nay they actually have imagined them to be *real Exiſtences*; otherwiſe we ſhould never have ſeen Arguments produced, to prove that *Knowledge* is *Something diſtinct* from the *knowing Man*; that it is Something, which is *in* him; or, that becauſe we uſe *affirmative Expreſſions* concerning it, it muſt therefore be *Something real**. We ſee then, what Miſtakes about abſtract Ideas ariſe from the Force of Sound. For no ſooner are the Expreſſions diveſted of their common Form, but the Ideas are diveſted of their Exiſtence, and reduced to their primitive Non-Entity.

FROM what has been ſaid, I obſerve as follows.

FIRST, that ſince there are two different Acceptations of the Term *Nothing*, which I have above explained †, it ought always to be remembered, that whenever we call SPACE *Nothing*, we call it ſo in the Senſe of *Non-Entity*; and we ſhall find that moſt, if not all your Ob-

* See Third Def. p. 11. † Chap. I. p. 4. &c.

jections

jections to our calling SPACE *Nothing*, are founded upon the *Ambiguity* of that Term.

SECONDLY, from the foregoing Remarks concerning *Abſtraction*, and *Abſtract Ideas*, I obſerve, that the *Modes* of any Being, ſuch as *Extenſion*, *Figure*, *Solidity*, &c. are not any Thing really *diſtinct*, or *different* from the *Being* of which they are ſaid to be *Modes*; but that they are only the *Being it ſelf*, conſidered under *different Ideas*. From whence I argue; that if SPACE be the *real Extenſion* of any *Being*, it muſt be the *real extended Being*.

THIRDLY, I take Notice, that it is no ſolid Objection to SPACE being a mere *Abſtract Idea*, that we can *think*, *conceive*, and *talk* about it, ſince we may do the ſame of all *Abſtract Ideas* whatever.

FOURTHLY, I infer, that it is of no Force to argue, that SPACE muſt be *Something real*, becauſe we uſe *affirmative Expreſſions* concerning it: ſince we may and do uſe ſuch Expreſſions, concerning other *Abſtract Ideas*.

LASTLY, I remark, that *Abſtract Ideas* are ſometimes looked upon as *Realities*: and that this ariſes from conceiving them, *after the manner of Subſtances*, and ſpeaking of them as *real Things*. This cuſtomary Way of ſpeaking is not always to be avoided. We may expreſs ourſelves in ſuch Phraſes, as Uſe has recommended: but then, when we enter into *Metaphyſical* Debates, we muſt not argue from ſuch *Phraſes*, or lay ſo great a Streſs upon *Words*, as to conclude, that the *Ideas* they are uſed to expreſs, muſt therefore be *real Things*. If

we would in Reality be *Searchers after Truth*, we ſhould carefully examine our *Ideas*, and ſtrip them of the *Marks* Men uſe for them; otherwiſe, there muſt be endleſs Diſpute, Wrangling, and Jargon*.

CHAP. III.

Arguments for the Reality of SPACE *Examined, and Objections Anſwered.*

HAVING premiſed in the foregoing Chapters, what I thought neceſſary, in Order to give you a general Light into the Cauſe of thoſe Errors, which you have, during the Courſe of *Three Defences*, unhappily fallen into; proceed we next to conſider diſtinctly what you have advanced, in *Defence* of your two Firſt Pieces, and in Objection to my *Examination* of them.

BUT I muſt firſt beg the Readers Excuſe, if he is not ſo well entertained in the following Pages, as I could wiſh. For I am very ſenſible, that it can be no Pleaſure to him, any more than to me, to be employed in unravelling Sophiſtry, and diſtinguiſhing Ambiguities. But this is what you have made neceſſary, by your Manner of handling the Cauſe you have undertaken; and ſince you are got into ſuch a Road, we are obliged to follow you in Order to bring you back. I have Reaſon to believe, that whoever conſiders this your *Third Defence* attentively, will ſoon be induced to imagine, that you have embarked in a

* See *Locke* H. U. B. 2. c. 13. §. 28.

Cauſe

Cauſe, which you now find to be indefenſible; and, that you have choſen to make Uſe of the weak Defence of Sophiſtry, rather than give up what Dr. *Clarke* has advanced. Thus is the Name and Character of a *Perſon* thought ſufficient to ſupport the moſt ridiculous Hypotheſis; ſo much Reaſon had I to enter my Caveat, againſt any Thing being brought beſides rational Arguments to determine between us; and I ſtill have Reaſon to deſire the ſame: For when I ſee Men perſiſting to defend a Cauſe, for the Support of which they are forced to have Recourſe to ſuch low Artifices; I cannot think it either uncharitable, or unreaſonable to believe; that had Dr. *Clarke* advanced that Two and Two were Six, ſome of his Diſciples would go on in that Method of Calculation.

I would not here be thought, in the leaſt to detract from the Character which that Author has ſo juſtly gained in the learned World: No, far be it from me. Dr. *Clarke* was a Man of very great Abilities: The World hath with Reaſon acknowledged him to be ſuch: But he was ſtill a Man, therefore not infallible: And as the learned Author of the *Remarks* upon his *Expoſition of the Church-Catechiſm* obſerves, "The better he "has performed in ſome Points, the more ne"ceſſary is it, to take Notice where he has de"ſerved Cenſure; leſt Truth and Error, Good "and Bad ſo mingled ſhould be imbibed toge"ther, and one ſhould ſerve to recommend and "ingratiate the other." *

BUT to proceed to the Buſineſs in Hand, Since

* Remarks upon Dr. *Clarke*'s Expoſition of the Church-Catechiſm p. 2. Edit. 3.

we have ſo far gained our Point, as to reduce you to cavilling; all we have now to do in ſuch Places, is to bring you out from thoſe Refuges, and the Buſineſs is done —— That my Charge againſt you of Sophiſtry is neither ill-grounded nor unjuſt, the following Pages will I hope ſufficiently evince.

I muſt beg your Excuſe, for not following you exactly in the Order of your Arguments and Objections: I ſhall take ſuch a Method as will render the Whole more clear and obvious to the Reader. This your *Third Defence* conſiſts of two *Vindications*, one of your *Firſt*, the other of your *Second Defence:* I ſhall not conſider them ſeparately, but throw them into one, and conſider them together.

ARGUMENT I.

YOUR firſt Argument for the Reality of SPACE runs thus *viz.* "Either there is no Difference "between touching and not touching; or elſe "That which is between two Walls, when they "do not touch, is really *Something*. And it ſeems you cannot yet ſee the Fallacy of this Reaſoning. "This [ſay you] is a Disjunction, which ſeems "to me no Way defective. Unleſs therefore he "had proved, either that there wanted another "Branch, or that there is no Difference between "a Negative and an Affirmative, he has not pro-"ved againſt me." *

I imagined, Sir, that you would not any more have inſiſted on this threadbare Argument of the two Walls: But it ſeems you think they have as

* Third Def. p. 2.

yet

yet received no Breach, and that they are ſtrong enough to withſtand all our Battery. You ſtill therefore found your Reaſoning upon them; and ſince it is your Pleaſure, we muſt attend you: But I hope you will be convinced, that your *Disjunction* is *defective*, when you conſider, that you take for granted, the Principle on which it is built. For when you argue, that "either there "is no Difference between touching and not "touching; or elſe That which is between two "Bodies when they do not touch, is really "Something"; I am ſorry, that you either cannot, or will not ſee, that you ſuppoſe without any Manner of Proof, that *the Exiſtence or non-Exiſtence of* Something between *two Bodies is the* Eſſential Difference *of touching and not touching*. This is the Principle which I called in Queſtion before, and I have yet ſeen no Reaſon to alter my Judgment; and as it is certainly not ſelf-evident, it does not appear that your Disjunction built upon it, without any Proof, is concluſive. Every one knows that disjunctive Syllogiſms are inconcluſive, if the Enumeration be not compleat, or, as you allow, if any one *Branch be wanting*. Now Sir, this is the Misfortune of your Argument; there wants a Branch: For had it been compleat, it muſt have ſtood thus — *viz.* "Either "the Difference of touching and not touching, "does *not conſiſt* in the being of *Something between* "— or elſe there is either no Difference between "touching and not touching — or, when two "Bodies do not touch there muſt be Something "between". And now, perhaps, you may ſee that the firſt Branch is wanting in your Argument: which if true will prove that the two other Branches, which are the whole of your Argument,

are

are not concluſive: that is, if the *Difference* &c. does *not conſiſt* in the *being of Something between*; then, there is no Neceſſity that either there muſt be *no Difference* between touching and not touching, or elſe, that when two Bodies do not touch there muſt be *Something between*. That it does not conſiſt in this, and what it does conſiſt in, ſhall be ſhewn in the proper Place. In the mean Time, ſince it is not ſelf-evident that it does conſiſt in This, you ought not to have taken it for granted; ſince it was incumbent upon you to have proved it, before your *Disjunction* (which depends upon the Truth of it, yet nevertheleſs *ſeems to you no Way defective*) could be of any Force. Now to take this Principle for granted, is the very ſame Thing, as to take for granted, that SPACE is Something real: for it is ſuppoſing, that whenever two Bodies do not touch, there muſt always be Something real between them; which, when there is only SPACE between them, is the very Point I deny, and is what I have taxed you with taking for granted. My Charge therefore of begging the Queſtion ſtands in full Force againſt you.

YOU proceed — "But he allows, that *if there* "*was no* SPACE *between them, they would touch*; "and yet nevertheleſs, ſays, that SPACE is *No*"*thing*." *

AND pray where is the Abſurdity of this? I allow, that when all Matter is removed from between two Bodies, and there is likewiſe no SPACE between them, they will touch: *and yet nevertheleſs* I ſay, that if there was SPACE between them, SPACE would be Nothing real. I am not

* Third Def. p. 2.

ſenſible

ſenſible that there is any Thing in this, which contradicts either Reaſon or Truth. But yet, let us ſee what Work you are pleaſed to make with it — By putting the Term *Nothing*, inſtead of SPACE, you would make me aſſert, it ſeems, that if there was *Something* between two Bodies they would touch. — "If this [ſay you] be the "Truth of the Caſe [*i.e.* if SPACE be *Nothing*] "let us put *Nothing* for *Space* in the foregoing "Sentence, and then ſee what Senſe it will make. "*If there was no* Nothing *between them they* "*would touch*; that is, if there was *Something* be- "tween them they would touch; but when "there is any Thing between them, they do not "touch: Therefore they do touch, and do not "touch, at the ſame Time." *

THIS is ſo pretty a jingle of Words, that 'tis Pity they are to ſo little Purpoſe. *If there was no* SPACE *between two Bodies (from between which all other Matter is ſuppoſed away) They would touch:* This is True. *If there was* no Nothing *i. e. if there was* Something *between two Bodies, they would touch:* This is abſurd. The Truth is mine, the Abſurdity is your own; and proceeds from a low Quibble upon the word *Between.*

I allowed, that *if there was no* SPACE *between two Bodies they would touch:* But you ought to have remembered, that I allowed this, in that particular Inſtance of your two Walls, from between which *all other Matter was ſuppoſed away:* For the Objection which you here raiſe, could only be urged againſt One, who ſhould allow, that two Bodies would touch, *if there was no* SPACE *between them*, tho' Matter ſhould, at the

* Third Def. p. 3.

ſame

ſame Time, be ſuppoſed actually *filling up the intermediate Space*: For it is in this Caſe only, that when we ſay, *there is no* SPACE *between them*, it will follow that there is Something *between* them.

FOR although SPACE be *Nothing*, *no Space* be *no Nothing*, and *no Nothing* be *Something*; yet, when I allow, that, if there be *no Space* between two Bodies, *(from whence all Matter is firſt ſuppoſed away)* they will touch; it will not follow, that I by this Means allow, that the two Bodies would touch, if there was *Something between* them. It will only follow, that I allow they would touch, if there was *Something where the* SPACE *was*: and this is true: But then the *Something* here ſignified by *no* SPACE, is only the *Bodies themſelves* which touch, therefore is not *between* the Bodies *i. e.* the Bodies are not between themſelves, which your Argument proves, if it proves any Thing. This Attempt therefore, Sir, to ſhew me guilty of an Abſurdity, ſerves only to diſplay your Skill in Sophiſtry, which you will excuſe me for having unravelled; ſince it is in Order to undeceive ſome of thoſe *great many Perſons*, with whom it might otherwiſe prevail.

HAVING delivered yourſelf of this Quibble, you are pleaſed to *come to Particulars*, and cite from me the following Paſſage. *viz.* "Though "it be neceſſary to two Bodies *touching*, that *No-* "*thing* ſhould be between them, yet it does not "follow that to their *not touching* it is neceſſary "that *Something* ſhould be between them." * This, it ſeems, you are ſurprized at, and is Something too ſtrange for your Belief: You ask, "If the

* Third Def. p. 3.

"latter

" latter Part of this Sentence is true, where is " the Difference between touching and not touch- " ing *? " By this Queſtion it is plain, that you " have all along taken it for granted, that the Exiſtence of Something between two Bodies, is the eſſential Difference of touching and not touching. As this is the Prime Error on which you proceed, it will be proper to ſet you right, by ſhewing you wherein the Difference *&c.* does really conſiſt.

THE Difference of touching and not touching, conſiſts in the Bodies themſelves being, or not being *diſtant*; *i. e.* in their being in a different Situation, or bearing a different Relation of Poſition to each other, without Reſpect to any Thing elſe: And this *Situation*, or *Relation of Poſition*, is not (as you would have us imagine) any real Affection of SPACE, nor does it ariſe from the Exiſtence of SPACE *between*; but it has Reſpect only to the *Bodies themſelves*; to them it is confined, and has nothing to do with any Thing elſe. If you ask, what is being *diſtant*, but having *Something between* them? and what is being *not diſtant*, but having *Nothing between* them? I anſwer, that whoever conſults his own Ideas, will ſoon find, that the Idea of being *diſtant* is not the Idea of *Something between:* and that the Idea of being *not diſtant*, is not the Idea of *Nothing between*. When we have the Idea of Bodies *not diſtant*, the Idea of there being *Nothing between* them will perhaps follow the former Idea in the Mind, not as if they were Ideas of the ſame Thing; but as the latter is a Conſequence of the former. The being of *Nothing between* them is not the

* Third Def. p. 3.

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* Third Def. p. 3.

Cauſe or Reaſon why they are *not diſtant:* nor has it any Thing to do with the Idea of their *not being diſtant:* but their not being diſtant is the Cauſe or Reaſon, why there *can be Nothing between* them. So in the other Caſe; when two Bodies are diſtant, the being of *Something between* them is not the Cauſe or Reaſon of their being *diſtant*; but their being *diſtant*, is the Cauſe or Reaſon, why there *may* be *Something between* them: But then as in this Caſe there may *not* be Something between them; the being, or not being of Something between, is here an *Accident* only of their being diſtant. And therefore, although there is Nothing between two Walls which do not touch, yet it is no Conſequence, that there is no Difference between touching and not touching.

You ask — "Can Nothing conſtitute a Dif-
"ference between two Somethings? according to
"this Author" [you ſay] "it can; becauſe he
"grants that there is a Difference; and ſays alſo,
"that *Space is ſufficient to conſtitute that Diffe-*
"*rence*; and yet SPACE, according to him, is
"Nothing." *

In Anſwer to this, I muſt obſerve, that in ſpeaking on this Subject of SPACE (as of all abſtract Ideas) we uſe Terms and Expreſſions, which are not true in a ſtrict Metaphyſical Senſe. Conceiving them after the Manner of Subſtances, for the Help of the Underſtanding, we are apt to be led into Error: and under the Diſguiſe of Words, and common Forms of Speech, they do as it were by Artifice intrude on our Minds, as real Beings. Since then we may be deceived, and impoſed on, even by ourſelves; it ſhould al-

* Third Def. p. 3.

ways

ways be our Care to guard againſt it; and to diſtinguiſh between Words and Things, Appearances and Realities. Much more ſhould it be our Care not to *argue from ſuch Terms*; or to pretend to defend our Point by *laying a Streſs on ſuch Expreſſions of our Opponents*, when we are conſcious at the ſame Time, that they do not mean them in a ſtrict Metaphyſical Senſe. For there is juſt the ſame Difference, between being deceived ourſelves by a Form of Words, and arguing from ſuch Words of another Perſon, knowing at the ſame Time that he does not mean them in a ſtrict Senſe; as there is between an *Error*, and a *voluntary perſiſting* in it.

IT was neglecting to diſtinguiſh between *Expreſſions* which may be uſed according to the common Way of ſpeaking, and what is *True* in a ſtrict Metaphyſical Senſe, that has led you to urge, that SPACE muſt be Something real, becauſe I happen'd to ſay that it was *ſufficient to conſtitute a Difference*. This is the Sentence you catch Hold on, and imagine that you can prove from hence, that SPACE, even according to me, muſt be Something real: But my Meaning to any unprejudiced Reader, is eaſy and obvious.

IT is indeed, ſtrictly and Metaphyſically ſpeaking, improper to ſay, that SPACE is *ſufficient to conſtitute*, or that SPACE *is between*; But when we ſay that SPACE *is between* Bodies, it is from conceiving it after the Manner of a Subſtance, *i. e.* from conceiving *Nothing* after the Manner of *Something*; and thence affirming Something poſitive of it; whereas all the poſitive Expreſſions are applicable to the Bodies only. Thus it is not SPACE, which *is*, or *exiſts between* the Bodies; but the

Bodies are *diſtant*, and there *is not* any *Matter*, or *any Thing between* them.

When I ſaid therefore, that pure Space is *ſufficient to conſtitute the Difference*; it was ſpoke in Compliance with the common Forms of Speech; not, that I fancied Space any *Thing able*, or *ſufficient to conſtitute*; and the Meaning of that Sentence explained in a Strict Metaphyſical Senſe, is this, *viz.* that the Difference of not touching and touching of two Bodies does not conſiſt in the *Exiſtence* of *Something between* them: it is ſufficient that the *Bodies* are *diſtant*. The *Bodies themſelves* being *diſtant* are *ſufficient to conſtitute* that Difference: which is all I meant by ſaying, that *pure Space*, or pure *Diſtance*, is ſufficient to conſtitute the Difference; without ſuppoſing, as I there add, this pure Space, or pure Diſtance, to be any *Thing exiſting between* the Bodies, but *a mere Void*. It is not therefore Space, or *Diſtance*, or a *mere Void*, that ſtrictly can be ſaid to *conſtitute*; but it is the *Bodies* themſelves, which being *diſtant*, are of themſelves *ſufficient to conſtitute the Difference* between their touching and not touching. From hence then my Meaning is clear, and it is to no Purpoſe for you to argue from inaccurate Expreſſions, unleſs it be to ſupply the Want of ſound Argument, and to prop a falling Cauſe. Many Inſtances might be brought to ſhew, that poſitive Expreſſions do not prove, that What they are uſed about, is *Something real*. What is it that conſtitutes the Difference between a long Body, and a ſhort one? In the common Way of ſpeaking *Length* is ſaid to *conſtitute* this Difference: yet it does not follow, becauſe this poſitive Expreſſion of *conſtituting a Difference* is uſed concerning *Length*, that therefore Length *in*

the

the Abſtract is any *Thing real:* and the Reaſon is, becauſe ſtrictly ſpeaking, it is not *Length*, but the *long Body* which *conſtitutes* the Difference. Thus in our Caſe, *Diſtance*, or SPACE may, in the common Way of ſpeaking, be ſaid to *conſtitute* the Difference; though ſtrictly it is the Bodies themſelves. I own it requires ſome Exactneſs and Care to conceive theſe Things aright. We are too liable to be deceived by the cuſtomary Forms of Expreſſion; we are too apt to *realize* our abſtract Ideas, which is owing to the Forwardneſs of the *Imagination*, in giving Aſſiſtance to the *Intellect*, for the greater Eaſe in conceiving, and Readineſs in talking upon Subjects Abſtracted and Intellectual. For meaſuring Diſtances in *Imagination*, we have Recourſe to *imaginary Subſtrata*, as in *actual* meaſuring we make Uſe of *real* ones. Try the Caſe in other Ideas that are confeſſedly abſtract, and it may aſſiſt you in underſtanding That before us. *Weight* is an abſtract Idea; there is a Difference betwixt a Pound and an Ounce: Now what is it, that ſtrictly ſpeaking *conſtitutes* this Difference? Is it the *Idea* of *Weight?* or the *Bodies themſelves* being more or leſs *weighty*? And thus there is a *Diſtance* between two Bodies: Now what is it that *conſtitutes* this Diſtance? What, but the Bodies themſelves bearing ſuch a Relation of Site to one another. And what has this to do with the Exiſtence, or non-Exiſtence of any Thing between? This ſeems to me to be the Truth of the Caſe, and as to your Cavils at that Expreſſion of *Space being ſufficient to conſtitute the Difference*, without being any Thing real; what I have ſaid is a ſufficient Anſwer. It is "hardly poſſible (as a late Writer well obſerves) "to ſpeak on this Subject of "*Non-Entities*, or *Nothings*, without uſing the

"Terms

" Terms, that repreſent *poſitive Beings*, and *real* " *Properties.*" * But an Argument founded upon mere Terms, and common Expreſſions, can be only uſed when the Diſputant wants a better. I doubt not but you may find many more of my Expreſſions, liable to the ſame Cavils as This before us; and if you think this Sort of Argument will be of any Service to you, you are heartily welcome to make the beſt of it. Our Cauſe, as it requires no ſuch Kind of arguing in its Defence, ſo it fears it not when uſed againſt it: It gathers Strength from ſuch Blows, and ſtands the firmer for ſuch an Oppoſition.

I ſhall now beg leave to take Notice of a Paſſage, which (as it appears to me) if it be not cleared up, will leave your Notions in great Obſcurity. I had obſerved, that you " ſuppoſed the " Difference of touching, and not touching of " two Bodies, to conſiſt merely in the Exiſtence " of *Something real between them* &c. †. This you quote in your *Third Defence*, and make the following Remark upon it. " *Something real* [ſay you] " muſt, I think, either mean a *Subſtance*; " and then we are agreed; for *neither of us ſup-* " *poſe* that there muſt be a *Subſtance between* " *the two Bodies*, when they do not touch, or " that elſe there would be no Difference between " touching and not touching *&c.* **". Here you inſiſt that the Difference does conſiſt in the Exiſtence of *Something* between them: but you ſeem much afraid of the word *real:* you are apprehenſive it may mean a Subſtance; and then it

* Philoſophical Eſſays on Various Subjects. Eſſ. I. Sect. XI. p. 40.

† Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE Examined p. 14, 15.

** Third Def. p. 13.

ſeems,

ſeems, you would not ſay, that the Difference conſiſted in the Exiſtence of *Something real* between them. No; if it means a Subſtance, "we are agreed, [ſay you] "for *neither of us* ſuppoſe, that there muſt be a "*Subſtance* between the two Bodies when they "do not touch." That I do not ſuppoſe ſo, is indeed very true: but that *you* muſt either ſuppoſe ſo, or elſe, that you muſt ſuppoſe nothing at all between 'em, I ſhall make appear.

THE Force of your Remark ſeems to be this; you would urge, that there are ſome Things which are not *Subſtances:* and therefore, although you do not ſuppoſe there muſt be a Subſtance; yet, that you may without any Abſurdity ſay, there is Something. But now, if ſo; I ask, what you call that *Something?* you will anſwer in your uſual Language, a *Mode.* If then you ſay there muſt be *Something*, and yet do not ſuppoſe that there muſt be a *Subſtance*, and *That Something* be a *Mode*; it will follow, that you ſuppoſe there muſt be a *Mode* between them, and yet do not ſuppoſe that there muſt be a *Subſtance*; which is nothing leſs than ſuppoſing, that there may be a *Mode* between them *without a Subſtance*; which, I believe, even you will hardly venture to affirm: and yet, if you do not, you muſt contradict your ſelf. For if there cannot be a Mode between them *without* a Subſtance; then, if there be a Mode at all, I preſume it will follow, that it muſt be *with* a Subſtance; directly contrary to you, who ſay, that there muſt be Something between the two Bodies; (which *Something* you call a *Mode*;) and yet confeſs you do not *ſuppoſe that there muſt be a Subſtance.*

IF therefore you will aſſert, that, when two Bodies do not touch, there muſt be *Something* between

between them; you muſt ſay that there is a *Subſtance*. That there muſt be a *Subſtance*, or *nothing at all*, will appear from conſidering, that by your granting there need not be a *Subſtance*, you grant that there need not be *any Thing at all*. —— For, ſince there cannot be a *Mode* without a *Subſtance*; and ſince you own that there need not be a *Subſtance*; who does not immediately ſee, that you own there need not be a *Mode*? (which yet, at the ſame time you ſay there muſt be; ſtrange Inconſiſtency!) *i. e.* that there need not be either *Subſtance* or *Mode*: and, if there need not be either Subſtance or Mode, and yet *Something*; you muſt be ſo kind, as to oblige the World with the Diſcovery of a new Sort of *Somethings*.

" It is very needful [you tell us] " to put " our Author in Mind of that common and " neceſſary Diviſion or Diſtinction of Things " made Uſe of by *Logicians*, *viz.* into *Genus* " and *Species*; the not conſidering which, ſeems " to be what led him into the Miſtake, which " runs through his whole Book." * Your Author is very much obliged to you for this Piece of Service, and I dare ſay, that no one will preſume to imagine, that your Memory ſhould fail you, during the Courſe of this Work; or that I ſhould be obliged to put you in Mind of this very ſame *common and neceſſary Diſtinction*: However, if the not conſidering This, has led me into any Miſtake, it is to be hoped that the Recollection of it, will by your Aſſiſtance, be able to lead me out again.

* Third Def. p. 4.

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" THE Words *Thing*, *Something*, *Being*, or the " like, are uſed [you are ſo kind to inform us] " to ſignify the *Genus*, or are general and uni- " verſal Terms, comprehending all Things what- " ſoever under them, whether they be Subſtances, " Properties, or Relations *&c.* This *firſt Genus* " comprehended under the Name *Thing*, is divided " into two *Species*, *viz.* Subſtance and Property." * You go on with a great Deal more about *Genus* and *Species*, which is to as little Purpoſe, as it would be for me to repeat it. The Force of it ſeems to be This; that *Subſtance* is only one *Species* of *Things*; and therefore, that although *Space* be not a *Subſtance*, yet it is not improper to call it a *Thing*; becauſe, though it comes not under that *Species* of *Things* called a *Subſtance*; yet it comes under another *Species* of *Things* called a *Property*.—— But you ſhould have remembered alſo, Sir, that *Things* are divided into Things *Real*, and Things *Ideal*. *Things Real* are ſuch as have a *real Exiſtence*: *Things Ideal* are ſuch as have no *real Exiſtence*, but are ony *Ideas* in the Mind.

OUR Diſpute is, whether *Space* be any *Thing Real*; for that it is an *Ideal Thing*, I am very ready to grant. " It is very proper [ſay you] " to call " SPACE *Something*, though it be no Subſtance " *&c.*" † But if no *Things* beſides *Subſtances* are Things *real*, it follows, that SPACE muſt either be a *Subſtance*, or *no Thing real*: Now, that no Things are *Things real*, but *Subſtances*, will eaſily appear. Your own Diviſion of *Things* is into *Subſtance* and *Property*: If a *Property* therefore be no *Thing real*, then no Things but *Subſtances* are *Things real*: Now, a *Property* muſt either be con-

* Third Def. p. 4. † Ibid. p. 6.

ſidered as in the *Abſtract*, or as in a *Subject*: It is plain that a Property in the *Abſtract* is only an *Ideal* Thing, or has no Exiſtence *ad extra*, and that a Property in a Subject, a Subſtance, or Being, is only the Subſtance or Being *it ſelf*, under a particular Conſideration. If therefore it be proper to call SPACE *Something*, though it be no *Subſtance*; it can be only in the Senſe of Something *Ideal*. To what Purpoſe then, is this long Account of *Genus* and *Species* introduced here? For though the Word *Thing* be a *Genus*, under which are contained the two *Species*, *Subſtance* and *Property*; yet 'tis plain that SPACE muſt either be the former, *viz.* a *Subſtance*, or elſe it is no *Thing real*. What have you gained then, Sir, by inſiſting on the Propriety of calling SPACE a *Thing*? Since if it be not a *Subſtance* it may as well be no *Thing* at all; becauſe it is then a Thing in *Idea* only: and if you mean no more than This, as you can prove no more; I am very ready to agree with you, and to own, that in ſuch a Senſe, we can very properly ſay that SPACE is Something: and ſo we can ſay likewiſe of *Whiteneſs* in the *Abſtract*, or any other abſtract Idea whatſoever.

BUT alas! Sir, of what Service is all This to your Queſtion? SPACE muſt not only be a *Thing*, but a Thing *real*; a *Thing* which has Exiſtence *ad extra*, or you loſe your Cauſe: and if it be a Property, and yet Something real, it muſt be more than a Property; it muſt be a Subſtance; otherwiſe, how can it be *between Walls?* can a Property be ſaid to be there, any otherwiſe than as the Subſtance is there? can *Extenſion* be *between* any Thing? If any Thing is really *between*, is it not the *Extended Subſtance?* If SPACE be not Some-

Something more than a Property, how can it be Infinite, Eternal *&c.*? can a *mere Property* be ſo? or muſt it not be the Subſtance, if any Thing? Nay if SPACE be not more than an abſtract Property, how can it *be* at all? The Reaſon why I concluded that SPACE muſt be a Subſtance, if any Thing, was becauſe I could not but take it for granted, that when you called it *Something*, you meant *Something real*; which if you do, I have ſhewn that I rightly concluded from your calling it *Something*, that it was a *Subſtance:* and if you do not mean Something *real*, then your Argument that "it may be *Something* yet not a *Sub-*"*ſtance*, is nothing to the Purpoſe.

BUT I may add, that the Diſpute about the Propriety of calling the *Properties* or *Modes* of any particular Being *Somethings real*, when conſidered in any other View, than as the *Being it ſelf* under a certain *Modification*, can be of no Service to the main Queſtion. For you contend that *Space* is *Something*, becauſe it is a Property of ſome Subſtance; but now ſuppoſing that Properties, conſidered *merely as ſuch*, are *Somethings real*; yet this conduces nothing towards proving that SPACE is *Something real*, 'till SPACE is proved to be a *real Property* of ſome Being. When you have done this Sir, then, and not till then, you will have done the Buſineſs; and I ſhall not any longer contend, whether *Properties* are *Things real* or not. Prove SPACE to be a *real Property*, the Property, the *Extenſion* (as you affirm it to be) of the *Self-exiſtent and Eternal Being*! and I will then allow it to be *Something* in what Senſe you pleaſe.

IT ſhould here be obſerved, that whenever I ſay that *Things real* muſt be *Subſtances*, I do not mean thereby, any unknown *Subſtratum:* This is

not the Diſpute here. But by *Subſtance*, I mean only ſome Thing which has Exiſtence *ad extra*, or ſome *Being*. We know not the *Subſtratum* of *Matter*; nay it is ſtill a Queſtion among Philoſophers whether there be any ſuch Thing or not: Yet we all agree, that *Matter* is a *Subſtance*. When I ſay therefore that *Things real* muſt be *Subſtances*; and that SPACE, if it be any *Thing real*, muſt be a *Subſtance*; by *Subſtance* here is only meant Something that has Exiſtence *ad extra*, which a *Property* or *Mode*, merely as ſuch, hath not.

I had uſed an Argument, the Sum of which was this *viz.* That if two Bodies which are ſuppoſed to be diſtant, be ſo increaſed as to touch one another; then, if the Space was Something really exiſting betwen them before, it muſt either now be annihilated, or removed, or elſe muſt exiſt between them ſtill: That it is annihilated, or removed, you will not ſay; it muſt therefore exiſt between them ſtill; ſo that two Bodies touch, and yet there is SPACE between them, *i. e.* they do touch, and do not touch at the ſame Time*. To this you anſwer, "That the SPACE that was "between the Bodies before they touched, is now, "when they do touch, neither removed from be"tween them, nor annihilated; neither is it be"tween the two Bodies ſtill; but it is juſt where "it was." † Now this to me is a very extraordinary Sentence! For, if SPACE was any Thing *exiſting between* the Bodies before they touched; and the Bodies have been increaſed in a direct Line to each other, till they touched; and this *Thing* which *exiſted between* them before, and was

* Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE Examined p. 8, 9.

† Third Def. p. 8.

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the Reaſon why they did not touch, is now when they do touch, neither annihilated, nor removed; I think it neceſſarily follows, that it muſt, if it had any *real Exiſtence*, exiſt between them ſtill. To tell us, that it is *neither removed, nor annihilated, neither is it between the two Bodies ſtill, but it is juſt where it was*; is the ſame as to ſay, that the *Thing*, which *exiſted between* the Bodies before, is now not ſuppoſed to be annihilated, and yet (tho' the Bodies are increaſed in a direct Line) is not removed from between them; and yet is not between them; but yet is juſt where it was; which ſeems to carry an Air of Legerdemain with it, and to be Something like telling us, that it is here; and it is not here; and yet — High paſs! — it is juſt where it was before. But however you have been ſo kind as to let us into this Secret, by acquainting us, that it is *penetrated by the Increaſe of the Bodies* *; ſo that, tho' it was between 'em before, and is now neither removed nor annihilated, yet it is not between the two Bodies ſtill, "but it is juſt where "it was; only with this Difference, that, as it "was before between the Bodies, it is now pene-"trated by the Increaſe of the Bodies †."

To explain this, you inſtance as follows, "Let "there be two Bodies each of them a Yard Cube, "and let them be placed at a Yard Diſtance from "each other; and let us alſo ſuppoſe all Matter "to be taken from between them; that is, let "us ſuproſe a cubic Yard of empty SPACE be-"tween them. If theſe two Bodies be crouded "together, ſo as that their two Superficies fa-"cing each other touch, and any Perſon ſhould

* Third Def. p. 8. † Ibid.

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" ask what was become of the cubic Yard of " SPACE that was between them; I would an- " ſwer, that it was neither removed, nor anni- " hilated, but that it is now where the two in- " ternal half cubic Yards of the Bodies are; and " that, as before the Removal of the two Bodies, " the SPACE was between them, that is, between " the internal Superficies of each Body; it is " not now between the two whole Bodies, but " only between the two external half-cubic Yards, " and penetrated by the two internal half-cubic " Yards of the Bodies *.

To This I reply as follows.

FIRST I preſume, that when you ſay the Space is penetrated by the two half-cubic Yards of the Bodies, you mean, that every Part of the SPACE (to ſpeak in your Language) is penetrated by every Part of the two half-cubic Yards of the Bodies; or, that this cubic Yard of SPACE which was between the Bodies is, when the Bodies touch, ſo diffuſed throughout the two half-cubic Yards of the Bodies, that wherever there is *Body*, there is SPACE. This, I think, muſt be your Meaning; becauſe, if there be any Point of theſe two half-cubic Yards of Body, where there is not SPACE, then the SPACE cannot be *juſt where it was*. Now, if this is your Meaning, it is blending *Body* and SPACE together in ſuch a Manner, as to make them be One and the Same: For, if there is no one *Point* of the *Bodies*, where there is not *Space*; and no one *Point* of the *Space*, where there is not *Body*; I doubt it will be difficult to diſtinguiſh One from the Other; or to tell us, whether this cubic Yard be *Body* or *Space*; that is,

* Third Def. p. 8, 9.

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in plain Engliſh, you run into Confuſion and Abſurdity.

SECONDLY, ſince no Point of *Matter*, in this Inſtance, can be aſſigned, where there is not *Space*; if we take that *Point* where theſe Bodies touch, ſince that Point is *Matter*, it will follow that there is *Space* at the very Point where they touch: And I doubt you will have need of ſome very nice Diſtinction, to ſhew how there may be SPACE at the very *Point* where they touch; without ſhewing at the ſame Time, either that there is SPACE *between* them, or that That *Point* is *Space*. If there is SPACE *between* them, then the Abſurdity I before charged you with follows cloſe, *viz.* that the Bodies do touch and do not touch at the ſame Time: If you ſay, that That *Point* where they touch, is *Space*; then, ſince it is pretty evident that it is *Matter*, it is as evident that it muſt be both *Matter* and *Space*: and if ſo, I would deſire to be informed whether it is *Space* or *Matter* which touches.

——— *Dignus Vindice Nodus.*

THE Reaſon why you imagine, that the SPACE, which was ſuppoſed to exiſt between the Bodies before they touched is now, when they do touch, neither annihilated nor removed, but exiſts juſt where it was, ſeems to me to be This; you conceive SPACE to be Something exiſting between the Bodies at firſt; and when they touch, you find you cannot ſuppoſe SPACE to be annihilated or removed, and thence you conclude, that it muſt be juſt where it was. But if you would conſider what I take to be the Reaſon, why you cannot ſuppoſe it either annihilated or removed; That will ſhew you the Reaſon, why it does not therefore follow, that it muſt exiſt there ſtill;

viz.

viz. Becauſe it is not any Thing exiſting at all. In ſhort, the Idea of SPACE, and of its *actual Exiſtence*, is ſo fixed in your Mind, that (as you ſay in your *Second Defence*) you *can by no means get rid of it* *: and therefore, becauſe the *Idea* of ſuch actual Exiſtence remains; you conclude that SPACE muſt remain, and actually *exiſt*, where you had an Idea of its actual Exiſtence before, even tho' there be Matter: But if every one may conclude, that All thoſe *Ideas* which he ſhall chance not to be able *to get rid of*, muſt therefore have *real Archetypes*; every *Creature of the Brain* may have a real Exiſtence in Nature.

HAVING ſhewn the Abſurdity which followed from your ſuppoſing SPACE to be *Something really exiſting between* the Bodies, I proceeded to obſerve, that "from our ſuppoſing SPACE to be "Nothing but the Abſence of Matter, no ſuch "Abſurdities would follow; for when two Bo-"dies do not touch, and there is only SPACE be-"tween them, we ſay there is nothing between "them —— Let their Extremities be extended "'till they touch, and there is ſtill, we ſay, no-"thing between them." †

YOU tell us that, if we conſider this Paſſage, we ſhall ſee that what I before applied to you, of proving that there is no Difference between touching and not touching, "may be much more juſtly turned upon my ſelf**. To ſupport this Accuſation you argue as follows "If SPACE is "really Nothing, then Nothing may be SPACE. "I hope the Author will not deny This: If

* Second Def. p. 6.

† Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE Eyamined p. 10.

** See Third Def. p. 9.

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" then Nothing be SPACE, I beg leave to repeat " the preceeding Paſſage of this Author, and put " the Word SPACE inſtead of the Word Nothing; " for he allows, that all we can affirm of SPACE, " we may affirm of Nothing; and therefore What " we can affirm of Nothing, we may affirm of " SPACE. Let us then try the Paſſage in that " Manner, and ſee what it will prove. *When two* " *Bodies do not touch, and there is only* Nothing " *between them, we ſay there is* SPACE *between* " *them.* —— *Let their Extremities be extended* " *'till they touch, and there is ſtill, we ſay,* SPACE " *between them.* That is, when the two Bodies " do touch, there is SPACE between them; and " when they do not touch, there is alſo SPACE " between them: where therefore can the Diffe- " rence be between touching, and not touching? " and will it not alſo follow, that they do touch, " and do not touch, at the ſame Time?*"

WHERE the Difference lies, between the touching of two Bodies, tho' in both Caſes there be Nothing between them, I have elſewhere ſhewn†. And it will appear preſently, that you have here failed in your Endeavours to prove it a Conſequence from What I have ſaid, that there is SPACE in both Caſes between them; and that the Bodies touch, and do not touch at the ſame Time. For pray, good Sir, from whence do you derive this Licence of putting one Word for another, juſt as your Fancy leads you? one would imagine, you thought that Words were like the *Sybil*'s Leaves, which might be blown about, and changed with every Breath. The Fallacy to be detected lies in the latter Part of your Argument. My

* Third Def. p. 9, 10. † See p. 25.

Expreſſion was This *viz.* "Let their Extremi-
"ties be extended 'till they touch, and there is
"ſtill we ſay Nothing between them." This Sentence, changing the word *Nothing* into *Space*, you thus repeat *viz.* "Let their Extremities be
"extended till they touch, and there is ſtill, we
"ſay, SPACE between them." Now to this Twiſt of Words, I anſwer that although when two Bodies touch, there is Nothing between them, yet it does not follow, that becauſe *Space* is *Nothing*, therefore there muſt be SPACE between them: For, when it is ſaid, that there is Nothing between two Bodies which touch; the Term *Nothing* is uſed in one Senſe; and when SPACE is ſaid to be *Nothing*, it is uſed in another. When we ſay that SPACE is Nothing, it is uſed in that Senſe which excludes only Things *Real:* But when it is ſaid, that there is Nothing between two Bodies which touch, it is to be underſtood in that Senſe which excludes, not only all *Real* Things, but all *Ideal* Things, or all *Ideas* of any Thing as *between*. The meaning therefore of this Expreſſion is, that there is not any Thing *Real* or *Ideal* between them; *i. e.* There is no *Real Exiſtence* between them, neither have we that *Idea* which repreſents *Diſtance* or SPACE, as between them. The Term *Nothing*, when underſtood in the Senſe we here uſe it does, you ſee, by being a Negation of all *Ideal*, as well as *Real* Exiſtences, exclude SPACE, which is an *Ideal* Exiſtence, from being, as we ſay, between the Bodies which touch.

IT appears then, that to ſay *there is* Nothing *between two Bodies when they touch, therefore, ſince* SPACE *is* Nothing, *there is* SPACE *between them*; is the ſame as to urge, that becauſe SPACE is *Nothing*,

thing, in that Senſe which is only a Negation of Things *Real*; therefore when there is Nothing between two Bodies, in that Senſe which is a Negation of all *Ideal* Things (and therefore of SPACE among the reſt) as well as of all *Real* Things, there is therefore SPACE between them; which is confounding theſe two different Acceptations of the Term *Nothing* together, in ſuch a manner as to deſtroy the Uſe of Language, which I ſuppoſe was deſigned to make Men underſtand one another; and is arguing in ſo many Words, that becauſe there is Nothing between two Bodies in that Senſe which excludes Things *both Real and Ideal*; therefore (obſerve the Conſequence!) there is Nothing between them in that Senſe which excludes *only Things Real*; i. e. becauſe there *is not any Thing Real or Ideal* between them, therefore there *is Something Ideal* between them; there *is* Something Ideal between them, becauſe there is *not* Something Ideal between them. — This is your Argument, and a curious One it is! But I believe it will hardly be thought ſufficient to ſhew, that it follows from any Thing I had ſaid, that there is SPACE in both Caſes (*viz.* when they touch and do not touch) between the Bodies; or, that the Bodies touch, and do not touch at the ſame Time; but that you have been amuſing your Readers, by playing upon the Ambiguity of a Word.

IF you underſtand the Term Nothing in this Place, in the Senſe I here uſe it *viz.* as a Negation of Things *both Real and Ideal*; your Argument has no Manner of Force. If you underſtand it in that Senſe in which I do not here uſe it, *viz.* as a Negation of Things *Real only* (which is the Senſe I uſe it in when there is

SPACE between the Bodies) then you are not objecting to me, but to Somebody elſe, who, like the SPACE you are treating of, is Ideal only.

IN ſhort, the whole Myſtery of the Inſtance above is This: When two Bodies do not touch, and there is only SPACE between them, we ſay there is Nothing between them; becauſe there is not any Thing really exiſting between them; yet the Bodies being *diſtant*, give us the Idea of Diſtance or SPACE as between them; but ſtill, as Diſtance and SPACE, according to my Apprehenſion, are only *Ideas* which have no *Archetypes ad extra*; ſo we ſay, that although we have the Idea of Diſtance or SPACE, as between them; yet there is Nothing or *No-Thing Real* between them. Now when the Bodies do touch, we ſtill ſay there is Nothing between them; but then, the Bodies not being *diſtant*, we have not, as we had before, the *Idea* of Diſtance, or of SPACE: So that in the former Caſe, there is Nothing between them, but then we had the *Idea* of Diſtance or SPACE: in the latter Caſe there is Nothing between them, but then we have not the *Idea* of Diſtance or of SPACE.—To ſay then that there is Nothing between two Bodies when they touch, therefore there is SPACE, or there is Diſtance, becauſe SPACE and Diſtance are Nothing; is to ſay that becauſe there is Nothing between them, therefore we muſt have the *Idea* of their being *diſtant*, becauſe *Diſtance* in the *Abſtract* is Nothing.

BUT you may farther conſider that the Term *Nothing* conſiſts of two Words, and that it is truly a Negation every one knows who underſtands Engliſh; and it is therefore alſo as evident, that

when

when we ſay SPACE is *No-Thing*, we mean, that SPACE is *not a Thing:* Inſtead then of ſaying as you do, that "if SPACE is Nothing then Nothing "is SPACE"; Let us, to render the Propoſition true and intelligible, repeat it thus *viz.* "If "SPACE is not a Thing, then a Thing is not "SPACE": Now we are got at the Truth, but it is ſuch Truth, as utterly deſtroys your Argument, and lays open the Fallacy of it. For will it follow, that becauſe SPACE *is not a Thing*, or becauſe a *Thing is not Space*, will it therefore follow, I ſay, when there *is not a Thing* between two Bodies which touch, that there muſt be SPACE between them? No: The Reader ſees your Argument depends upon its Obſcurity, and when brought into the Light, its Fallacy is glaring: when ſtripp'd of its ambiguous Phraſe, and reduced to plain Senſe, every one ſees that it has not the leaſt Appearance of Force in it. When you ſay that, *If Nothing is Space, then if there is Nothing between two Bodies which touch, there is Space*; the Fallacy in this Sentence, may not perhaps ſo plainly appear; but explain it, and ſay that *If a Thing* is not *Space, then, if there* is not a Thing between *two Bodies which touch, there muſt be Space*; reduce it thus to its proper Meaning, and every one muſt ſee, that there is no Manner of Conſequence, or Connection in the Propoſition.

YOU ſay that, "If the Words [*Space* and *No-*"*thing*] cannot be ſo altered, then it is moſt ma-"nifeſt, that SPACE cannot poſſibly be Nothing, "that is, it muſt certainly be Something." * It is moſt manifeſt, that this Paſſage is Nothing to the Purpoſe. SPACE is not Nothing, in that Senſe

* Third Def. p. 10.

which

which excludes Things *both Real and Ideal*, but what then? does it follow that it cannot be Nothing in that Senſe which excludes *only Things Real?* Is it a Conſequence, that becauſe it is not Nothing, in a Senſe which *denies* it to be any Thing *Ideal*, therefore it cannot be Nothing, in a Senſe which yet *allows* it to be a Thing *Ideal?* Therefore when you argue, that SPACE muſt be *Something*, if it be *not Nothing*; as we only allow it to be *not Nothing*, in that Senſe of the Word, which excludes it from being any Thing *either Real or Ideal*; it can only be ſaid, that SPACE is Something, becauſe it is not Nothing in that Senſe of the Term juſt mentioned: But then as *Something* is diſtinguiſhed into *Real* and *Ideal*, it cannot be ſaid, that becauſe SPACE is not Nothing in that Senſe which excludes it from being any Thing either Real or Ideal, therefore it is Something *Real:* No; becauſe it may be, as it is, Something *Ideal:* and therefore to ſay, that SPACE *muſt certainly be Something* becauſe it is *not Nothing*, as you do in the abovecited Paſſage, will do you no Service; unleſs that Argument would prove it to be Something *Real*; *i. e.* Something which has an Exiſtence *ad extra*; which that it will not, I hope I have ſufficiently ſhewn.

YOU argue, that if SPACE be not Nothing, it muſt be Something; or, that I muſt have "found "out a Thing that is between Something and "Nothing, which exiſts, but does not really exiſt, "which ſeems [ſay you] to be his Notion of "SPACE." *

To ſay that SPACE is *Something Ideal*, is not to find out a Thing between Something and No-

* See Third Def. p. 10, 11.

thing

thing: It is only diſtinguiſhing *Things* into *Real* and *Ideal*; a Diſtinction which you have made neceſſary, by calling Modes, Relations in the *Abſtract*, and all abſtract Ideas, *Things*.

MY Notion of SPACE therefore is not, that it is a Thing between Something and Nothing, which exiſts, but does not really exiſt: No; but that it is a mere abſtract Idea: an Idea which my Mind has formed, from conſidering Extenſion in the General: but as Extenſion in the General is an Idea of pure Intellect, my Imagination therefore ſupplies this Idea with an Imaginary Subſtratum, for the Help of the Underſtanding, as has been before explained. My Mind, by this Means, repreſents SPACE to me as a *Thing*: but, ſince this *Thing* is only my own *Idea*, and has no *objective Reality*, I therefore call it an *Ideal Thing*.

"IF he will tell me [ſay you] what Sort of "a Thing that is, which is neither Something "nor Nothing, and can ſhew me the Difference "between the real and not real Exiſtence, of that "which has ſome Exiſtence; I ſhall be very ready "to give up the whole Diſpute." *

IT is not ſo very difficult, to ſhew the difference, between the *real* and *not real* Exiſtence of that, which has (according to the cuſtomary Way of ſpeaking) ſome Exiſtence. SPACE, if we would ſpeak ſtrictly, has no Exiſtence at all. But as Properties, Relations, and all abſtract Ideas, are in common Speech ſaid to exiſt in the Mind; ſo SPACE is ſaid to have an *Ideal* Exiſtence, in Contradiſtinction to thoſe Things which have an Exiſtence *ad extra*. The Difference therefore, between the *real* and *not real* Exiſtence, of that

* Third Def. p. 11.

which

which has ſome Exiſtence, is this; *viz.* a Thing is ſaid to have *real Exiſtence*, when it exiſts *ad extra*; and not to have *real Exiſtence*, and yet *ſome* Exiſtence, when it exiſts only in the Mind.

THE Queſtion between us is whether SPACE has *real* Exiſtence. Now I conceive that *real Exiſtence* can only be applied to What exiſts *ad extra*. The Diſpute then turns upon This *viz.* whether SPACE exiſts *ad extra:* Your Anſwer would be, I preſume, that *Modes* exiſt *ad extra*; SPACE is a *Mode*; and therefore SPACE exiſts *ad extra*. To which I reply

FIRST, That *Modes* do not exiſt *ad extra*, under any other Conſideration, than that of a *modified Subſtance*, and are Nothing but the *Subſtance:* But you grant that SPACE is not a modified Subſtance; and conſequently, SPACE does not exiſt *ad extra: Ergo*, if *real Exiſtence* be Exiſtence *ad extra*, it has no *real Exiſtence*, by your own Confeſſion. — Secondly, ſuppoſing, but not granting, that *Modes* exiſt *ad extra*, conſidered *as Modes*; yet, till SPACE is proved to be a *Mode*, which is a Point that ſhall be conſidered in due Time, you will not have proved, that SPACE exiſts *ad extra*, even upon ſuch a Suppoſition.

YOU proceed as follows — "I ſaid in my firſt "Defence, when I aſſerted SPACE to be Some-"thing, that *I would not be underſtood by Thing, "to mean a Subſtance* &c. I doubt then, anſwers "he, he will find it pretty difficult to be under-"ſtood at all; for if it be a *Thing exiſting* and yet "not a *Subſtance*, then it is a Thing that is nei-"ther *Body* nor *Spirit* &c. I need not trouble "the Reader with any more of this Page. It "ſeems very odd, that any Perſon ſhould try to

"exclude

"exclude *Properties*, from coming under the *Ge-*
"*nus* comprehended in the Word *Thing**.

IT ſeems very odd, that you ſhould imagine this Sort of Reaſoning would do you any Service: For, in the firſt Place, I do not exclude *Properties* from coming under the *Genus* comprehended in the Word *Thing:* But then I ſay, that in the *Abſtract* they come under that *Genus*, only as *Ideal Things*; and in the *Subject* are *Real* Things, in no other Senſe, than as they are the *Subject it ſelf*, under ſuch, or ſuch a Conſideration. If therefore by *Thing* you mean a *mere Property*, or a Property in the *Abſtract*; then I may readily grant SPACE to be a *Thing:* but then you are but juſt where you ſet out; for, ſince it does not follow from this Argument, that SPACE is a *Real* Thing, or that it hath Exiſtence *ad extra*, you have been talking in vain. But if you mean that it is a Property *in ſome Subject*; then indeed it will be a *Real Thing*; but yet in no other Senſe, than as it is the *Subject it ſelf* under ſuch a Conſideration. The Reaſon therefore why I ſaid that SPACE, if it was a Thing, muſt either be Body or Spirit, was, becauſe I imagined you intended to prove it to be a *Real Thing*, *i. e.* to have Exiſtence *ad extra:* And if it be a *Real Thing*; then, for the Reaſons juſt given, my Argument was ſound and concluſive; and I ſtill repeat, that it muſt be either Body or Spirit: and therefore I fancy, that the Reaſon why you did not *trouble the Reader with any more of* the following Pages was, becauſe it might have *troubled* you to anſwer them.

* Third Def. p. 11.

SECONDLY, ſuppoſing *Properties* to come under the *Genus* comprehended in the Word *Thing*, in any Senſe you pleaſe; ſuppoſe 'em to be *Real* Things; yet you have done Nothing, unleſs you had proved that *Space* is a *Property*. When you have evinced This, I will grant SPACE to be a *Thing* in any Senſe you ſhall chuſe: Nay, I now grant it to be a *Thing*, if *abſtract Ideas* are *Things*. But what will follow from hence? will it follow, that SPACE is a *real Property of any Being*, or that SPACE is a Property of the *Almighty?* I confeſs this is a Concluſion too abſtruſe for my narrow Underſtanding to comprehend; and, if this does not follow, what have you gained by your *Ambages Verborum*, your *Genus* and your *Species*, ſince you are ne'er the nearer having proved what you contend for?

YOU go on — "would any one ſay, that be-
"cauſe Knowledge is not a Subſtance, it is there-
"fore Nothing" — and a little farther — "I dare
"ſay that this Author will not allow Knowledge
"to be either Body or Spirit, and yet it muſt
"certainly be Something." * To This I anſwer, that, if by *Something*, you mean That which has Exiſtence, in the more true and ſtrict Senſe of the Word, *i. e.* Exiſtence *ad extra*, then I deny Knowledge to be Some-Thing: But, if you mean by it only, Something *Ideal*, in which Senſe *Whiteneſs*, *Extenſion*, and all other *abſtract Ideas* are called *Somethings*, then I grant *Knowledge* to be *Something*.

YOU ask — "If Knowledge is really Nothing,
"where is the Difference between a Wiſe and an
"Ignorant Man, when by the Suppoſition, there

* Third Def. p. 11, 12.

"is

"is Nothing more in the One than in the Other."* This is fallacious: But however, to ſatisfy you, Sir, the Difference between a Wiſe and an Ignorant Man is, that the Wiſe Man knows, what the Ignorant Man does not: yet Knowledge and Ignorance in the *Abſtract* are Nothing but *abſtract Ideas*; and the Difference is, to ſpeak properly, conſtituted only by the Men themſelves; one of whom *Knows*, whilſt the other is *Ignorant*.

IF Knowledge be Nothing, then you urge, that *by the Suppoſition, there is Nothing more in the One than in the Other*. When we ſay that *Knowledge* is *Nothing*, we mean, that *Knowledge* conſidered *abſtractedly*, is *No-Thing really exiſting*: and therefore, it only follows, that by the Suppoſition, there is *NoThing really exiſting*, more in the One, than in the Other: And This is true. For do you imagine, that Knowledge is a *Thing really exiſting within* a Man? If you do, I can't help it: But all that I underſtand by Knowledge being in a Man, is, that a Man *Knows*. Thus *Length*, conſidered merely as *Length*, or in the *Abſtract*, is no *real Thing*: and it is as true, that *Length* is not any *real Thing exiſting in* a long Body, any more than it is in a ſhort one. But does it follow, that becauſe *Length* in the *abſtract*, is Nothing *real*, nor any *Thing exiſting in* a Body, therefore there is no Difference between a long Body and a ſhort one? The Caſe here is the ſame, as in your Inſtance of the Wiſe and the Ignorant Man; *Length* and *Knowledge*, are not *Things exiſting within* the *Body*, or *within* the *Man*: *Knowledge* is not one Thing, and the *Man* another; or *Length*

* Third Def. p. 11.

one Thing, and the *Body* another; But the *Man*, and the *Body*, are the only *real Things*; and *Knowledge* and *Length* are only *Ideas* formed by *Abſtraction:* Tho' *Length* and *Knowledge* therefore are Nothing, nor can be properly ſaid to exiſt *in* thoſe Things which are called their Subjects; yet it does not follow, that there is no Difference between a long Body and a ſhort one, a wiſe and an ignorant Man. There is Nothing, 'tis true, *in* one more than *in* the other: but then, one happens to be Long, and the other Short; one to be Wiſe, and the other Ignorant: Here is the Difference, which is not conſtituted by any *Thing within* 'em, but by *Themſelves.* —— I wiſh, Sir, you had *known* here, as well as in your Preface, *that Quibbles and Wrangling upon Words are endleſs:* For it no more follows, that *Knowledge* muſt be *Something real*, becauſe we commonly ſay, that there is Knowledge in Men; than that *Difference* muſt be *Something real*, becauſe we ſay there is Difference in Men.

But you proceed — "were it Nothing, we "could truly deny every Thing of it, and then "there could be no Difference between a Perſons "having, or not having it." *

When we ſay, that a Man *has Knowledge*, we mean only that he *Knows:* not, that *Knowledge* is any Thing really exiſting, which he actually *has*, and *poſſeſſes*, as he *has*, and *poſſeſſes* his *Eſtate.* We ſay a Man *has* Knowledge, as we ſay a Man *has* Sobriety; that is, that he is *Sober*; not that *Sobriety* is any Thing *of it ſelf* diſtinct from the *Man*, which He can be ſaid to *have:* No; *Sobriety* is not one Thing real, and the *Man* ano-

* Third Def. p. 12.

ther;

ther; but it is either a *mere abſtract Idea*, or elſe the *Sober Man himſelf*.

BUT does it follow that, becauſe *Sobriety* is not any Thing diſtinct by it ſelf, and cannot be *had* by any Man, as He *has* his *Bottle*, therefore that there is no Difference between a Sober Man and a Drunkard? No ſober Man, I am ſure, can think ſo; and yet unleſs you had proved this, you have not proved what you aim at, namely, that if Knowledge be not *Something* of it ſelf, there is no Difference between a Wiſe and an Ignorant Man.

BUT you tell me, "There is no Way to eſcape "this Rock without ſailing between Something "and Nothing." * ——If ſo, I muſt beg the favour of you, Sir, to be my Pilot! for this is a Courſe you are well acquainted with; and which I am afraid you muſt often yet Steer, before we have done with SPACE. But I cannot eſcape this Rock, it ſeems, "without imagining that "Knowledge may be Nothing, and yet that "Something may be affirmed of it *&c.*" † This is the *Charibdis* to your *Scylla*; but I hope I ſhall eſcape 'em both. For there is no Neceſſity, that if Knowledge in the *abſtract* be Nothing, therefore there muſt either be no Difference between a Wiſe and an Ignorant Man; or elſe, that I muſt imagine Knowledge to be Nothing, and yet that Something may be affirmed of it: There is no Neceſſity for either of theſe, I ſay; for though Knowledge in the *abſtract* is Nothing; yet a Wiſe Man differs from an Ignorant Man, in that he *Knows*, whilſt the Ignorant Man *does not*: and yet this is not to imagine that Knowledge is No-

* Third Def. p. 12. † Ibid.

thing

thing, and yet that Something may be affirmed of it: For I do not affirm any Thing of Knowledge as a *real Thing*; but, as we ought to do, of the *Knowing Man* only. It is not Knowledge which the Man *has in* him, that makes him differ from the Ignorant Man; but it is *He himſelf* which conſtitutes the Difference. There is no Neceſſity therefore, to Sail between theſe two Difficulties, when (to uſe your Words) *I can ſo eaſily go wide of them both.*

You Remark — "The Gentleman, I think, had "no Reaſon to be ſo deſirous to be told, what SPACE "is, ſuppoſing it to be neither Body nor Spirit: "I had often enough ſaid in my firſt Defence, "that it was a Property." * Now, in my Opinion, the Gentleman had very good Reaſon to be ſo deſirous of knowing, what that ſtrange Kind of a Thing could be, which was neither *Body* nor *Spirit*, and yet was a *real Exiſtence:* For, tho' it is true, you had often enough *ſaid* in your *Firſt Defence*, that it was a *Property*; yet it happened, that you never *proved* it: And therefore, if you had *ſaid* it ten Times oftner than you did, the Gentleman would ſtill have had the ſame Reaſon, to have made farther Enquiries about it. Beſides, had you proved it to have been a *Property*, it muſt then have been either *Body* or *Spirit*, or elſe a Property in the *Abſtract* only; to ſay therefore, that SPACE is neither Body nor Spirit, *but* a Property, is indeed, as you ſay, *going wide of 'em both*; but then it is running directly upon a Property in the *Abſtract*.

I had ſaid that, "Although when two Bo-"dies touch, and when they do not touch (if

* Third Def. p. 12.

"all

" all Matter be removed from between) there is " in both Caſes Nothing between them; yet it " does not follow, that there is no Difference be- " tween touching and not touching: That they " do not differ in this Reſpect, is very true, but " they do differ in there being SPACE between " them: Yet it will not follow that SPACE muſt " be Something *really exiſting.*" * To this you reply — " I confeſs I do not clearly underſtand " this Paſſage: He ſeems to own that there is a " Difference in there being or not being SPACE " between the two Bodies; and yet ſays that it " does not therefore follow that SPACE is any " Thing. I ſhould be very glad to ſee what " the Difference is, if that which Cauſes the " Difference be Nothing." †

As to your *not clearly underſtanding this Paſſage*, it is none of my Fault: I think it is clear enough for any Body to underſtand, but thoſe whoſe Intereſt it is not to underſtand it. *I own that there is a Difference in there being or not being Space between the two Bodies*; i. e. I own that there is a Difference in there being, or not being *Diſtance* between the two Bodies, or in the Bodies being *diſtant*, without any Matter between them; and yet I ſay, *that it does not therefore follow, that Space is any Thing*; i. e. it does not therefore follow, that *Diſtance* is any Thing. You *ſhould be very glad to ſee*, you ſay, *what the Difference is, if that which cauſes the Difference be Nothing*: but that which cauſes the Difference is not Nothing; for it is not *Space*, or *Diſtance*, which cauſes the Difference, but the Bodies themſelves.

* Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE Examined p. 15.

† Third Def. p. 14.

" THE

"THE Difference [you ſay] between us ſeems "now to be brought to a very narrow Compaſs, "and is no more than This: whether it does "not follow, from their being a Difference be-"between touching, and not touching, as he grants "there is; that when two Bodies do not touch, "there muſt be Something between them." * It ſeems then, you have but juſt now found out where the Pinch of the Queſtion lay; and, that you have been all along ſuppoſing the *main Point*, without knowing any thing at all of the Matter: But I am glad you ſee it at laſt; for, I perceive you now begin to be ſenſible, that the Reaſon why you imagined, that when two Bodies did not touch, there muſt be Something between them, was, becauſe you thought it ſelf-evident, that the Difference of touching and not touching, conſiſted in the Exiſtence or non-Exiſtence of *Something between:* but this is ſo far from being ſelf-evident, that it is manifeſtly falſe: yet this is the Principle on which your whole *Demonſtration* is founded; and 'tis to this we owe ſuch a curious Chain of Reaſoning.

BUT ſurely, Sir, now you have found out where the Difference lies between us, and have brought it to ſo *narrow a Compaſs*; we might reaſonably have expected, that you ſhould have endeavoured to give us ſome Proof, of what you had before taken for granted; and have ſhewn us, how it followed, from there being a *Difference* between touching and not touching, that when two Bodies do not touch there muſt be *Something between* 'em; and not have left your Subject juſt where you found it: you ſee that the Truth of

* Third Def. p. 15.

your

your Argument depends upon ſhewing, that the Difference *&c.* conſiſts in the Exiſtence, or non-Exiſtence of *Something between*; and yet you do not ſo much as offer at any Proof of it; but leave it to me to ſhew where the Difference lies, if it does not lie where you imagine; which is ſhifting off the Proof from your ſelf. What is it to me where the Difference lies? you argue upon Suppoſition that it conſiſts in the Exiſtence or non-Exiſtence of *Something between:* This is what therefore you ought to prove; otherwiſe your Argument is built upon a Principle, which does not appear to be true, and is conſequently no Argument at all.

You think it ſufficient to ſhut up all with ſaying, that, "If this Gentleman can any Way "ſhew the Difference which he allows, between "touching and not touching, ſuppoſing two "Bodies to have Nothing between them, and "yet not to touch; he will then, and not till "then prove what he has ſpent ſo many Pages here "in trying to do." * What I ſpent ſo many Pages in trying to do, was, I think, to ſhew that you *ſuppoſed the very Point to be proved:* which if I have done, I ſhould fancy it will be but little Satisfaction to you, to number the Pages, and to reflect *how many I have ſpent in doing it.* Now in Order to do This, there was no Occaſion for me to *ſhew the Difference between touching and not touching, ſuppoſing two Bodies to have Nothing between them, and yet not to touch:* but only to prove that you *took it for granted,* that the Difference *conſiſted in the Exiſtence, or non-Exiſtence of Something between*; and this I have done: It is your

* Third Def. p. 15.

Buſineſs therefore, to ſhew us, that the Difference does conſiſt in what you have hitherto *ſuppoſed*; and *you will then, and not till then, prove what you have ſpent ſo many Pages here, in trying to do.*

But however, Sir, you find that I have not ſtood ſo preciſely on the ſtrict Rules of Controverſy; for I have complyed with your Requeſt, and have ſhewn you, wherein the Difference of the touching and not touching of two Bodies conſiſts; tho' in each Caſe there is ſuppoſed to be Nothing between them *.

To conclude this Argument —— I charged you with ſuppoſing the very Point to be proved in the Inſtance of your two Walls: You have laboured to get off; and after much Quibbling and many Doublings and Turnings confeſs at laſt, that the main Point of Diſpute between us is, whether it does not follow from there being a Difference between touching and not touching; that when two Bodies do not touch there muſt be Something between them; that is, that the main Point of Diſpute is, whether the Difference of touching and not touching, conſiſts in the Exiſtence or non-Exiſtence of Something between; which you have all along taken for granted; and on which your whole Argument depends: yet, you have not offer'd at any Proof of it; even now, when you own it to be the only Difference between us: which is ending as you begun with *ſuppoſing the very Point to be proved:* I therefore repeat that Charge once more, and leave you, to get clear of it at your leiſure.

And thus I have conſidered every Thing which bears the Face of an Argument for the *Reality of*

* See p. 25. *&c.*

Space,

SPACE, from the Difference between two Walls touching and not touching; and have anſwered your Objections relating to this Point; and I hope it appears, that you have added no Reinforcement to your former Argument above the Dignity of a Sophiſm, or a Quibble in Language. I fear the Reader will think I have been too minute and particular, and I can only offer in Excuſe, that you led me through a Path, wherein I have been obliged to follow you, as I had no other way of unravelling your Sophiſtry, and guarding againſt future Cavils.

ARGUMENT II.

That the Idea *of* SPACE *is not the* Idea *of a* PRIVATION.

"THE Idea [ſay you] ariſing from a Priva-
"tion is not an Idea of the mere Abſence of
"the Thing only; for that would be an Idea of
"Nothing."* The Idea ariſing from a Privation is not in one Senſe an Idea of the *mere Abſence* of the Thing; becauſe it is always an Idea connected with the Idea of *That* whoſe Abſence you conſider: but though it be not an Idea of *mere Abſence*, yet it is not therefore, as you would argue, an Idea of Some *Place* which hath *real Exiſtence* without That Thing. It is not an Idea of a *Place*, as any Thing diſtinct and ſeparate from that Body; it is only a reflection that the Body which once did bear a certain Relation

* Third Def. p. 22.

to other Bodies, does no longer bear that Relation.

You tell us, that you "have a Poſitive Idea "of a Dog: Now ſuppoſe [you add] by any "Accident, all the Dogs in the World were "dead; would this Author ſay, that he had a "Poſitive Idea of no Dog *?" No Sir; unleſs you take 'em out of the World after their Deceaſe: for otherwiſe, my Idea would only be an Idea of a Parcel of dead Dogs inſtead of living Ones. But, if you ſuppoſe all Dogs to ceaſe to exiſt; Then I affirm, that I ſhould have the *Poſitive Idea* of No-Dog; which I ſhould gain by reflecting, that Dogs did once exiſt, but that they now do not; *i. e.* I ſhould reflect, that they were all dead and gone; which is a *Poſitive Idea*; for pray what is a *Negative* Idea? I think he who found Fault with *Negative Properties*, ſhould have been aware of *Negative Ideas:* and I may anſwer you in your own Words, *viz. The Author ſhould have explained what he means by a Poſitive* Idea: *are there any* Ideas *that are not Poſitive? That which is called an* Idea, *muſt be either an* Idea, *or not an* Idea; *or, is there Something between an* Idea, *and no* Idea? *as he ſeems to imagine* Abſence *to be, I know not what, between* an Idea, *and* no Idea. *I confeſs I cannot frame to my ſelf any Notion at all of a Negative* Idea: *If there are ſuch, I ſhall be obliged to this Gentleman, if he will ſhew me what Sort of an* Idea, *a Negative* Idea *is*; *and make appear the Difference between that, and a Poſitive one* †.

The Difference, which Mr. *Locke* may ſeem to make between *Poſitive* and *Privative* Ideas, is

* Third Def. p. 22. † See Ibid. p. 18, 19.

only

only in their *Cauſes*, or rather *Reaſons*, not in the *Ideas*, as they are in the Mind. All *Ideas* are *Poſitive*; tho' the *Reaſons* of ſuch Ideas, may ſometimes be *Privations* — "Whatever (ſays he) "may be the external Cauſe of it, when it comes "to be taken Notice of by our diſcerning Fa- "culty, it is by the Mind looked on and conſi- "dered there, to be a real *Poſitive Idea* in the "Underſtanding, as much as any other whatſo- "ever; though perhaps the Cauſe of it be but "a *Privation* in the Subject." * The Idea therefore of the mere Abſence of a Dog, tho' the *Cauſe* be a *Privation*, is *a real Poſitive Idea in the Underſtanding, as much as any other whatſoever:* and therefore 'tis plain from Mr. *Locke*, that he would have ſaid, he could have a *Poſitive Idea* of *No-Dog*.

You ask, "what would the Idea of the real, "or ſuppoſed Abſence of all Dogs be? I appeal "to himſelf, whether it would not be an Idea "of ſome Place without a Dog, where he had "either ſeen, or ſuppoſed a Dog to be." † I anſwer, that it would be a Reflection that ſuch and ſuch Things, which did once bear a Relation of Site to Dogs, no longer bear any ſuch Relation to that Sort of Animal: it would not be an Idea of the *Place* of thoſe Dogs as Something exiſting *ad extra*; but only the *abſtract Idea* of that *Relation of Site*, which I had either ſeen, or ſuppoſed Dogs to bear to other Things.

If I have a Poſitive Idea of no Dog, then you ſay, "That all Ideas whatever ariſing from Pri- "vations, muſt be Nothing, becauſe they muſt

* *Locke* Hum. Underſtand. B. 2. c. 8. §. 1.

† Third Def. p. 22.

"be

" be all alike; for an Idea of no Dog, cannot be " different from an Idea of no Horſe." * That all Ideas whatever ariſing from Privations muſt be all alike, is what I defy you to prove: for an Idea of no Dog is juſt as different from the Idea of no Horſe, as a Dog is from an Horſe: for, otherwiſe we might ſay the very ſame Thing to you, upon a Suppoſition that the Idea of no Dog was an Idea of ſome really exiſting *Place* without a Dog; as you imagine it: for I would then ask, where is the Difference between the Idea of a Place without a Dog, and the Idea of a Place without an Horſe?

" The Idea of the Abſence of Something [you ſay] " muſt be the Idea of Nothing *&c.*" † Very true! the Idea of the Abſence of Something, *quatenus Abſence*, is the Idea of no *Thing*; *i. e.* no Thing *ad extra:* but what then? is it therefore *no Idea?* yes ſurely it is! and a Poſitive one too, made by reflecting on the Thing whoſe Abſence you conſider.

You think " it is incumbent upon this Au- " thor, ſince he has an Idea of Nothing, and of " different Nothings, to tell us what Sort of an " Idea it is; and how the Ideas of different No- " things are diſtinguiſhed amongſt one another; " and wherein they differ from other Ideas." ** Theſe are mere Words — when I have the Ideas of the Abſence of different Things, theſe are not Ideas of *different Nothings:* they are only *different Ideas*, which have no *objective Realities*; and are formed from reflecting on thoſe *different Things*, whoſe *Abſence* I conſider: Theſe different Ideas

* Third Def. p. 22. † Ibid. p. 23.

** Ibid.

are

are diſtinguiſhed amongſt one another, according to the different Things, whoſe Abſence they are Ideas of.

As to our *Idea* of SPACE, I have all along ſaid, that I think *Reflection* muſt be taken into the Account *: I imagine, that the *Idea* of SPACE is formed from reflecting upon *Body*, tho' we may not always take Notice of ſuch Reflection. It is formed from conceiving Body away: This Conception (we having at the ſame time the Idea of the *Extenſion* of Body) leaves us the Idea of Extenſion in the *general*, without any particular extended Subſtance. This is not the Idea of *real Place*, as any Thing exiſting *ad extra*; but it is the Idea of the *Abſence of Body*, conceived after the Manner of *Extenſion*. The Idea therefore of the Abſence of Body, ſeems to me to be an Idea of Reflection: and ſuch an Idea is as *poſitive* as any other Idea whatſoever, tho' it be the Idea of a *Privation*. The *Abſence* of Body is as poſitive an Idea, as the Idea of *Body*: The Idea of the Abſence of any Thing is not (as you would have us imagine) the poſitive Idea of a *real Place* exiſting *ad extra* without that Thing: It is only a poſitive Idea of the *Relation of Site*, which any Body did once bear to another, conſidered now without the *Real Body*. To ſuppoſe a Body abſent from any *Place* is only ſuppoſing it to ceaſe from *bearing ſuch a Relation*, as it once did; but *Relation* is Nothing *ad extra*. By daily conſidering Bodies bearing ſuch and ſuch Relations to each other, which we call *exiſting in Place*; when we imagine theſe Bodies away, we apply their Dimenſions to an imaginary *Part* of

* See Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE Examined p. 67.

SPACE:

SPACE: and as we before conſidered theſe *real* Dimenſions to bear a Relation to other Bodies; ſo we conceive theſe *imaginary* Dimenſions to do; and thence ſome are led to conſider this *imaginary Part* of SPACE, thus clothed with *Ideal* Dimenſions, to be a *Place really exiſting* without Body.

I ſhall take occaſion here, to ſhew the Weakneſs of an Objection I meet with in the *Vindication* of your *Second Defence*. I had told you that, "when we ſuppoſe the Bodies away, we are apt "to apply their Dimenſions to that *imaginary Part* "of SPACE where we conſidered them before "exiſting." * To which you anſwer — "what "is This, but ſaying that Nothing exiſts but "in Imagination? for, if Bodies exiſt only in "ſome *imaginary Place*, they cannot really and "truly exiſt at all." † Pray Sir, who told you, that Bodies exiſted in *imaginary Place?* This is a mere Imagination of your own. I ſaid that Bodies exiſted in an *imaginary Part* of *Space*. We deny SPACE to have *real* Parts, or to be any Thing *real*; and therefore, when we talk of the *Parts* of SPACE, thoſe *Parts* are *Imaginary*; imaginary Subſtrata of imaginary Extenſion. I ſaid not that Bodies exiſted in imaginary *Place:* No; the Place is *real*; *i. e.* real *Place*; For *Place* is the *Relation of Site* which one Body bears to another; and this *Relation* is *real Relation*. A Body therefore, tho' it exiſts in an *imaginary Part* of SPACE yet exiſts in a *real Place*; that is, it bears a Relation of Site to other Bodies. When we ſuppoſe the Bodies away; then indeed the *Place* is *imaginary:* it is the *abſtract Idea* of *Relation*, as

* Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE Examined p. 131.

† Third Def. p. 92.

has

has been before explained. —— Thus much for the Objection as it occurs in the *Vindication* of your *Second Defence.*

You ſay, you — "Know of no Privation "that we can have an Idea of, merely as the Ab- "ſence of the Thing, He inſtances [ſay you] "in the Caſe of Darkneſs, which is a Privation "of Light. To which I ſay, that no Man can "have an Idea of Darkneſs *no where* &c." * *Light* is That, by means of which we ſee the various Objects which ſurround us, and conſider *them* as exiſting in Place; *i. e.* as bearing different Relations of Site to each other. We are accuſtomed to refer all our *Ideas,* of *Imagination* at leaſt, to Something *without* us; and to conſider SPACE as a *common Receptacle.* Hence we refer the *Idea* of *Light* to Something *without* us, as correſpondent to that *Idea:* and as every Thing is conceived to exiſt in Place, we at length imagine *Light* as exiſting in ſome Place: and becauſe *Darkneſs* is only a *Privation of Light,* we in like Manner refer the *Idea* of *Darkneſs* to *without,* and fancy it as a *Place* without *Light.* Thus we refer *Sound* and *Silence* to *without*; and thence imagine Sound to be in *Place,* and Silence to be a *Place* without Sound: whereas, whoever will conſider his own *Ideas,* and reflect a little upon his Manner of acquiring them, will find, that the *Idea* of *Darkneſs,* &c. is truly an *Idea* of a *mere Privation.*

You take the Truth to be "that we are ſo "very converſant with *Place, Space,* &c. that, "when any Thing by being taken away, cau- "ſes a privative Idea, we conſider it only as

* Third Def. p. 24. *&c.*

" the Abſence of the Thing, without conſider-
" ing the Place." *

Now, Sir, I take the Truth to be this — we are uſed to conſider Things exiſting *without* us, as bearing Relations to one another; and when any of theſe Things, by being taken away, cauſes a privative Idea; we, by reflecting on the Relation which we have ſeen or ſuppoſed it to bear to other Things, are apt to fancy ſuch *Ideal Relation* as a *Real Place* without that Thing; whereas, it is only the *abſtract Idea* of *Relation*.

You add — " If we try to find out the Na-
" ture of ſuch an Idea, we ſhall ſee that we can-
" not frame to ourſelves the Idea of any Priva-
" tion at all, merely as a Privation." †

If, by *merely as a Privation*, you mean, that we cannot frame to ourſelves an Idea of the Abſence of any Thing, without an Idea of ſome *really exiſting Place*, from whence we ſuppoſe the Thing to be abſent, then I ſay, we *can* frame to ourſelves an Idea of the Abſence of a Thing, *merely as a Privation*; becauſe it is only framing an Idea of a Thing, ceaſing to bear ſuch or ſuch a Relation to other Things; which is not an Idea of any *real Place*, exiſting *ad extra*; but only an *abſtract Idea of Relation*. — If, by *merely as a Privation*, you mean, that we cannot form an Idea of the Abſence of a Thing, without conſidering the *Thing it ſelf*, and ſuppoſing it to ceaſe from bearing a Relation to other Things; then I allow we cannot frame to ourſelves the Idea of any Privation, *merely as a Privation*: But what then? Relation of Situation is not a *really exiſting Place*: it is Nothing but the Bodies them-

* Third Def. p. 25. † Ibid.

ſelves

ſelves bearing ſuch Relation; and conſidered without the Bodies, is but an *abſtract Idea*. A *Place without a particular Body* is the *Relation* of that *Body* conſidered in the *Abſtract*, and is not any Thing *ad extra*: and this is, truly ſpeaking, an Idea of a Privation, *merely as a Privation*.

YOU obſerve—"If this be true [if we cannot frame an Idea of a Privation merely as a Privation] then it is impoſſible for us to have any ſimple Ideas *from* Nothing; *contrary to what this Author aſſerts page* 30." *

THIS, Sir, is charging me with what is directly falſe in Fact; as any one will find, who turns to the Page you cite: I there ſay, that Mr. *Locke* "gives us a Reaſon why a *privative Cauſe*, "may in ſome Caſes at leaſt, produce a *poſitive* Idea *&c.*" But is this aſſerting, that we may have ſimple Ideas *from* Nothing, in ſuch a Senſe as will do you any Service? No; for you may remember that I told you in p. 68, that, "when "Mr. *Locke* ſays, that Privations may be *Cauſes* "of *Ideas* in the Mind [which is what you call "having Ideas *from* Nothing] he does not "mean, that *Privations*, which are Nothing *ad* "*extra*, may be *actual Cauſes*, but rather *Reaſons* "why we have Thoſe Ideas." Now, who would imagine, after ſuch an Explanation of what I underſtood Mr. *Locke* to mean, by ſaying that a *privative Cauſe may produce a poſitive Idea*; who would think, I ſay, that after this, you ſhould venture to aſſert that I ſaid, we might have ſimple Ideas *from* Nothing? and who will not ſtill wonder more at this your Aſſertion, when he turns to my *66th* Page, where he will read (what

* Third Def. p. 25.

you ought to have remember'd) the following Words, which are *in Terms* directly oppoſite to what you here pretend to fix upon me? The Words are Theſe — "I grant it is impoſſible, "and contradictory that we ſhould have *a ſimple* "*Idea*, or indeed *any Idea* at all *from* Nothing; "or, that Nothing ſhould be the *Cauſe* of a ſim- "ple, or of any Idea in us: But to have an "Idea, or a ſimple Idea *of* Nothing (*i. e.* to have "an Idea, or a ſimple Idea which has Nothing "exiſting without us, correſpondent to it) is far "from impoſſible." * — Let any one compare this with what I had ſaid in p. 30, and judge whether you had any Reaſon to think I meant, that we might have ſimple Ideas *from* Nothing! or whether you have not aſſerted Something directly contrary to what I ſaid, and what you willfind impoſſible to make good.—I anſwer then to your preſent Argument, that our Ideas of Privations, or of the Abſence of any Thing, are not Ideas *from* Nothing: We have not the Idea of the Abſence of Body *from* mere *Abſence* (conſidered in any other Senſe than as a Reaſon) but *from* Body; that is, from reflecting on Body: yet this is an Idea of a Privation, *merely as a Privation*; *i. e.* without ſuppoſing it abſent from any *really exiſting Place*.

* Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 66, 67.

ARGUMENT III.

That SPACE *is not, like* WHITENESS, *an* ABSTRACT IDEA.

THE Subſtance of what you ſay in Defence of this Point, is This — "An abſtract Idea "is an Idea of a Quality of Body, which we "may conceive without any *particular Body*, but "yet *not without any Body at all:* Thus, tho' we "can have the Idea of Whiteneſs, without any "particular white Body, yet we cannot have the "Idea of Whiteneſs without *any Body at all:* "But we can have an Idea of SPACE, *without* "*any Body, or material Subſtance at all.* The "Difference therefore between *Whiteneſs* and *Space* "is plain: and conſequently *Space* is not like "*Whiteneſs*, or an *abſtract Idea.*" * This I believe you will acknowledge to be your Argument in its full Force: But I am apt to think, if you would impartially conſider, that you would find, there is not this Difference between *Whiteneſs* and SPACE.

IT is very true, we cannot have the Idea of Whiteneſs *without any Body at all:* but then, this Body may be only an *Imaginary Subſtratum*, formed by the Mind, for the help of the Underſtanding. It is an Idea of *Somewhat*, with one Quality only, namely *Whiteneſs*; that is, an *Ideal white Somewhat*, and that's all. Nor is the Caſe different in SPACE: for we cannot have, as you would urge, an Idea of SPACE,

* See Third Def. p. 17, 18.

with-

without any Body or material Subſtance at all: The Mind is always ready with an *imaginary Subſtratum* upon the Occaſion. We can indeed have the Idea of SPACE, without conſidering it as the Extenſion of any *particular Body*; but not without conſidering it, as *Somewhat* with the Idea of one Quality only, namely *Extenſion.* Thus you ſee, or at leaſt may ſee, that *Whiteneſs* and *Space* exactly agree in that, wherein you imagined them to differ. The Idea of *Whiteneſs* is an *Ideal white Somewhat:* and the Idea of SPACE is an *Ideal extended Somewhat:* We can no more therefore have the Idea of SPACE without any Body or material Subſtance at all, *i. e.* without an *extended Somewhat*, than we can have an Idea of *Whiteneſs* without any Body at all, *i. e.* without a *white Somewhat*; unleſs Spirit can be extended like Matter.

"Let any Perſon try [ſay you] whether he "can frame to himſelf an Idea of a white No-"thing."* And, in return I ſay, Let any Perſon try, whether he can frame to himſelf an Idea of an *Extended* Nothing: I believe he will find one, full as eaſy as the other.

IN the Inſtance of your two Bodies, you talk of *a cubic Yard of Space* between them; whereby it is moſt evident, that you yourſelf cannot ſpeak of SPACE, but your Mind preſently ſuggeſts to you a material Subſtratum, for your Thoughts to reſt on; and that you cannot have the Idea of SPACE, *without any Body or material Subſtance at all.* To argue therefore, that you can, and yet to talk of *cubic*

* Third Def. p. 17.

Yards

Yards of Space, is to argue, that you can have an Idea, which 'tis plain you cannot; and is conſequently arguing againſt your own Ideas; unleſs you would talk of *cubic Yards* of *Spirit*, and *cubic Yards* of the *Divine Subſtance*. For, however harſh and abſurd theſe Expreſſions may appear, they muſt be your own: For, if SPACE be the real Extenſion of the Self-exiſtent Being, and you meaſure that Extenſion by cubic Yards; 'tis Nothing leſs then ſaying, what I have mentioned. If you deny your Meaning to be this; and own, that cubic Yards are only *material* Meaſures; then ſince you apply them to SPACE, it appears, that when you have the Idea of SPACE, you conſider it either as a Real, or Ideal extended material Somewhat: and if you cannot have the Idea of SPACE, without the Ideas of ſuch material Meaſures (as it appears you cannot, by your general Expreſſions concerning it) then, I think, we may with Reaſon conclude, that you cannot have, what you would perſuade us that you can, *viz.* the Idea of SPACE, *without any Body or material Subſtance at all.*

YOU appeal to me — "Let him ſay in the fore-"mentioned Inſtance of two Bodies that are di-"ſtant from each other, without having any Mat-"ter between them, whether he has not an Idea "of SPACE between the two Bodies." *

I anſwer, yes; allowing for the Impropriety of ſaying, that any Thing *ideal* can *be* between. But altho', Sir, there be no Matter between the Bodies, and I have the Idea of SPACE; yet, I have not the *Idea* of SPACE, *without any material Subſtance at all*, as you would from hence infer; but

* Third Def. p. 18.

my

my Idea, is an imaginary material Subſtratum, *i. e.* an ideal extended Somewhat. For till *Spirit* is proved to be *extended*, Extenſion is only applicable to *Matter*.

" Let him alſo ſay [you continue] whether he " can poſſibly have any Idea of *Whiteneſs* between " them, whilſt there is no Matter there." *

I Reply, yes; as well as I can of SPACE: for it is only forming an imaginary Subſtratum in my Mind; and then I have an Idea of Whiteneſs between them, or an Ideal white Somewhat, as much as I have of SPACE, or an Ideal extended Somewhat.

YOU had ſaid, that " Whiteneſs is only owing " to a particular Texture of Parts upon the Surface " of the white Body *&c.* But the Extenſion of, " or the SPACE in which any Body exiſts, nei- " ther is, nor can poſſibly be owing to any Tex- " ture of Parts or Difference of Surface; ſince, " were Matter either ſquare or round, or any o- " ther Shape whatever, it muſt neceſſarily be " extended; that is, muſt exiſt in ſome Part of " SPACE." †

THIS, I thought, was " little to our Purpoſe: " For, of what Significancy in the preſent Di- " ſpute is it, whether the Ideas of Extenſion and " Whiteneſs be excited in the ſame Manner or " not?" **

BUT you now tell us, that your Meaning is not what it ſeemed to be; for, that " the Diffe- " rence was not ſuppoſed to conſiſt in any different " Excitement, but in the one's being diſtinct and

* Third Def. p. 18.

† Firſt Def. p. 3.

** Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 19.

" ſepa-

" ſeparate from Body, and in the other's being " neceſſarily joined with it." *

LET This be your Meaning, yet I muſt own, Sir, I cannot ſee any Force in this Argument. *Whiteneſs* is an Idea owing to a *particular* Texture of Parts, but *Extenſion* is not; *Whiteneſs* is not neceſſarily join'd with Body in general, as *Extenſion* is, but only to particular Bodies: and what then? can we not have the Idea of *Extenſion* in the *Abſtract*, as we have an Idea of *Whiteneſs* in the *Abſtract*? what, tho' one is joined with all Bodies, and the other not? does that hinder us from juſtly illuſtrating our *abſtract Idea* of *Extenſion* by the *abſtract Idea* of *Whiteneſs*? Whiteneſs conſidered without a white Body is an *abſtract Idea*, which can have no Subſiſtence of it ſelf: So is *pure Extenſion*: in this they agree; and this is all the agreement between them, that Mr. *Law*, I believe, ever intended.

THO' Whiteneſs is not a Quality of all Bodies, yet it is conſidered as a Quality of *Body*: and the Idea of this Quality in *general*, or in the *Abſtract*, without any particular Body, I think, may be very well uſed to illuſtrate the Idea of *Extenſion* in *general*, or in the *Abſtract*, without any particular Body. – If you think otherwiſe, we can't help it: The Cauſe by no means depends upon this; ſo that your Objection is but trifling at beſt; for I imagine, you would hardly make it an Argument, even ſuppoſing Mr. *Law*'s Inſtance to be improper, which he uſes to illuſtrate his Notion of SPACE, therefore that his *Notion* of SPACE was *wrong:* For, would it follow that his Notion of SPACE, *as Extenſion in the Abſtract*, is

* Third Def. p. 18.

wrong; becauſe *Whiteneſs*, which in the *Abſtract* is the Inſtance he makes uſe of, is not, like *Extenſion*, a Quality or Mode of Body *in general?* No ſurely! But however, the Queſtion to be asked here is only this; whether or no, becauſe *Whiteneſs* does not agree with *Extenſion*, in being a Quality of *all Bodies*; it therefore follows, that *Whiteneſs* in the *Abſtract* does not agree with *Extenſion* in the *Abſtract*, in being an *abſtract Idea which can have no Subſiſtence of it ſelf*? for, as I obſerved before, this was all the Agreement Mr. *Law* ſuppoſed between them: If they do agree in this, Mr. *Law* has properly uſed the Inſtance; and you have been talking to no Purpoſe. There is no Occaſion therefore, to take any further Notice of what you ſay upon this, in the *Vindication* of your *Second Defence* p. 81.

BUT there is an Objection which you make in Relation to my Reaſoning, which I muſt not forget to remark upon. It had been ſaid that SPACE is *Extenſion* conſidered *abſtractedly*; as *Whiteneſs* without a *white Body*. Upon which you obſerve very gravely; that "This Gentleman's Rea-"ſoning will prove Whiteneſs to be SPACE." * I dare ſay the Reader muſt be big with Expectation of what this Mountain will bring forth! — It is This — "If Whiteneſs be Nothing, and SPACE "alſo be Nothing, Whiteneſs is SPACE; it be-"ing as impoſſible, that two Things ſhould be "a Third, without being one another; as that "two Things ſhould be equal to a Third, with-"out being equal to one another." † To what Purpoſe, Sir, have you been ſo converſant with Logicians, if it was only to make uſe of their

* Third Def. p. 16. † Ibid.

Sophiſtry?

Sophiſtry? Of what Service was it to you, to *know that Quibbles and Wrangling upon Words are endleſs**, if you ſtill take that endleſs Path.

THE Term *Nothing* is here a Negation of all *real Things:* To ſay then, that, if *Whiteneſs* be No-*Thing real*, and SPACE be No-*Thing real*, then *Whiteneſs* is SPACE; is juſt the ſame as to argue, that, if all *abſtract Ideas* are no *Realities*, then all *abſtract Ideas* muſt be the *ſame*.

YOU will allow, that *white* and *black* in the *Abſtract* are Nothing, *i. e.* no Realities: Now, if *white* is No-Thing, and *black* is No-Thing, then according to your Way of drawing Conſequences, *white* is *black*. —— Whether a Man, who would endeavour to prove that *white* is *black*, is not to be deem'd paſt Confutation, let the Reader judge! Mr. *Locke* obſerves that "there were Philoſophers "found, who had Learning and *Subtlety* enough "to prove, that *Snow was black*, *i. e.* to prove, "that *white* was *black*; whereby they had the "Advantage to deſtroy the Inſtruments and "Means of Diſcourſe, Converſation, Inſtruction, "and Society." † —— We ſee that Sect of Philoſophers is not entirely extinct!

BUT give me leave to obſerve, that if this Sort of Argument be concluſive, your own Reaſoning will prove, what perhaps you are not aware of, that SPACE is DURATION, and that DURATION is SPACE.—I ſaid, that *Whiteneſs* is *Nothing*, and SPACE is *Nothing*; from whence you couclude, that *Whiteneſs* is SPACE: Now, you ſay that SPACE is *Something*, and DURATION is *Something*; and I fancy, you by this time perceive, that (to argue as you do) If SPACE be *Something*, and DURATION alſo be

* Preface to the Third Defence.

† *Locke* Hum. Underſtand. B. 3. c. x. §. 10.—Edit 9.

Something; SPACE is DURATION; "it being as im-
" poſſible, that two Things ſhould be a Third,
" without being one another; as, that two Things
" ſhould be equal to a Third, without being e-
" qual to one another." — If the Argument is concluſive in one Place, I apprehend that it has the ſame Force here: Anſwer this, and you anſwer your own!

THO' it may be true, that when two *Things* are a third *Thing*, they muſt be one another; yet, when the *third Thing* happens to be *no Thing*, it muſt be falſe; which is manifeſtly the Caſe in your Argument; where the three *Things* are *Whiteneſs*, *Space*, and *Nothing*. Now, I preſume, this general Term *Nothing* is not a *Thing*, but only a Negation of the two former Ideas to be *Things* real. The third Term in my Argument concerning DURATION and SPACE, *viz. Something*, has, of the two, a better Pretence to be a *Thing*; as *Something* is more like a *Thing*, than *Nothing*: and conſequently, if your Argument is good, mine is better. But the Truth is, the third Term in both, *viz.* the Terms *Nothing* and *Something* are neither of 'em to be conſidered as *Things*, but as mere *general Terms*: For, if your Way of Reaſoning was true, and general Terms were thus to be underſtood, as *Things*; we might prove any two Things whatever to be the ſame: for it is but affirming two *Species* of their *Genus*; and then, if your Rule be true, they are the ſame. It might therefore have been of Service to you, to have remember'd here *that common and neceſſary Diviſion, or Diſtinction* of *Genus* and *Species*, or of *General* and *Special* Terms. — But how ſhort are our Memories, when our Neceſſities require it!

FURTHER

FURTHER, the third Term in your Argument being *Negative*, makes it ſtill worſe. For, if two *Ideas* muſt be the *ſame*, becauſe they are each no *Thing*, *i. e.* no *Thing real*; it is but denying any two Terms of a Third, and they will be the ſame: Thus becauſe a *Stone* is *no-Animal*, and a *Tree* is *no-Animal*, a *Stone* muſt be a *Tree*: for, if *no-Animal* be taken for a *Thing* (which I think it may be, as well as *No-Thing*) then your Rule does the Buſineſs preſently.

BUT I cannot avoid telling you, that your Rule in general is deluſive. It is indeed impoſſible that two Things ſhould be a Third, or agree with a Third *in all Reſpects*, without being one another: but, it is not impoſſible, that two Things may be, or agree with a Third, in *ſome Reſpects*, without being one another.

Two Things cannot be equal to a Third, without being equal to one another; but then it only means, that they cannot be equal to a Third, without being equal to one another, *in that Reſpect, in which they are equal to the Third.* So it is impoſſible, that two Things ſhould be, or agree with, a Third, without being, or agreeing with one another, *in that Reſpect, in which they are, or agree with, the Third:* but it does not follow, that becauſe two Things agree with a Third *in one Reſpect*, therefore they muſt agree with each other *in all Reſpects*; any more than it follows, that, becauſe two Things are equal to a Third *in one Reſpect*, therefore they muſt be equal to one another *in all Reſpects.*

WE may thus conſider the Terms *Whiteneſs* and SPACE, agreeing with the third Term *Nothing, as it is a Negation of real Things*; and *Whiteneſs* and SPACE, may be ſaid for that Reaſon, to agree

agree with one another, *in that Reſpect*; *i. e.* as they are neither of them *real Things:* but, it does not follow, that becauſe they both agree with the Term *Nothing in that Reſpect*, therefore they muſt agree with each other *in all Reſpects*, and become both the ſame Ideas. But, Sir, you ought to have remember'd that Rule in Logick, that, *from two Negative Premiſes Nothing can be concluded*, and that, *when two Ideas diſagree to a Third, we cannot infer that they either agree or diſagree with each other* *, unleſs in their mutual *diſagreeing* with the *Third*. – This is the Caſe here. SPACE is no-*Thing*, and *Whiteneſs* is no-*Thing*: Both theſe Propoſitions are *Negative:* And theſe *two Ideas*, SPACE and *Whiteneſs*, *diſagree to a Third* Idea, *viz. Thing*, and therefore, by the foregoing Rule, we cannot infer that they *agree with each other*, unleſs in their mutual *diſagreeing* with the *Third Idea*: Conſequently, we cannot infer (as you do) that if SPACE is no Thing, and Whiteneſs is no Thing, then Whiteneſs is SPACE: all that we can infer is, that neither Whiteneſs nor SPACE are Things real, *i. e.* that thoſe two *Ideas*, have no *objective Realities*. —— I am ſorry I am obliged to take Notice, that you deviate from the common and known Rules of Syllogizing.

BUT ſince you have found out ſuch an acute Way of Reaſoning, I wonder you gave your ſelf ſo much needleſs Trouble, in proving SPACE to be a *Property*; when you might ſo ſoon have done it by the foregoing Method: For, if SPACE be *Something*, and a *Property* be *Something*; then you know that, according to you, *Space* is a *Property:* How clear the Reaſoning! How evident the

* See *Watts*'s Logick Part 3 c. 2. Sect. 2. Rule 6.

Con-

Conſequence! and you might by the ſame Argument, have proved it to be an *Elephant*, or any other Creature you had a Mind to.

IN ſhort, when we ſay that *Whiteneſs* and *Space* are *Nothing*; we mean that the *Ideas*, Whiteneſs and SPACE, have no *objective Realities*. But is it ſound Reaſoning to ſay, that, if the *Idea* of *Whiteneſs* has no objective Reality, and the *Idea* of *Space* has no objective Reality, then the *Idea of Space* is *the Idea of Whiteneſs?* If it be, your Argument is valid: and you may by the ſame Method prove all abſtract Ideas to be the ſame.

THE Reader will readily excuſe me, from troubling him any longer upon ſuch an Argument: It ſeems calculated rather for thoſe Schools, where Sophiſtry is at leaſt allowable: Where Perſons ſometimes ſtand obliged, and therefore determined to defend that Side of a Queſtion, which at the ſame Time they know to be wrong; and are, for that Reaſon, to ſupport a bad Cauſe, forced to have recourſe to Art and Wile: But this, believe me! will never do from the Preſs, where the Public are to be Judges of the Diſpute: Where both Parties are ſuppoſed to be in Earneſt, to believe themſelves in the Right; and where the Learned, in that view, are to determine. The Arts of Sophiſtry are here to be diſdained, at once the Supports and Signs of a weak Cauſe! and whoever ſees theſe in a *Second*, or *Third Defence*, will perhaps be induced to conclude, that the Author is reſolved to *defend*, tho' by ſuch Methods, whatever he has once aſſerted.

WE are not diſputing here for the Sake of diſputing only, or to ſhew our Talents, but to weigh the Merits of the Cauſe: For it is but of ſmall Importance to the World, who is the better

better Diſputant; You, or I. But how irreconcilable is it, to hear any one profeſſing, that he *has no Purſuit here, after any Thing but Truth*; and yet to ſee him thus rambling after it, through the Labyrinth of Error, and taking that Road, which is deſigned on purpoſe to lead Men aſtray? If this be to *purſue Truth*, I doubt you may purſue it long enough, before you overtake it.

ARGUMENT IV.

From SPACE *having* PROPERTIES.

I took Notice, that the Tranſlator of Arch-Biſhop *King*'s Origin of Evil, "uſed the Expreſſion of SPACE *having ſome Properties*, for "Inſtance *Penetrability*, or a *Capacity* of receiving "Body; but uſes it in ſuch a Manner, as plainly ſhews he never meant, nor ever thought "SPACE to be endued with any poſitive Property." * Here you tell me that "the Author "ſhould have explained what he means by a poſitive Property: are there any Properties that "are not poſitive?†" No Sir; There are no *Properties* which are not *poſitive:* Thoſe which you apply to SPACE are not *poſitive*; and therefore they are *no Properties*. The very Reaſon of my uſing the Expreſſion of *poſitive Properties*, was to diſtinguiſh *true* Properties from *fictitious* ones; *Properties* from *no Properties*. You called the *receiving all Body*, a *Property* of SPACE; and would conclude that SPACE muſt be Something, becauſe

* Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 23.

† Third Def. p. 18.

it

it has *ſuch Properties*: "That SPACE has the *Pro-*
"*perty* [ſaid you] or the Capacity of *receiving*
"*all Body* &c. no Perſon was ever ſo abſurd as to
"deny." * To this I anſwered, that the Tranſlator did deny it. He does indeed call Penetrability or a Capacity of receiving Body by the Name of *Property*; (not in his own Name as we ſhall ſee preſently) but he ſpeaks in ſuch a Manner, as evidently ſhews he never imagined it to be a *Property*; or that SPACE was endued with any *Property*; but that it was a mere *Negation*. That this is truly Mr. *Law*'s Meaning is plain from his own Words; which, if you had turned over to the next Leaf, you would have ſeen in my Quotation from him; where he explains himſelf by telling you, that to argue from *ſuch Properties*, is the ſame as "to aſſign abſolute *Negations*,
"and ſuch as by the ſame Way of Reaſoning may
"be applied to *Nothing*, and then call them
"*poſitive Properties*." † And in the very next Sentence he calls them *pretended Properties*, and *ſuppoſed Properties*. From whence it is plain, that when he uſes the Expreſſion of SPACE *having Properties*, he uſes it only as an Argument which the Gentlemen on your Side of the Queſtion bring; and the Tenor of his Diſcourſe ſhews that he does not think SPACE has any *Properties*; that what you aſſign as a *Property*, and argue from as ſuch, is no *true Property*, but a *pretended*, and a falſly *ſuppoſed* one; is Nothing *poſitive*, but a mere *Negation*: and the Expreſſion of a *poſitive Property*, you ſee, he makes Uſe of only in Oppoſi-

* Firſt Def. p. 4.

† Tranſlation of ABp. *King*. Note 5. Ed. 1.—N. 3. Ed. 2.
— Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 24, 25.

tion to a *mere Negation*. This is what he meant: and inſtead of ſaying in Anſwer to my 23*d* Page, *The Author ſhould have explained what he means by a poſitive Property*; you might have turned to p. 27, where you would have found that I only meant to oppoſe *poſitive Properties* to *no Properties*: not as if we believed any ſuch Things as *Negative Properties*, as we were only diſtinguiſhing between *Properties* and *Negations*; a Diſtinction which your perplexed Manner of treating the Subject gave me occaſion to inſiſt upon.

By calling mere Negations *Properties*, you make the Diſtinction of *poſitive* Properties neceſſary; and then ask, *if there are any Properties that are not poſitive*? as if we believed any ſuch Things as *negative Properties*; when we are only arguing againſt you, and ſhewing, ſince what you call *Properties* are *mere Negations*, *i. e.* are not *poſitive*, that they are *no Properties at all*.

Mr. *Law* argued —— "To ſay that Space "muſt have Exiſtence becauſe it has ſome Proper- "ties, for Inſtance Penetrability, or a Capacity "of receiving Body, ſeems to me the ſame as to "urge, that *Darkneſs* muſt be Something, becauſe "it has the Power or Property of receiving *Light* "&c." * To this Paſſage and my Explanation of it, you object "Theſe are the Tranſlator's "own Words: But this Gentleman tells us, that "he did not mean either that Space was [*had* "you ſhould have ſaid for that was my Word] "a Capacity; or that Darkneſs was a Capacity; "but only, *that they were Suppoſitions alike ridicu-* "*lous*. If this was really the Tranſlator's Mean-

* Tranſlation of ABp. *King*'s Origin of Evil N. 5. Edit. 1. —— N. 3. Edit. 2.

"ing,

" ing, to what Purpoſe did he ſay, in the Man-
" ner he did, that it did not from thence follow,
" that they muſt exiſt, or be Something *&c.*" *
The Error which you here run into proceeds, I find, from your miſtaking the Senſe of the Tranſlator. You imagine that the Words, *becauſe it has ſome Properties, for Inſtance Penetrability, or a Capacity of receiving Body* — and *Becauſe it has the Power of receiving Light,* are Sentences ſpoken by the *Tranſlator*, as if he *allowed* SPACE *to have a Property* of receiving Body, and *Darkneſs* of receiving Light; and that he would argue from thence, that it did not follow, ſuppoſing them to have theſe *Properties,* that they had Exiſtence. But This, if I underſtand that Gentleman, was not his Meaning: But that thoſe Sentences above in *Italics*, were ſpoken as the abſurd Reaſons which ſome Perſons give, in order to prove the real Exiſtence of SPACE, and *Darkneſs.* The Tranſlator's Meaning therefore is evidently This; "to ſay
" SPACE muſt have Exiſtence, *and to give this*
" *Reaſon for it* viz. becauſe it has ſome Proper-
" ties, for Inſtance Penetrability, or a Capacity
" of receiving Body, ſeems to me the ſame as to
" urge, that Darkneſs muſt be Something, *and to*
" *give this Reaſon for it*, viz. becauſe it has the
" Power of receiving Light: whereas neither of
" them have any Properties; and thoſe which
" are aſſigned them are mere Negations." — This I underſtand to be all the Tranſlator meant, a Meaning right and true: and juſtly did he urge it againſt Thoſe, who pretend to prove the real Exiſtence of SPACE, by ſuch Sort of Arguments as he here ſhews the Weakneſs of. *Darkneſs* has

* Third Def. p. 19.

as good a Pretenſion to real Exiſtence as SPACE; ſince *receiving Light* may as well be called a *Property* of *Darkneſs*, as *receiving Body* be called a *Property* of SPACE; but the Truth is, neither of them are *Properties* but mere *Negations*.

THIS Inſtance of Darkneſs puts me in Mind of a pleaſant Objection made to my laſt Piece, by one who is in the Way of Thinking with the Anti-Gravitarian Mr. *H———n*; and is conſequently one of thoſe deep-penetrating Gentlemen, who can ſee Things in Scripture which never were there; and find out Myſteries which no-Body can underſtand. He was greatly offended, that I had denied the Exiſtence of *Darkneſs*; This, it ſeems, he looked upon as a ſtrange Kind of Aſſertion, nothing leſs than a Denial of Scripture; for he remember'd *Moſes* had told him, that *Darkneſs* was *upon the Face of the Deep*. And if he had remember'd *Gen.* 1. 6. and 7. he would, no Doubt, have brought that Text to prove that *Space* was *Created* on the Second Day; which would have been both as good Senſe, and as good Divinity as That of ſome conſiderable Writers, who make SPACE *a Conſequence of God's Exiſtence*. But theſe Gentlemen are to be left to the uninterrupted Enjoyment of their own Speculations; whoſe Notions ſeem to be too ſublimated, for Heads that are (as a certain Writer expreſſes it) leſs exalted in the Clouds, and Underſtandings more terreſtrial than their own.

BUT I return — "There ſeems [you ſay] to "be no Occaſion to take Notice of all our Au- "thor has ſaid in the 27*th* and 28*th* Pages." Theſe are the very Pages, Sir, where you might have ſeen what I meant by a poſitive Property: To ſay therefore, that *The Author ſhould have*

explain'd

explain'd what he means by a poſitive Property; and preſently afterwards to tell us, that *There ſeems to be no Occaſion to take Notice of all our Author has ſaid in* thoſe very Pages, where the Author has explained what you wanted to know; plainly ſhews, that you induſtriouſly avoided to underſtand the Author's Meaning.

BUT it is proper the Reader ſhould be told what theſe Pages contain, which you think there is *no Occaſion to take Notice of.* You had ſaid that, "whatever is endued with Properties muſt actual-"ly exiſt; that SPACE has the *Property* or Ca-"pacity of receiving all Body *&c.* no Perſon "was ever ſo abſurd as to deny." * Now, Sir, the Deſign of theſe 27*th* and 28*th* Pages was, in Anſwer to you, to ſhew, that *Space was endued with no Property, Attribute* &c. that *receiving Body was no poſitive Property; that is, was truly no Property at all, but an abſolute Negation:* That *the Property which is applied to* SPACE, *of receiving Body, is Nothing but a Property in Body to exiſt, where no Body exiſted before* &c.

INSTEAD of anſwering This, as you ought to have done, you paſs it off with ſaying, "There "ſeems to be no Occaſion to take Notice of all "our Author has ſaid in the 27*th* and 28*th* Pages: "for, tho' he may deny SPACE to have any At-"tribute or Property, yet he has himſelf affirmed "Something of it, to wit, that it is ſufficient to "conſtitute a Difference between Things; and "therefore he cannot deny it to be Something." †

Now was it not incumbent on you to have defended what you had aſſerted, againſt the Ob-

* Firſt Def. p. 4.

† Third Def. p. 20.

jections

jections I there advanced? Had not you affirmed, that SPACE had the *Property* or the Capacity of receiving all Body? and did not I object that this was no *Property*, but a mere *Negation*, which might as well be applied to *Nothing*, as to SPACE? did not you ſay that no Perſon was ever ſo abſurd as to deny, that SPACE had ſuch a *Property* as you mentioned? and did not I tell you in theſe Pages, that *I* deny'd it? Surely then you ought here to have offered at ſome Proof that SPACE was endued with a *Property*: Should you not have endeavoured to confirm what you had before aſſerted, namely that receiving Body was a *Property*, and a *Property* of SPACE? I believe the Reader will think you ſhould: For, not to take Notice of theſe Objections and Arguments, is to give up the Point concerning SPACE having the *Property* of receiving Body; at leaſt, while thoſe Arguments remain unanſwered, they ſtand firm againſt you, and ſupport the Cauſe I defend. Nay it is moſt plain, that you do give up the Point, or paſs it over at leaſt, of SPACE having the Property of receiving Body; for you urge, *Tho' he may deny Space to have any Attribute or Property, yet he has himſelf affirm'd Something of it* &c. — Is not this paſſing over your former Argument for the Exiſtence of SPACE, and putting the Controverſy upon another Foot? But to drop your former Argument of SPACE *having the Property of receiving Body*, and to lay a Streſs upon *mere Words*, ſhews only that you are forced to fluctuate from one Argument to another; and that not being able to keep your ſelf above Water, by the Juſtice of your Cauſe, or the Force of Reaſon; you are willing to lay Hold of any little Twig, to keep your ſelf from Sinking.

BUT

BUT tho' you will not *take Notice* of all I have ſaid in thoſe forementioned Pages, yet you are pleas'd to make ſome *Remarks* upon them; *viz.* "The Difference between a poſitive and a "negative Property, which he lays ſo much Streſs "on, I before own'd I did not underſtand; "for they ſeem, each of them, from the Nature "of our Language, capable of being put one for "another." * What I meant by a poſitive Property, I think you might eaſily ſee: If you did not, I have again explained it. The only Queſtion is, whether *receiving Body* can be called a *Property* at all? I think it cannot: and that this *Property* which is applied to SPACE, is only a *Property* in *Body* to exiſt where no Body exiſted before: The *Property* is in *Body*, not in *Space*. This I objected to you, but you have thought fit to give no further Anſwer. You argue indeed, that poſitive Properties, and negative Properties are capable of being put one for another: You Inſtance — "Body is endued with a "poſitive Property of excluding other Bodies; "but it is a negative Expreſſion to ſay, that it "is not capable, or has not a Capacity of re-"ceiving other Bodies into its Place." † But this, at moſt proves only, that a *Property* of *Body* may be changed to a *negative Expreſſion* concerning *Body*, and yet *Body* be ſtill endued with a Property: but it does not prove, that becauſe the Property of *Body* to exiſt where no Body exiſted before, may be repreſented in a *negative Expreſſion* concerning SPACE; therefore SPACE muſt be endued with a *Property*; yet, unleſs you had proved this, your Inſtance is wide of the Point.

* Third Def. p. 20. † Ibid. p. 20.

YOUR

YOUR next Attempt is to prove, that either SPACE muſt be really Something; or elſe, that I talk *downright Contradictions and Nonſenſe*, as you are pleaſed to expreſs it; which I ſuppoſe was deſigned as a Specimen of your Endeavours, *to treat the Author of Dr. Clarke's Notions &c. with all the Civility you could* *. But you begin — "It "is, he ſays, a Property of one Body to exclude "another. I ask then from whence? His Anſwer "I ſuppoſe will be, from the ſame Place, from "that Place in which the other exiſts." † True! but my Meaning in ſuch an Anſwer would be— *from bearing the ſame* Relation; *from bearing that* Relation of Site *to other Bodies, which the excluding Body bears.*

YOU advance — "I ask again, what is Place? "Why, I ſuppoſe he will ſay, a Part of SPACE." ** But I ſee no Reaſon you have to ſuppoſe ſo; when I have ſo often denied SPACE to *have Parts*; and have ſo frequently told you, that by *Place*, I mean only the *Relation of Site* which one Body bears to another. But taking this for granted, you go on moſt triumphantly in the following Strain. — "What then is SPACE? Here I know "he will anſwer, Nothing. If therefore SPACE "be Nothing; Place, which is only a Part of "Nothing, muſt be Nothing too." †† But, if *Place* be not a *Part* of SPACE (which is what you hang this fine String of Arguments upon, as that which you *ſuppoſe* would be my Anſwer) but only the Relation of Bodies to each other; then, you know, it does not follow, that if SPACE

* See Preface to Third Defence.

† Third Def. p. 21. ** Ibid.

†† Ibid.

is Nothing, Place muſt be a *Part of Nothing*; which is your own *Nonſenſe*. — The latter Part of your Sentence indeed happens to be true notwithſtanding, *viz. that Place is Nothing*: For Relation, or Place in the *Abſtract*, is moſt certainly Nothing; that is, no-Thing exiſting *ad extra*, but an *Idea* only: for what is *Relation*, conſidered abſtractedly from *Things related?* Well, but if Place is Nothing, let us hear what Sort of a Concluſion you draw: It is this — "So that when "one Body has the Property of excluding ano-"ther, it has the Property of excluding it from "Nothing, or from No-where; that is, it has "the Property of excluding it, and it has not, "at the ſame Time." * One Body has the Property of excluding another from that Place where it exiſts; not from a *Part of Nothing*; but *from bearing the ſame Relation which it ſelf does to other Bodies, at the ſame Time.* But tho' Relation in the *Abſtract* be *Nothing*; does it therefore follow, that one Body muſt have a Property of excluding another Body from *Nothing*, in ſuch a Senſe as to ſignify, that it has the Property of excluding it from *No-where*, or, *of not excluding it at all?* Whoever ſays it does, confounds Words and Ideas together in ſuch a Manner, as ſhould render him beneath our Notice. The remaining Part of your Argument which extends beyond the Bottom of this your 21*ſt* Page is of the ſame Sort with the former: it proceeds upon the ſame *Suppoſition*, that I ſhould anſwer, *Place is a Part of Space:* But I would have you look over this Part of your Argument again; remembring as you go along, that I ſhould not make the Anſwer which you

* Third Def. p. 21.

ſuppoſe; and obſerving that *Place* is not a Part of SPACE; that it is not any Thing diſtinct and ſeparate from the Bodies; but is only the Relation which they bear one to another.

BUT I cannot forbear remarking, that inſtead of replying to what I objected, concerning SPACE *being endued with Properties*; or giving an Anſwer to what I obſerved with Reſpect to *thoſe Properties* (which you attribute to SPACE) *being no Properties at all*; inſtead of anſwering theſe, as I had Reaſon to expect you ſhould, you paſs 'em over; and only ſelect a particular Paſſage, where you firſt *ſuppoſe* me to ſay Something which may ſerve your Purpoſe; and then proceed to argue from ſuch a *Suppoſition*. Thus, inſtead of anſwering what I *do* ſay, you *ſuppoſe* me to ſay Things which I do *not* ſay, and anſwer them very ingeniouſly. You dreſs up a Man of Straw, and when you have attacked, and moſt manfully defeated him, you imagine you have confuted my Opinion: Which puts me in mind of a Paſſage I have ſomewhere met with, where a Diſputant of this Kind is compared to the Hero of a certain famous Romance, who fancied he ſaw Monſters in every Paſſenger he met upon the Road; and by this Means (never ſeeing any Thing in its true Light, or calling any Thing by its right Name) was perpetually fighting with Phantoms of his own raiſing.

ARGUMENT V.

From SPACE *having* PARTS.

"SPACE [ſay you] is one, uniform, conti-
"nued Thing, yet it has nevertheleſs aſſignable
"Parts; and may have Things predicated of ſome
"of them, different from Thoſe which may be
"predicated of others." * That is, SPACE is *one, uniform, continued* Thing; and yet is nevertheleſs compoſed of *many, different,* aſſignable *Parts:* Query therefore, whether That which is compoſed of *many, different,* aſſignable *Parts,* can be *one uniform* Thing? If it can, then it is incumbent upon you to explain what you mean by *one uniform Thing.*

BUT I attend to your Illuſtration — "Thus I
"can ſay that the Part of SPACE which this
"World exiſts in, is different from that Part, in
"which the Sun exiſts." † But to *ſay* is one Thing, and to *prove* is another: For the Difference you aſſign, is not any Difference in your *Parts of* SPACE; but is only telling us, that the Sun, and this World are diſtant: But does their being diſtant, make any *Difference* in the *Parts* of SPACE? or, does it prove that SPACE *has Parts* at all? What you call two *aſſignable Parts* of SPACE, are only two *aſſignable Bodies,* namely this Globe, and the Sun. If they are the *Parts* of SPACE which differ; then they would differ as much, if the Sun and this World did not exiſt as you ſuppoſe them now to do: and therefore, upon a Suppoſition

* Third Def. p. 25. † Ibid. p. 25, 26.

that neither this World, nor the Sun did exiſt, I deſire you would ſhew the *Difference* of theſe two *Parts* of SPACE: If you cannot; then it is plain the *Difference* is not in any ſuch *Parts*, but in Something elſe.

THIS is like an Argument which occurs in a very late Author *; and which by Reaſon of its marvellous Force, I beg Leave to take Notice of! "If SPACE [ſays he] is Nothing, and therefore "hath no Exiſtence, there could be no ſuch Thing "as *here* or *there*; for *here* and *there* are certainly "Affections of Something *&c.*" † True! but they are not Affections of SPACE; but of *thoſe Things* which are ſaid to exiſt in SPACE. It is not SPACE, or any *Part* of it, that is *here* or *there*; but the *Things* which exiſt are *here* or *there*; that is, they bear ſuch or ſuch Relation of Situation to other Things. That *here* and *there* are Affections of *Something*, by no Means proves SPACE to be *Something*; unleſs *here* and *there* were proved to be Affections of SPACE; which this Author ſhould have done; or elſe he leaves his Argument—juſt as he found it.

I MAY take Notice that Mr. *Locke* has obſerved that WHERE *and* WHEN *are Queſtions belonging to finite Exiſtences*; ** and as the Advocates for the Reality of SPACE contend likewiſe for its *Infinity*, they muſt acknowledge that according to Mr. *Locke*'s Opinion WHERE is not applicable to SPACE.

THE Book where the forementioned Argument appears, is a late Piece, to which the Anonymous

* An Eſſay concerning Rational Notions *&c.* —— Anonymous. † P. 187.

** *Locke* Hum. Underſtand. B. 2. c. 15. §. 8.—Edit. 9.

Author

Author has prefixed the Title of *An Eſſay concerning rational Notions* &c. Towards the end of Prop. VIII he profeſſes *to ſay Somewhat concerning Space.* He tells us that "the Opinion or "Conceit of Some that SPACE is nothing at all, "is a wild and extravagant Notion: for *Nothing* "hath no Manner of Exiſtence, which we are "ſure from continual Experience SPACE has." * It would have been kind in this Author, if he had informed us what *Manner of Exiſtence* SPACE has: and I ſhould be glad to know what *Experience* he has had of SPACE, that makes him ſo *ſure* it has Exiſtence. "*Nothing* [he ſays] hath no "Manner of Exiſtence, which we are ſure from "continual Experience SPACE has:" that is, if we ask him why SPACE is *Something*? he anſwers — becauſe it has *Exiſtence, i. e.* becauſe it is *Something.* If we ask how he knows that it has *Exiſtence*? why, he knows it, becauſe *he's ſure of it:* That is, SPACE is *Something*, becauſe *he's ſure of it*; which is an Argument of ſuch Force, that I ſhall not attempt to anſwer it. This Author ſeems to me, not to know what the Gentlemen on our Side the Queſtion have ſaid; or to ſee the Difficulties and Objections which oppoſe this *Rational Notion* of his: For if he had, he could never have thought it ſufficient to ſay, that the *Conceit* of Some, that SPACE is Nothing, *is a wild and extravagant Notion*; or to think he had done the Buſineſs, by adding a trite Objection or two, which had more than once been anſwered. He is miſtaken if he thinks his Arguments are new; or that the Queſtion may be treated in ſuch a *wild*

* Eſſay concerning Rational Notions p. 186.

and

and extravagant Manner, as he has done. —— But enough of this Author and his *Notions*.

You quote from me the following Paſſage *viz*. "If it [Space] has Parts, it muſt be diviſible; "for the very Notion of Parts implies Diſcerpi- "bility: to ſay that any Thing has Parts, and "yet that thoſe Parts are inſeparable, ſeems to be "near a Contradiction. I think the Ideas of "Extenſion, and indiviſibility, are incompati- "ble." * You anſwer — "This is a bare Aſſer- "tion, and without any Colour of Proof *&c.*" † If the very Notion of *Parts*, implies *Diſcerpibility*, then there was no Occaſion to give any other Proof: and whether it did not imply it, I thought ſufficient in this Place to leave with the Reader. But in my Anſwer to your *Second Defence*, I had given you a Proof of it: But you have not thought proper in either of theſe Places, to make any Anſwer to it. Inſtead therefore of ſaying that I had here given *a bare aſſertion without any Colour of Proof*; you ſhould have conſidered the *Proof* which you might have found by turning over a few Pages; and either have anſwered it, or given up the Point. Your taking Notice that I have not *here* produced a Proof, is no doubt deſigned to make the Reader believe, that I had produced no Proof of it *at all*; and ſince I had given a Proof of it in p. 126, to take no Notice of *That* is a mere Evaſion.

You ſay — "It is true indeed, that whatever "is not extended, ſuppoſing an unextended Sub- "ſtance poſſible to be, ſuch a Subſtance would "be indiviſible: but it does not follow, that

* Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of Space, Examined p. 31.

† Third Def. p. 26.

"what

" what is extended, muſt be diviſible: I am ſure " it is plainly otherwiſe in the Caſe of SPACE."* —— I am ſure *this is a bare Aſſertion, and without any Colour of Proof.* I ask, what is the Reaſon that an *unextended* Subſtance would be *indiviſible?* Is it not, becauſe it has *no Parts*? and if this be the Reaſon, does it not imply that if it *had Parts* it would be *diviſible?* I doubt you will find it difficult to avoid this Conſequence.

WHATEVER is extended, *has Parts*; This, I preſume, will be allowed me: The Queſtion then is, whether that which *has Parts*, muſt not have *diviſible* Parts? And here we ought, I think, to argue according to the common, and received Meaning of the Words *Extenſion*, and *having Parts*; or elſe you ſhould have told us what you mean by thoſe Expreſſions. Every Man, who makes Uſe of Terms where Doubts may ariſe about their Signification, is obliged either to explain his Meaning, or to uſe them according to that which is the common, and received one; *i.e.* He is obliged either to give us his own *peculiar* Senſe, or elſe to talk according to *common* Senſe.—Now, I ſuppoſe every one underſtands, that to *have Parts* is to be *compounded* of *Parts*; and to be *compounded of Parts* is to *conſiſt of Parts joined together*; and Parts that are *join'd together*, may be ſuppoſed *aſunder*; *i. e.* may be *diviſible.* — In the Idea then of *Parts*, is plainly implied *Diviſibility:* If every Thing then which is *extended* has *Parts*, then every Thing which is extended has *diviſible* Parts; and that every Thing which is *extended* has *Parts*, I fancy wou will hardly deny: Whatever therefore is *extended*, muſt be *diviſible.*

* Third Def. p. 26.

I AR-

I ARGUED to this Purpoſe in my laſt Piece, to prove the very ſame Thing, namely that what is *extended* is *diviſible:* but you have thought proper, as I juſt now obſerved, not to attempt any Anſwer to it, as I deſire the Reader to remark by conſulting Dr. *Clarke's Notions of* SPACE *examined* p. 125, 126. and this your *Third Defence* p. 89, 90: and therefore ſince you repeat the ſame Aſſertion, namely, that what is *extended* need not be *diviſible*, without taking any Notice of the Anſwer before made to it, I have a Right to repeat here that Anſwer; which, if it had any Force before, muſt have the ſame Force ſtill.

YOU ſay in the Page before mentioned *, that you "ſuppoſe I endeavour to maintain the No-"tion of the Soul's being an unextended Sub-"ſtance." I muſt confeſs that at preſent it is my Opinion; and though it may be difficult to us in this preſent State, to conceive an *unextended Subſtance*; which I imagine proceeds from our being converſant with none but *extended* Subſtances; yet, unleſs I could conceive, that an *Immaterial Subſtance* could be *diviſible*, or that *Extenſion* does not imply *Diviſibility*, I muſt ſtill retain the Notion, that the Soul is not extended—That it muſt be *diviſible*, if *extended* was the Argument I there urged, by ſhewing that *Extenſion* implied *Diviſibility:* This Argument, I ſay, you make no Reply to: but inſtead of it you tell us, that *an Immaterial Subſtance may be* diviſible, *for what* you *know* †: and in another Place, you ſay that——"A Spirit may be, for all this Gen-"tleman can ſhew to the contrary, an extended

* Third Def. p. 90

† See Third Def. p. 90.

"divi-

"divisible Substance." * I must observe therefore, that your Conduct looks as if you saw the Difficulties attending *Indivisible Extension:* and therefore, instead of saying any Thing against my Argument brought in Answer to your *Second Defence*, to confute that Notion; or producing any Thing against it *here*, except a certain Instance of *an extended indivisible Thing*, which I shall take further Notice of presently; you chuse to argue that, *for what You know an immaterial Substance may be divisible*; and therefore, that my Argument to prove it *not extended, because it would then be divisible*, required no Answer. This, Sir, may seem a plausible Way of evading a Defence of *indivisible Extension*, when we argue that a *Spirit* must be *divisible*, if *extended:* But since you have thought proper to maintain the Notion of *indivisible Extension* in other Parts of your Book; you ought to have answered the Argument which I produced against it: But you have not done it, and therefore till you do, you have not answered me, nor defended your self.—— To tell us, as you do here, that you are *sure it is plainly otherwise in the Case of Space* †, is a downright begging the Question: for we are *here* disputing (which surely you forget) whether SPACE, if it *has Parts*, must not be *divisible*; and it is therefore arguing, like the Anonymous Author just now remarked upon, that *it is so, because you are sure of it*; which the Reader, if he pleases, is to take for a Proof.

BUT although you will not attempt to defend *Indivisible Extension*, by answering my Arguments; yet you will endeavour, you say, "to give the

* Third Def. p. 28. † Ibid. p. 26.

"Author an Idea of an extended indiviſible "Thing; or at leaſt ſhew him, that the two Ideas "of Extenſion and Indiviſibility are not in- "compatible." * — And now let the Reader prepare for a very curious Invention! It is this — "Let us ſuppoſe a Yard Cube of Matter free "from all Pores, ſo that it ſhould be perfectly "ſolid: Suppoſe this Matter ſurrounded with "Something, that ſhould hinder its being ſepa- "rated into any Parts whatever; that is, ſhould "hinder the Body from taking more Room." † — I cannot think, Sir, but you muſt ſmile at your ſelf, when you produced this extraordinary Inſtance, this Quinteſſence of Proof. — "It is "plain, you ſay, that this Matter is extended, "and it cannot be divided *&c.*" ** It is very plain indeed, Sir, that this Matter cannot be actually divided, ſo long as it is *ſurrounded with Something that ſhall hinder it*; that is, it cannot be divided, when it cannot be divided. But you aſſign an *external accidental* Impediment: You *ſuppoſe this Matter ſurrounded with Something, that ſhould hinder its being ſeparated into any Parts whatever:* A notable Inſtance indeed, of an *extended indiviſible Thing!* and if you had ſuppoſed this Thing locked up in a Cheſt, it might have proved full as much. It is like binding Something over a Man's Eyes; and then producing him, as an Inſtance of one who hath Eyes, and yet cannot ſee. Do you really flatter your ſelf, you have ſhewn by this Inſtance, that what is extended may be, *in its own Nature*, indiviſible?

* Third Def. p. 26. † Ibid. p. 27,

** Ibid.

THIS is what you muſt explain to me; or elſe you are fighting with the Wind. My Aſſertion was this, that *the Ideas of Extenſion, and Indiviſibility, were incompatible:* Now, it is evident I muſt mean, that what was *extended*, muſt, *as ſuch*, and *in its own Nature*, be *diviſible*; not, that what is *extended*, cannot by *accidental Impediments* be ſecured from *actual Diviſion*. To what Purpoſe then have you been talking about a Piece of *Matter*, *ſurrounded with Something that ſhould hinder it from being ſeparated*? You might as well have told us, of a Piece of Matter at the Bottom of the Sea, which no Body can come at; or that Matter is not, *as Matter*, diviſible *in infinitum*, becauſe I cannot cleave a Grain of Sand with a common Hatchet. You ſeem not to know the Diſtinction, of a Thing being indiviſible, *as it is that Thing*, or *in its own Nature*; and being *accidentally* ſo: The extended Piece of Matter which you mention, is ſtill, *in its own Nature*, and *as it is extended*, diviſible, let it be ſurrounded with a Rock of Adamant: Such an accidental Impediment may hinder it from being *actually divided*; but does not alter the *Nature* of *Extenſion*, or of the *Thing extended:* It ſtill retains the *Nature* of *Diviſibility*, notwithſtanding it cannot, in your Inſtance, be *actually divided*. You have therefore failed, Sir, in your Endeavours to ſhew me by this Inſtance, *that the two Ideas of Extenſion, and Indiviſibility, are not incompatible:* They ſeem to me to be as incompatible as ever: And let any one try, whether or no, in the Inſtance you mention, he can have an Idea of that Piece of Matter being *extended*; without having at the ſame Time, the Idea of its being, *in its own Nature*, diviſible: If he cannot, you have been labouring in vain.

"If we ſuppoſe this ſolid Matter to be infi-
"nite, it will be a tolerable Repreſentation [you
"ſay] of the Indiviſibility, and Extenſion of
"SPACE."* In Anſwer to this, I muſt obſerve

FIRST, that *If we ſuppoſe this ſolid Matter to be infinite*, i. e. *poſitively*, and *metaphyſically* infinite; by which we mean *perfect*, or, to which Nothing can be *added*; if we ſuppoſe this ſolid Matter, I ſay, to be infinite, in this Senſe; we ſuppoſe, what ſeems to me to be an Impoſſibility and a Contradiction. For, as it conſiſts of *Parts*, it muſt be conſidered as *Quantity*, or *Number*; which in their very Nature include perpetual *Increaſableneſs* or *Addibility*; and muſt therefore, in their very Nature, be incapable of this *poſitive*, or *metaphyſical Infinity*. And to ſuppoſe this ſolid Matter to be infinite in the other Senſe; *viz. negatively* infinite, which is the only Infinity that can be applied to *Quantity*, is nothing more than to ſuppoſe, that the Mind of Man has a Faculty of going on in infinitum; and enlarging this Matter in his Mind, without being able to ſtop any where: but this Senſe of *Infinity* will not here ſerve your Turn; and the other, as I have obſerved, is a Contradiction.

SECONDLY, I anſwer, that I cannot conceive any *extended* Being without Parts; nor conſequently either *Infinite*, or *indiviſible*: I cannot conceive it to be *poſitively* infinite for the Reaſons above given: and I cannot conceive it to be *indiviſible*; becauſe I can never think of *Parts*, but immediately my mind anſwers, *Diviſibility*: and

* Third Def. p. 27.

there-

therefore, till you can produce a Proof, that the very Notion of *Parts* does not imply *Diviſibility*; or, that a Thing may be *extended*, without having *Parts*; I ſhall never be able to conſider an *extended Being*, under any Circumſtances whatſoever, without, at the ſame Time, conſidering it as *Diviſible*.

THIRDLY — The ſuppoſed *poſitive Infinity* of this ſolid Matter, is aſſigned as a Reaſon for its being *indiviſible*, though it be *extended*: and as this Inſtance is brought as a Repreſentation of the *Indiviſibility*, and *Extenſion* of SPACE; ſo I preſume, that the *poſitive Infinity* of SPACE is aſſigned as the Reaſon, for its being *indiviſible*, notwithſtanding it is *extended*: If ſo, I muſt beg Leave to inform you, that the *poſitive Infinity* of SPACE, muſt never be alledged to me, as a Proof of its being *indiviſible*; or as a Proof of any Thing at all about it; becauſe I deny it to be any Thing *poſitively infinite*, as well as to be *extended*. You muſt not therefore go on quite ſo faſt with me; but prove firſt, that SPACE is *real Extenſion*, and that it is *poſitively infinite*; and then, but not before, you may boldly aſſign *ſuch Infinity* for a Proof, where it will be of any Service to you. But at preſent, Sir, we are but juſt where we ſet out: For if you tell me *Space is extended, and has Parts*; I anſwer, *It is then diviſible*: If you urge, that *it is poſitively infinite*; I reply, you have not *proved it*. I deny it to be *real Extenſion*; but if it was, I deny that there can be any real Extenſion *poſitively infinite*, or That to which nothing can be added: And you muſt prove that there can, before you aſſign the *Infinity* of *real Extenſion*, as a Proof that *real Extenſion* may be *indiviſible*,

INFINITY (i. e. *poſitive* Infinity or *Perfectneſs*) and *Extenſion* are in my Ideas, as incompatible, as *Extenſion*, and *Indiviſibility*; and will to me remain ſo, until I can find out a *Number*, to which nothing can be *added*, and clear up all the Abſurdities of an *infinite Series*.

THE Ideas then of *Extenſion* and *Indiviſibility*, which you have been endeavouring to reconcile, will, I believe, appear as incompatible as ever, to thoſe who thought them ſo before. You have hitherto failed in producing any Proof; and therefore, if you think it worth your While, you muſt try once again, to invent another Inſtance of an *extended indiviſible Thing*; but I dare ſay, you will find none comparable to the former.

YOU remark that — "the Difference [between "SPACE, and your infinite extended Matter] is "only this, that to ſeparate the Parts of SPACE, "is both to croud thoſe Parts into one another, "and to leave SPACE between; but to ſeparate "the Parts of the Matter, is only to croud the "Parts into one another; both which we ſee, "from the Nature of each of them, is impoſſi-"ble."* If we could by an impoſſible Suppoſition imagine Matter *infinitely extended*, yet, there ſeems to me to be no Occaſion, *to croud the Parts into one another*, in order to its *ſeparation*: for let Matter be ſuppoſed to be extended *ad Infinitum*; yet, whilſt you and I conſider it as conſiſting of *Parts*; inſtead of being at the Trouble of *crouding the Parts into one another*; we need only ſuppoſe one ſingle Part to be *annihilated*, and the Buſineſs is done: And this, by the Way, ſuggeſts to me an Abſurdity, which follows upon ſuppoſing that

* Third Def. p. 27.

Matter

Matter can be *poſitively infinite*: For, if when we have imagined (as far as we can imagine) Matter to be *infinite*, in the Senſe above mentioned; if, I ſay, we can after this, ſuppoſe an Inch of it to be annilated; then it muſt either ſtill remain *infinite*, and then *one Infinite* will be *bigger* by an Inch, than *another*; or elſe, the Addition of an Inch, would make that *infinite*, which was *finite* before; both which Suppoſitions are alike abſurd. — As to the other Part of your Remark, *viz.* that "to "ſeparate the Parts of SPACE, is to leave SPACE "between"; I muſt obſerve, that it is indeed very true, that we cannot ſeparate the Parts of SPACE; but not becauſe it is to *croud thoſe Parts into one another, and to leave* SPACE *between*; but becauſe SPACE *has not any Parts* to be ſeparated: and when you try to ſeparate the ſuppoſed Parts, the Reaſon why you ſtill muſt always leave SPACE, is only this, *viz. Take Nothing from Nothing, and there remains Nothing.*

I HAD ſaid, that "a Spirit is *indiviſible*, and "for that very Reaſon, *not extended*; for it is "very manifeſt that an *indiviſible Being* cannot admit of a *diviſible Quality*, which *Extenſion* is *&c.*" * Upon this you exclaim — "Where has our Au- "thor proved Extenſion to be a diviſible Quality? "and if he has not proved it, I muſt take the "Liberty to ſay, that it is not." † I reply, that I had proved it in the 126, and 127*th Pages*: and therefore, inſtead of *taking the Liberty* of ſaying, that *it is not*; and asking, *where I had proved it to be ſo*; it would have looked much

* Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 31.

† Third Def. p. 28.

fairer,

fairer, if you had turned to the forementioned Pages, and had *taken the Liberty* to *anſwer* them.

But you proceed—"A Spirit, he ſays, is in-"diviſible, and for that Reaſon not extended. "If he means by Spirit an Immaterial Subſtance, "then I ſay, that it may be queried whether it "is indiviſible, or no, and ſtill the Argument "againſt Matter's thinking be equally concluſive "*&c.*" * I muſt obſerve here, that you artfully turn off the Point of *indiviſible Extenſion:* we are diſputing, whether or no That which is *extended*, muſt not be *diviſible*; I aſſerted that it muſt; and then added, "I know the Reply to this is ready, "*viz.* Is not a Spirit extended, and is it not in-"diviſible? I anſwer; that a Spirit is indiviſible, "and for that very Reaſon, not extended: For "it is very manifeſt, that an indiviſible Being "cannot admit of a diviſible Quality, which Ex-"tenſion is; any more than a diviſible Being "can admit of an indiviſible Quality; which is "the Reaſon, that no Syſtem of Matter can be "intelligent." †

Now, inſtead of defending your Notion, that what is *extended* may be *indiviſible* (which is the Point in Hand) you take Occaſion to drop That, and proceed to tell us, *that it may be Queried, whether an immaterial Subſtance is indiviſible or no; and and ſtill the Argument againſt Matter's thinking, be equally concluſive.* Now ſuppoſing this Paſſage to be as true, as it appears to me to be falſe; it is dropping, I ſay, your Notion of *indiviſible Extenſion:* For to Query, whether an Immaterial Subſtance may not be *diviſible, as well as extended*;

* Third Def. p 28.

† Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of Space Examined p. 31.

at

at a Time when I am arguing that That, or any other Thing, *muſt be diviſible, if extended*; is rather admitting, that the *Ideas* of *Extenſion* and *Indiviſibility* are incompatible, than arguing againſt it. According to my Apprehenſion, it would have been more to your Purpoſe in this Place to have ſtill inſiſted upon it, that an immaterial Subſtance was *extended*, and yet *indiviſible:* here would have been an Aſſertion at leaſt (which is very often all the Proof you will condeſcend to give us in other Points) of *indiviſible Extenſion.* But the Truth is, you ſeem conſcious of the Abſurdities of that Notion; and are therefore willing to wave the Point: And, as you had maintained in other Places, that the *Soul* is *extended*; and as I had urged that it muſt then be *diviſible*; you here chuſe to *Query*, whether an immaterial Subſtance may not be *diviſible*; rather than put it on the other Foot, namely, that a Thing may be *extended*, and yet *indiviſible*; leſt if you ſhould be unable to make that good, your Notion of *extended Spirit* ſhould be utterly confuted. — But let us conſider this Notion of *diviſible Spirit.*

I MUST firſt obſerve, that you ſeem to have changed your Opinion, with Reſpect to this Point. It is not long ſince you believed, that immaterial Beings *muſt neceſſarily be indiſcerpible* (as the Reader may ſee, by turning to p. 43, 44. of your *Firſt Defence*) and that *as evidently as the known Properties of* Matter *prove it to be certainly a* diſcerpible *Subſtance*; *ſo evidently, the known and confeſſed Properties of* immaterial Beings *prove them to be* indiſcerpible: But notwithſtanding you there believed them to be *indiſcerpible*; and tell us, that they are *proved* to be ſo, from their *known* and *confeſſed Pro-*

perties; yet now, it ſeems, that an immaterial Subſtance *may, for what you know,* be *diviſible.*

You will perhaps anſwer, that your Notions are now conſiſtent with what they were before; for that when you talked of the *Indiviſibility* of *immaterial Subſtances*; you meant, as you in your *Third Defence* expreſs your ſelf, that they were *indiviſible*, as *thinking Subſtances*; but that, as *immaterial Subſtances*, they might be *diviſible:* This might ſeem a plauſible Way of reconciling your Sentiments, were it not for another Paſſage which occurs in your *Firſt Defence*; where you ſay, that "according to the Suppoſition of the Soul's be-"ing ſo extended, as to conſiſt of more than one "Point, yet theſe Points would be a *Continuum*, "they could not be ſeparable, *any more than eve-"ry Point of the Deity is.*" * Now, by this Paſſage it is plain, that you then thought, that an *immaterial Subſtance* could not be *ſeparable at all:* For that which cannot be ſeparable, *any more than every Point of the Deity is*, cannot be ſeparable *in any Senſe whatſoever.*—But beſides, Sir, the Purport of your Argument ſhews you meant, that an immaterial Being was indiviſible, *in all Senſes:* For the Paſſage which you quote from Dr. *Clarke* † is brought to confirm what you had before ſaid; namely, that though a *Spirit* be *extended*, yet there is no Neceſſity that it muſt be extended in the ſame Manner as *Matter* is; which you ſuppoſe to be Dr. *Cudworth*'s Meaning; who "ſeems [you ſay] to confound the two Ideas of "Indiviſibility and Non-Extenſion together, as "if they were the ſame Thing, when they are "certainly as wide and diſtinct from one another,

* Firſt Def. p. 42. † Ibid. p. 43, 44

"as

" as any two Ideas poſſibly can be. That they " are ſo, is very plain, from the Conſideration " of the Nature of SPACE, which no-Body " can be ſo abſurd, as to ſay is not extended, " and yet muſt allow, that it is indiviſible and in- " ſeparable." * — It is evident from hence, that your Meaning was, to maintain the Notion, that the Soul might be *extended*, and yet *indiviſible*; for that *Extenſion* did not imply *Diviſibility:* But if you had only meant, that the Soul might be *indiviſible* as a *thinking* Subſtance, and *diviſible* as an *immaterial* Subſtance; then your whole Argument will be Nothing at all to the Purpoſe. For to ſay that any *extended* Being is *indiviſible* as a *thinking* Subſtance, tho' it may be *diviſible* as an *immaterial* Subſtance, is no Proof or Reaſon, that what is *extended*, may be *indiviſible:* For if it be divi- ble *in any Conſideration whatever*, it is *ſimply diviſible:* And conſequently you would leave the Notion of *indiviſible Extenſion*, by ſuch an Argument, juſt where you found it. — It is plain therefore from the foregoing Obſervations, that the Author of the *Firſt* Defence, and the Author of the *Third* Defence, tho' the ſame Perſon, yet widely differ in their Sentiments.

Now I cannot aſſign any other Reaſon you could have, for admitting here, what you had denied before; but, that you was ſenſible of what Doctor *Clarke* confeſſes, in the Paſſage you have cited from him †; *viz.* that, " How far ſuch " *Indiſcerpibility* can be reconciled, and be conſiſt- " ent with ſome kind of *Expanſion* — is another " Queſtion of conſiderable Difficulty." And finding this *conſiderable Difficulty* hanging heavy

* Firſt Def. p. 42. † Ibid. p. 43, 44.

over you; and that you would be reduced to this Dilemma; either to give up the *Extenſion*, or the *Indiviſibility* of *Spirit*; you choſe to *Query* the *latter*. You will not ſay that it *is* diviſible; leſt you ſhould be forced, one time or other, to contradict your ſelf: Nor will you ſay, that it is *not* diviſible; leſt you ſhould not then be able to maintain its *Extenſion*: and therefore you find out a Medium, and tell us, that *it may be queried whether it is indiviſible or no*, and ſtill the Argument againſt *Matter's thinking* would be equally concluſive *.

THIS you aſſert; whether you have made it good, comes now to be examined: And I beg Leave to ſay, you are ſo far from it, that I will ſhew you have by your own Arguments which you have brought to ſupport it, proved the direct contrary.

THAT this may appear, I ſhall produce what you admit to be the Argument uſed by *All Authors* who have argued againſt *Matter's Thinking*; and I ſhall ſhew, that if *Spirit* be *diviſible*, in the Manner you here aſſert it to be, the ſame Argument will equally prove againſt a *Spirit's Thinking*: If I do this; then I ſhall hereby ſhew, that you prove (becauſe it will follow) from your own Arguments, that, *if a Spirit be diviſible, the Argument againſt Matter's Thinking, will not be equally concluſive.*

" ALL Authors [you ſay] that were for con-
" futing the Notion of Matter's Capacity of
" thinking, always endeavoured to prove the Im-
" poſſibility of it, from its having ſo many *di-*
" *ſtinct Percipients* in it; that is [you continue]

* Third Def. p. 28.

" be-

" becauſe it *conſiſted* of an infinite Number of *di-*
" *ſtinct whole Subſtances.*" * Theſe are your own Words: And a little before, you tell us, that a *Spirit* may, by *Diviſion*, become "ſeveral imma-
" terial Subſtances." †—Now, from hence will I ſhew, that a Spirit, according to your Notion of it, muſt *conſiſt* of ſeveral *diſtinct whole Subſtances* (as you are pleaſed to call 'em) *ſeveral diſtinct Percipients*; from whence it will appear, that the Argument, which you allow to be concluſive againſt *Matter's Thinking*, (*viz.* its having ſo many *diſtinct Percipients* in it) will be equally concluſive againſt *Spirits Thinking*.

IF a Spirit may be *divided*, and by ſuch Diviſion become *ſeveral immaterial Subſtances*; as you grant it may; then it is obvious, that a Spirit muſt *conſiſt of ſeveral immaterial Subſtances*: For otherwiſe you muſt ſay, that a Spirit may be *divided* into thoſe Things, of which it does not *conſiſt*; and that the Whole does not conſiſt of its Parts. Now, if a *Spirit* conſiſts of *ſeveral Subſtances*, it muſt, as well as *Matter*, conſiſt of ſeveral, *diſtinct*, *whole Subſtances*; unleſs you have found out a Diſtinction of *whole* Subſtances, and *not whole* Subſtances; if you have pray acquaint us, what Sort of Subſtances Thoſe are, which are not *whole* Subſtances! According to the little Knowledge I have of Things, That which is not an *whole* Subſtance, can be *no Subſtance at all*, in whatever Senſe the Word *Subſtance* be underſtood: For, to talk of an *Half-Subſtance*, would, I preſume, be thought no better Senſe, than to talk of an *Half-Being*, or an *Half-Property*; which would be dividing Beings, Properties *&c.* into

* Third Def. p. 29. † Ibid. p. 28.

whole

whole Beings, and *half Beings*, *whole Properties*, and *half Properties* — a Diviſion, to which my Metaphyſics have never yet carried me!

Now ſince that which conſiſts of *diſtinct whole Subſtances*, muſt conſiſt of ſo many *diſtinct Percipients* (as you allow; by making the *having diſtinct Percipients*, and the *conſiſting of diſtinct whole Subſtances* to ſignify the ſame *) it follows, that a *Spirit conſiſts* of ſeveral *diſtinct Percipients*.

Since then you admit that *All Authors who were for confuting the Notion of* Matter's *Capacity of* thinking, *always endeavoured to prove the Impoſſibility of it, from its having ſo many* diſtinct Percipients *in it*; *that is, becauſe it conſiſted of an infinite Number of* diſtinct whole Subſtances: And ſince I have ſhewn from your own Notions of a Spirit's Diviſion, that a *Spirit* muſt, according to you, *conſiſt* of ſeveral *diſtinct whole Subſtances*, and therefore of ſeveral *diſtinct Percipients*, as well as *Matter*; the natural Concluſion is, either that it is impoſſible for a *Spirit* to *think*; or elſe that the Argument againſt *Matter's* Thinking is by no Means concluſive.

I must therefore farther obſerve, that if the Argument againſt Matter's Thinking *be* concluſive; then, ſince upon Suppoſition that a *Spirit* is *diviſible*, it would *not be* concluſive; as I hope I have proved; it follows, that a *Spirit* cannot be *diviſible*, as you aſſert it *may be for what you know*. I cannot therefore but wiſh, Sir, that you had either known more, or aſſerted leſs.

* See Third Def. p. 29. Your Words are theſe — "its *having* ſo many *diſtinct Percipients* in it; *that is*, "becauſe it *conſiſted* of an infinite Number of *diſtinct whole* "*Subſtances*."

You

YOU argue much to the ſame Purpoſe, in the *Vindication* of your *Second Defence* *. What therefore I have ſaid here, is a ſufficient Anſwer to both. — But, ſince in this laſt mentioned Place, you tell us that "the Soul is a *Continuum*, or "*one, uniform* Thing †;" it is incumbent upon you, to explain your Meaning; and reconcile it to your Notion, that the Soul "may be *diviſible*, "for what you know," which you aſſert a few Lines above it. You ſay indeed, that it may be *diviſible*, as an *immaterial* Subſtance, but *indiviſible*, as a *thinking* Subſtance **; but this will be of no Service to you in the preſent Caſe: For if it be *diviſible* into *ſeveral* immaterial *Subſtances*, as you aſſert it may, for what you know; and is yet *one, uniform* Thing, which you likewiſe aſſert; you muſt either reconcile theſe Notions; or we muſt conclude, that you are irreconcileably inconſiſtent.

I SHALL conclude this Point with obſerving briefly, that the Reaſon which has induced Men to imagine that Spirits are extended, ſeems to me to be This. They ſuppoſe that no Properties can ſubſiſt but in ſome *Subſtratum*; that is, in Something different, and diſtinct from all its eſſential and conſtituent Properties; Something, in which all theſe Qualities, Properties *&c.* are *ſtuck*, and by which they are ſupported. They ſuppoſe therefore, that *Thinking*, and *Willing* &c. muſt have ſuch a Subſtratum. Now, being converſant with material Objects, and conſidering them as having a Subſtratum, and finding them all to be extended; hence they have aſſociated their two Ideas of

* Third Def. p. 90. † See Ibid.

** See Ibid.

a *Sub-*

a *Subſtratum*, and *Extenſion* together; in ſuch a Manner, as whenever they think of a *Subſtratum*, they always conceive it extended: And from hence conſidering Spirits to have a *Subſtratum*, and always joining the *Idea* of Extenſion to every Subſtratum, they conceive *Spirits* to be *extended*.—But I paſs on to another Argument.

ARGUMENT VI.

From BODY *being extended* INTO SPACE.

YOU argue, that if a Body be extended into SPACE, and SPACE be Nothing; "then is the "Body extended into Nothing. what therefore "is the Difference between being extended into "Nothing [into no where] and not being ex-"tended at all*? I am obliged to repeat, that when I ſay SPACE is *Nothing*, I mean that SPACE is *not a Thing*, that it is not a *real Exiſtent*: Is it then any Conſequence, that what is not extended into a *real Exiſtent*, muſt not be *extended* at all? But your Miſtake lies in imagining that what is extended into *Nothing*, muſt be extended *no where*; for *Somewhere*, or *ſome Place* is not a *Thing*, unleſs in the Senſe that *Relations* are *Things*; viz *Ideal Things*. Place is a Relation of Site, which one Body bears to another; and when we ſay that a Body is extended into a *Place*, we mean that the Part of the Body which is the Increaſe, bears a certain Relation to other Bodies, which before it did not. A Body may therefore be extended in-

* Third Def. p. 30.

to no-*Thing*; and yet be extended *Somewhere*; i. e. not extended into *Nowhere*.

BUT I had ſaid that "when the Body is ex-"tended into a Void, that Void becomes full, "which is all the Myſtery." * — To this you anſwer—"If all the Myſtery is, that Nothing be-"comes full; I beg this Author to tell me the "Difference between the Fulneſs of Nothing, "and no Fulneſs at all *&c.*" † To ſay that a Void becomes full, is only ſaying that there is *real Extenſion*, whereas before there was not: and that when there is real Extenſion, there is not a Void. But to talk, as you do, of the *Fulneſs of Nothing*, or the Fulneſs of a Void, is confounding Words; and amounts to the ſame as talking of a *full Void*, or a *full Nothing*. It is making the Void one *Thing*, and *Fulneſs* another; whereas, where *Body* is, there is no *Void*. If you would pleaſe therefore, to ask your Queſtion in intelligible Engliſh, you ſhould ſay "what is the Dif-"ference between a Void becoming full (which "was my Expreſſion) and no fulneſs at all?" and then I anſwer; there is juſt the ſame Difference, as there is between a Void and no Void, Body and no Body, *real* Extenſion and *Ideal* Extenſion.

* Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 34.

† Third Def. p. 31.

ARGUMENT VII.

From the DISTANCE *and* PLACE *of* BODIES.

YOU had ſaid, that "If there was no Diſtance "exiſting really, it would unavoidably follow, "that the Sun and Moon exiſted both in the "ſame individual Place." * To which I anſwer'd that "Diſtance is the imaginary Length of SPACE, "conſidered between any two Beings *&c.*" † You now reply — "what is This but allowing "the Conſequence I mentioned? For, if the "Diſtance of the Sun from the Moon be only "imaginary, it cannot be real; therefore the Sun "and Moon are really in the ſame Place, though "they are in our Imagination at a Diſtance," **

I SAID, that *Diſtance is the imaginary Length of Space*; upon which you reply; *If the Diſtance of the Sun from the Moon, be only imaginary, it cannot be real:* But pray Sir, who ſaid that the *Diſtance* was *imaginary?* The *Diſtance* is *real*, i. e. *real Diſtance*; or the Bodies are *really diſtant:* But yet, when Diſtance is conſidered as *a Length of Space*, it is imaginary *Length:* that is, it is not the Length of any *really exiſting Thing*. And here likewiſe may be anſwered what you offer in the *Vindication* of your *Second Defence*; where, becauſe I had ſaid, that "when we ſpeak of Things "being diſtant, we mean it of ſome Relation, or

* Firſt Def. p. 32.

† Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 37.

** Third Def. p. 32.

"Acci-

"Accident in the Things themſelves;" * — You reply—"That is, in plain Engliſh, the Diſtance "that is between two Bodies, is not *between* them, "but *in* them." † From whence you take Occaſion to play upon the Words *in*, and *internal* Relation, for fifteen Lines together. — It is ſufficient therefore to tell you, that the Relation is neither *in* them, nor *between* them: And that when I ſpoke of Diſtance, as a Relation *in* Bodies; I meant no more, than a Relation *of* Bodies, or a Relation which Bodies bear to each other.

THE Sun and Moon are not only diſtant in *Imagination*; but *really* ſo: For it does not follow, that becauſe *Diſtance* is *imaginary Length*, therefore it muſt be *imaginary Diſtance*; or that becauſe Diſtance is no *Thing*, therefore it muſt be no *Diſtance*; any more than that becauſe *Virtue* and *Vice* are no *Things* (*i. e.* no *real Exiſtents*) therefore that there is no Virtue or Vice in the World, or that Men cannot be ſaid to be either Virtuous or Vitious. And thus I conclude, that Diſtance is no *real Thing*, is only a Relation of Bodies, yet not an imaginary Relation (which would be the ſame as no Relation) but that it is really predicable of Bodies, or that Bodies [the Sun and Moon for Inſtance] may be ſaid to be *really diſtant*, and therefore do not exiſt in the ſame Place, tho' Diſtance be no *really exiſting Thing*.

BUT it is endleſs to diſpute about Words: and a Perſon who is reſolved to do it, may go on wrangling for ever. And This may be an Excuſe for omitting ſeveral *little* Objections of this Sort, which run through your Performance. To fol-

* Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 113.

† Third Def. p. 80

low you minutely in every Step you have taken, might perhaps take away all Room for future Cavils, and leave you nothing to ſay; but as I am ſenſible, it could afford but very little Entertainment, or Improvement to the Reader, I may very well be excuſed.

You take Notice of an Expreſſion of Mr. *Locke*, viz. *beyond the Univerſe*; from whence you would prove Space to be *Something real*. You argue that — "To ſay beyond the Phænomena of Na- "ture, means either that there is Something be- "yond them; or elſe there is no Difference be- "tween *Finity* and Infinity; becauſe we can in "both Caſes ſay, there is nothing *beyond* them." * Let us conſider what is meant by Beyond, for herein lies the Fallacy. Could we ſuppoſe the Phænomena of Nature infinite, in a poſitive Senſe, we could not ſay *beyond* them, but why? not merely becauſe there could be no *Thing exiſting* beyond them; but becauſe there could be no *beyond*. Now if the Phænomena of Nature be finite, it is proper and true to ſay *beyond* them, becauſe there *may be* Something exiſting beyond them, or becauſe there is *beyond*. *Space* and *beyond* are here the ſame: And if you can prove *beyond* to be a *Thing*, a *Being*, a *Property of God*; then, and not before, will this Expreſſion of Mr. *Locke* prove Space to be *Something*. — In ſhort, to ſay *beyond the Phænomena of Nature* does not mean that there is any *Thing exiſting beyond* them; but only, that the Phænomena of Nature are finite.

The Sum of what you ſay farther on this Head is This; *viz.* That "our Idea of the ab- "ſolute Place of any Thing, is an Idea of its

* Third Def. p. 35.

"Ex-

"Exiſtence in ſome Part of the Univerſe": and, that "there can be no relative Place without "an abſolute Place:" and, that "if Diſtance be "Nothing, there can neither be any relative, or "abſolute Place."* My Anſwer to which is This—If by *Exiſtence in ſome Part* of the Univerſe, you mean Exiſtence in ſome *really exiſting* Part of SPACE; this is ſuppoſing that SPACE is Something *really exiſting*, which is the Queſtion: And it will remain to be ſhewn, that Bodies cannot exiſt in a *relative* Place, without exiſting in an *abſolute* one, in ſuch a Senſe of *abſolute Place*: that is, it will remain for you to ſhew, that Bodies cannot bear a Relation of Site to each other, unleſs SPACE be a real Exiſtent. If you ſay that a Body cannot exiſt at all, unleſs it has ſome abſolute Place; and by *abſolute Place* you mean as above; then you muſt ſhew, that a Body cannot exiſt, unleſs SPACE be really exiſting too. By a Body's *exiſtence in Space*, I underſtand nothing more than *extended Exiſtence*: And it is no Conſequence, that if SPACE be not a real Exiſtent, an extended Being cannot exiſt. A Body indeed cannot be extended, unleſs there be a *Void*, or a *poſſibility* of its being extended: But then it muſt be proved, that this *Poſſibility* is a *real Thing*. we muſt, 'tis true, preſuppoſe SPACE to the Exiſtence of every Thing which is to exiſt in it; but this is only to preſuppoſe a *Poſſibility* of their *Exiſtence*: The *Preſuppoſition* of SPACE does not prove its *real Exiſtence*.

WHEN we ſay that a Body exiſts in *abſolute Place*; the Meaning is, that we conſider its Exiſtence *abſtractedly* from the *Relation* which it bears

* Third Def. p. 35, 36.

to

to other Bodies: And then, what we call the *abſolute Place* of that Body, is only its *mere Exiſtence*. This I take to be the true Meaning of *abſolute Place:* And then indeed there can be no *relative Place* without an *abſolute Place*; that is, Bodies cannot bear Relation of Situation to other Bodies, unleſs they *exiſt*; or, they cannot exiſt in *Place* (for, properly ſpeaking, there is no *Place* by *relative*) if they do not exiſt at all. But This, I apprehend, is no Proof of the *real Exiſtence* of SPACE.

ARGUMENT VIII.

From the IMPOSSIBILITY *of* ANNIHILATING SPACE.

DR. CLARKE argued, that SPACE could not, even in Thought, be *annihilated*; that it would *remain*, even after it was ſuppoſed to be *annihilated:* and from hence the learned Doctor would prove SPACE to be NECESSARILY EXISTING.* In *Defence* of this Argument you urged — "To "ſuppoſe SPACE away, certainly amounts to the "foremention'd Abſurdity [*i. e.* that it remains, even after it is taken away, or ſuppoſed to be annihilated] "for the Idea of it neceſſarily ruſhes "into our Minds; and we cannot but ſuppoſe "it to exiſt, even after we have tried to ſuppoſe "it annihilated." † In this Argument I could ſee no Force; and in anſwer to it, I obſerved, that if it ſhould be admitted, that the *Idea* of

* See Dr. CLARKE's *Anſwer to the ſixth Letter.*

† Firſt Def. p. 47.

SPACE,

SPACE, after all Endeavours to ſuppoſe SPACE *away*, would ſtill *ruſh into our Minds*; yet, it would not from thence follow, that SPACE muſt have *real Exiſtence*, much leſs *neceſſary* or *ſelf Exiſtence* — that *Ideas* may ruſh into our Minds, which have nothing *ad extra* correſpondent to them—that it ſeemed evident to me, that the very Reaſon why SPACE *i. e.* the *Idea* of SPACE, after all Endeavours to the contrary, does ſtill ruſh into the Mind, is becauſe SPACE is *mere Nothing*; and to ſuppoſe NOTHING *away*, or to endeavour, even in Thought to *annihilate* NOTHING, is a Contradiction; becauſe in the Idea of *Annihilation*, we always preſuppoſe the *Exiſtence* of *Something*; and when we endeavour to imagine NOTHING *annihilated*, *Nothing* will remain; for to annihilate *Nothing*, is to turn *Nothing* into *Nothing*, and therefore the *firſt Idea*, after all our Suppoſitions, ſtill recurs, and conſequently, if this be an Argument for the NECESSARY EXISTENCE of SPACE, it is full as good for the NECESSARY EXISTENCE of NOTHING.

BUT you are pleaſed in Reply, to ask the following Queſtions — *viz.* "If after all Things, by "which I now mean all created Subſtances, and "their Properties, are ſuppoſed to be annihilated, "this Author has an *Idea* of *Nothing*, which "ruſhes into his Mind, whether he will or no; "I ask, *Firſt*, what Sort of an Idea it is? *Secondly*, "whether it be an Idea of Nothing, nowhere, "or Somewhere *&c.*" * To your firſt Queſtion I anſwer, that it is an Idea ariſing neceſſarily from the Suppoſition which you make: It is an *Idea* of *Reflection*. I had before an *Idea* of Theſe Sub-

* Third Def. p. 37.

ſtances,

ſtances, that is, of their *Exiſtence:* I now conſider their Exiſtence to *ceaſe*; and what is my *Idea* then, but an *Idea* of the Negation of all created Exiſtences? and if I ask my ſelf what remains? will not my Mind immediately anſwer, *Nothing?* (for the Supreme Being is out of the Queſtion) and if, after This, I endeavour to annihilate, or to ſuppoſe NOTHING *away*, and again conſult my *Ideas*; ſhall I not find, that I have the ſame Idea I had before? To your ſecond Queſtion I anſwer, that it is neither an *Idea* of Nothing *Nowhere*, nor *Somewhere*; unleſs in ſuch a Senſe, as *Ideas* may be ſaid to be *Somewhere*. It is a *mere Idea* ariſing from imagining the Exiſtence of all created Subſtances to ceaſe. The remaining Part of this your 37*th Page*, is only ringing Changes upon the Words *Nothing Somewhere*, and *Nothing Nowhere*, and therefore I ſhall leave you to entertain your ſelf with the Muſic.

THIS Argument, urged by Dr. *Clarke* for the neceſſary Exiſtence of SPACE, *viz.* that it cannot be annihilated, is as it ſeems, a favourite one with Thoſe Gentlemen on his Side the Queſtion. I muſt own, I have often wondered, that the learned Doctor could think there was ſo much Force in this Argument as he ſeems to do; till I chanced to meet with the following Paſſage in Mr. WHISTON's *Hiſtorical Memoirs*; where he relates a Circumſtance of Dr. CLARKE's Life, which he ſays was communicated to him from the Doctor's own Mouth.—"One of his [Dr. "CLARKE's] Parents asked him, when he was "*very young*, whether God could do every Thing? "He anſwered, yes. He was asked again, whe-"ther God could do one particular Thing, could "tell a Lie? He anſwered, no. And he under-"ſtood

" ſtood the Queſtion to ſuppoſe, that this was " the only Thing, that God could not do: " Nor durſt he ſay, *ſo young was he then*, he " thought there was any Thing elſe which God " could not do: While yet, he well remember'd, " he had even then, a clear Conviction in his " own Mind, that there was one other Thing " which God could not do; *viz.* that he could " not *annihilate* that SPACE which was in the " Room wherein they were. Which Impoſſi- " bility now appears even in Sir ISAAC NEW- " TON's own Philoſophy." *

FROM this *Memoir*, I am not at all ſurpriſed that Dr. CLARKE believed SPACE to have *real Exiſtence*; or to find the *Impoſſibility of its being annihilated*, alledged in his Writings, as a Proof of its *neceſſary Exiſtence*. Mr. WHISTON has ſet the Matter in its true Light. It appears, that the Notion of SPACE being Something really exiſting *ad extra*, and the Impoſſibility of its Annihilation, were *natural* to him; Notions which he had when he was *very young*: And it is well known, that whatever is ſtrongly imbibed at ſuch an Age, too often remains with us all our Lives after. If the Idea of a *Phantom*, in our infant Years makes any ſtrong Impreſſion upon our tender Minds; we find it ever after very hard, if not impoſſible to *get rid of it*; it almoſt neceſſarily *ruſhes into our Minds, after all our Endeavours to the contrary*.

DR. CLARKE's Principle, that SPACE cannot be annihilated is, I think, a very true one: But then the Queſtion is, whether it cannot be anni-

* Mr. WHISTON's *Hiſtorical Memoirs of the Life of* Dr. SAMUEL CLARKE p. 15. Edit. 2.

hilated, becauſe it is *neceſſarily exiſting*; or whether, becauſe it is *Nothing?* you aſſert the former, and I the latter; it is therefore incumbent upon you to prove your Affirmative. As I apprehend, the *Impoſſibility of Annihilation* can be no Proof of the *neceſſary Exiſtence* of any Thing, unleſs that Thing be firſt proved to *exiſt*: For otherwiſe, the *Impoſſibility of Annihilation* will prove the *neceſſary Exiſtence* of *Nothing*. Your Argument begins at the wrong End: You firſt *ſuppoſe* SPACE to have *real exiſtence*; and then finding you cannot ſuppoſe it *annihilated*, you conclude that it muſt be *neceſſarily exiſting*. But it ſhould firſt be put out of all Doubt, that SPACE has *real Exiſtence*; and then indeed, if it cannot be ſuppoſed to be annihilated, it will follow that it is *neceſſarily exiſting*: Whereas, in this Argument, its *real Exiſtence* is taken for granted; and then you endeavour to prove its *neceſſary Exiſtence*, by an Argument which will, as I have obſerved, equally prove the *neceſſary Exiſtence* of *Nothing*.

YOU tell me the "actual remaining of SPACE "follows from the Impoſſibility of getting rid "of the Idea of its real Exiſtence, that is, from "the Contradiction implied in ſuppoſing it not "to exiſt." * I muſt take the Liberty, Sir, to inform you, that the *actual Exiſtence* of SPACE *ad extra*, by no means follows from your not being able to *get rid of* the *Idea* of its actual Exiſtence, or from your imagining (without ſhewing) that there is a Contradiction implied in ſuppoſing it not to exiſt. What if you could not *get rid of* the *Idea* of a *Caſtle in the Air?* — muſt there be *really* ſuch a *Thing*? If then, after all the Reaſon-

* Third Def. p. 80.

ing

ing that has been uſed to convince you, all the Arguments that have been urged, you ſtill find, that you can by no means *get rid of* this troubleſome Idea; it is your Misfortune: But you muſt not endeavour to perſuade us, that becauſe you *cannot help thinking* that SPACE is a *real Exiſtent*, therefore it muſt really be ſo —— A Man that ſhould have the Jaundice from his Birth, would by no means perhaps be able to get rid of the Idea of every Thing he ſaw being yellow: But I ſuppoſe, he would be thought to have a worſe Diſtemper, ſhould he endeavour to perſuade all Mankind, that *therefore* they really were ſo.

To conclude this Point. It appears, that Dr. CLARKE received into his Mind this *Notion* of the *neceſſary Exiſtence* of SPACE, when he was *very young*. It was one of the earlieſt of all his Thoughts: He ſeems as it were *cum lacte Nutricis errorem ſuxiſſe* * And it is no ſtrange Thing, that Men ſhould become zealous Votaries to thoſe Opinions, which they have entertain'd in their Minds from their very Infancy — and *a propos* in this Place, are the Words of Mr. LOCKE; "It is eaſy to imagine, how by theſe Means "it comes to paſs, that Men *worſhip* the *Idols* that "have been ſet up in their Minds; grow fond "of the Notions they have been long acquaint-"ed with there; and *ſtamp the Characters of* DI-"VINITY *upon Abſurdities and Errors.*" †

* Cicer.

† Eſſay on Hum. Underſtand. B. 1. c. 3. §. 26.—Edit. 9.

ARGUMENT IX.

That SPACE *is a* MODE *or* PROPERTY *of* GOD.

IN Defence of Dr. CLARKE, you ſay that "in proving SPACE to be Something from its "Qualities, he did not conſider it ſtrictly as a "*Property*, but as its own *Subſtratum*." * — The Meaning of this you explain, by what you call a parallel Inſtance; "A Capacity, you ſay, of di-"ſtinguiſhing betwixt Right and Wrong, Truth "and Falſhood, are Qualities accompanying "Knowledge; if therefore we ſee theſe diſtin-"guiſhing Qualities in any Being, ſhould we "not immediately apply Knowledge to this Be-"ing, and conclude that it was a Property of "this Being? So likewiſe, in the Caſe before "us: If we perceive that Something is pene-"trable, extended, *&c.* and that no Being could "be ſo, except SPACE was Something; will it "not moſt evidently follow, that SPACE is Some-"thing? and if it be a Property, that it is a "Property of that Being?" † You here imagine, that the *Capacity of diſtinguiſhing betwixt right and wrong* &c. is Something *diſtinct* from *Knowledge*; whereas it is *Knowledge* it ſelf: And therefore, if we ſee this *diſtinguiſhing Quality* in any Being, we ſhould undoubtedly apply *Knowledge* to it, and conclude that it is a *Property* of this Being: why? —Becauſe this *diſtinguiſhing Quality* is *Knowledge*; and therefore this is only ſaying, that if we ſee

* Third Def. p. 38. † Ibid. p. 39.

Know-

Knowledge in any Being, we ſhould conclude that *Knowledge* is a *Property* of this Being — But the Caſe before us is widely different. *Penetrability* and *Extenſion* are no Properties of God. And tho' *Immobility*, *Indiſcerpibility*, and *Infinity* are, yet this will not prove SPACE to be a Property of him, as a *Capacity of diſtinguiſhing between Right and Wrong, Truth and Falſhood*, will prove Knowledge to be a Property of that Being, in whom we find ſuch a Capacity: And for this plain Reaſon; *viz.* becauſe ſuch a *Capacity* is *Knowledge*: but *Immobility*, *Indiſcerpibility*, and *Infinity* are not SPACE; your *parallel Inſtance* is therefore not parallel in the leaſt.

As to *Penetrability*, I told you — "To ſay "that *Penetrability* is a Property of the Infinite "Being, *i. e.* of God, is ſaying that the Infinite "Being, *i. e.* God is *penetrable*; which is ſo ap-"parently blaſphemous, that it cannot by any one "be allowed to be a Property of him." * Now let us hear what Reply you make to this. It is an Anſwer drawn from the Sacred Writings, and uſher'd in with all the Pomp of Words — "God "forbid! it greatly behoves this Author, to con-"ſider upon whom this Accuſation of Blaſphemy "will fall: For if by a Being's being penetrable, "can only be meant that ſuch a Being may have "other Beings in it (and whether it can poſſi-"bly mean any thing elſe I appeal to all the "World;) then let him remember whoſe the "following Words are, *in him we live and move, "and have our Being.*" † —— I well remember, Sir, whoſe Words they are: But I muſt beg Leave

* Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE Examined p. 46.

† Third Def. p. 40.

to obſerve, that they are no Proof of what you contend for.

LITTLE, I believe, did St. PAUL ever imagine, that he ſhould be called upon as a Witneſs in ſuch a Cauſe! little did he think, that his Words would be produced to prove, that we live and move *in* the *Eſſence* of *God*; and, that as we are *in* SPACE we are *in* God; *i. e.* that SPACE is GOD! St. PAUL was ſpeaking to the Men of ATHENS, and endeavouring to aboliſh the Worſhip of *Idols*; and he would hardly have ſet up another in their Room. No; SPACE was an Idol, unknown to thoſe Times! an Idol, reſerved to theſe latter Ages, and for the Diſcovery of ſome modern Engliſhmen! But I muſt confeſs, Sir, you are not the only Perſon who has quoted theſe Words of St. PAUL to the ſame Purpoſe, and underſtood them in ſuch a Senſe: For the *Learned* Dr. CLARKE has done the ſame. Mr. LEIBNITZ calls it a *ſtrange Expreſſion*, to ſay that what is in SPACE, is *in* God's *Immenſity* *. To which the *Learned* Doctor replies, *This ſtrange Doctrine is the expreſs Aſſertion of St. Paul.* Acts XVII. 27, 28.

I MUST own, it is to me Something ſtrange, that either the *Learned* Dr. CLARKE, or any Body elſe ſhould ever underſtand theſe Words in the Manner you do. Had you not been contented to be your own *Commentator*, you would have found this Paſſage explained in a very different Manner by the moſt Learned Interpreters †. But

* *Leibnitz*'s Fifth Paper §. 44.

† Dr. WHITBY's Explanation is this; *viz.* "For in "(or *by*) him we live, and move, and have our Being." Dr. HAMMOND's Paraphraſe upon the Place is, — "For "our Life, Motion, and Subſiſtence is wholly *through* "him." The Learned GROTIUS remarks that it is an

what

what is ſufficient to put St. PAUL's Meaning paſt all Doubt, is the *Context*. When he has ſaid, that *in him we live, and move, and have our Being*; he immediately adds, *as certain alſo of your own Poets have ſaid, for we are alſo his Offspring*, τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν. From whence it is plain, that by theſe Words, *in him we live, and move, and have our Being*, St. PAUL means the ſame, as he does by, *we are alſo his Offspring*; becauſe he mentions this ſaying from ARATUS, as importing the ſame Doctrine which he was teaching. Whatever then is the Meaning of *we are his Offspring*, the ſame muſt be intended by *in him we live, and move, and have our Being*. Now the true Import of the Former is plainly this *viz.* that God is the common *Parent* of Mankind, the *Protector* and *Preſerver* of us all: That we derive our *Being from him*; and owe the *Continuance* of it *to him:* That it is wholly *through* him, or through his *Power*, and *Protection*, that we have our Life, Motion, and Subſiſtence; which muſt therefore likewiſe be the true Meaning of thoſe Words of St. PAUL, *In him we live, and move, and have our Being*. It appears then

Hebraiſm, and underſtands *in ipſo*, to ſignify the ſame as *per ipſum*. His whole Note runs thus *viz.* "Eſt Hebraiſmus. "*In ipſo*, id eſt, per ipſum, ipſius Beneficio. *Per ipſum ex-* "*iſtimus:* ipſe nobis *Vitam* Homini congruentem, & *Motus* "tali vitæ reſpondentes dedit." — And if you will enquire farther; you may find that the Prepoſition Ἐν is render'd by *Per*, as well as *In*; and Ἐν αὐτῷ in this Place is, you ſee, render'd by the Learned, *Per ipſum*; i. e. per ipſius *Omnipotentiam*, & Patrocinium; *through*, or *by Means of* him, or his *Power* and Protection. And agreeable to this, you will find that the *Arabick Verſion* actually has it, not *in Ipſo*, but *Per ipſum* — "ſiquidem *per ipſum* vivimus, mo- "vemus, & exiſtimus." WALTON *Polyg.*

that

that St. PAUL, in the Paſſage you have cited from him to prove it, meant not (as you do) that God is *penetrable*, or that he may have other Beings *in* him. — To charge the Apoſtle with teaching ſuch Doctrine, muſt proceed, either from Ignorance of his plain Meaning, or from a groſs Miſrepreſentation of it.

YOU object to the Inſtance, which I brought to ſhew your Argument (*viz.* that SPACE is the Property of the infinite Being) fallacious. My Inſtance was this *viz.* "God is Omniſcient; he "could not be Omniſcient, unleſs there were "Things for him to know: But does it from "hence follow, that theſe knowable Things are "Properties of God? *" This you think is not a parallel Caſe: And therefore reduce it to ſuch an one, as you think may be of Service to you. "The Argument [ſay you] ſhould have ſtood "thus, and then let the Author judge whether "it be concluſive, or no. An Impoſſibility of "ever being deceived belongs to God; but with-"out *Omniſcience*, this Impoſſibility of ever being "deceived could not belong to God; therefore "God is omniſcient." † But this Argument is no more parallel, than you imagine mine to be. It is very plain, that *it would not be impoſſible* for God to be *deceived*, if *Omniſcience* was *not* a Property of him: And therefore, ſince it *is* impoſſible for God to be deceived; it neceſſarily follows, that *Omniſcience* is a *Property* of him. But is it ſo evident, that God cannot be *Omnipreſent*, if *Space* be not a *Property of him?* This wants Proof; for as yet we have ſeen Nothing but bare Aſ-

* Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 47.

† Third Def. p. 41.

ſertions

ſertions, — An *Impoſſibility of ever being deceived* is *Omniſcience*; but *Omnipreſence* is not SPACE: This ſhews, that your Caſe is *by no means parallel.*

YOU ſay, "If we conſider it, we ſhall find "that it is impoſſible for a Being, to which SPACE "does not belong as a Property, to be indiſcerp-"ible." * — I preſume you will hardly ſay, that SPACE is a Property of any *finite Spirit:* And if not, then it is *impoſſible* for any finite Spirit to be *indiſcerpible.* You have here, Sir, advanced in Knowledge; for you have written but ſix Leaves, ſince you was ſo uncertain in this Matter, as to ſay only, that an immaterial Subſtance *may* be diſcerpible, *for all that you know* †: But now it ſeems, *It is impoſſible* for any finite immaterial Subſtance *to be indiſcerpible.* Yet, what is Something ſtrange, we ſhall find, if we look farther, that you have loſt all this wonderful Knowledge again, and are reduced to your former Uncertainty: For, in the *Vindication* of your *Second Defence*, you tell us again, that an immaterial Subſtance may, *for what you know*, be diviſible **. — But let us hear your Reaſon why it is impoſſible for a Being to which SPACE does not belong as a Property, to be indiſcerpible: It is this; you ſay, that "as SPACE "is a neceſſarily exiſtent Property, there muſt "be ſome Subſtance to which it belongs; and "that Subſtance muſt be Self-exiſtent, and there-"fore ſuperior to all other Subſtances, and con-"ſequently indiſcerpible." ††

IN the firſt Place, we deny SPACE to be a *neceſſarily exiſting Property:* And, in the next Place,

* Third Def. p. 41. † Ibid. p. 29.
** Ibid. p. 90. †† Ibid. p. 41.

tho' it be true, that *If* SPACE be a neceſſarily exiſting Property, there muſt be ſome Subſtance to which it belongs, and that Subſtance muſt be *Self-exiſtent*; yet it does not appear, that there *cannot be* a Self-exiſtent Subſtance, unleſs SPACE *be* a neceſſarily exiſting Property. You go on to ſhew that SPACE may be a *Property*, and yet *have Properties*; and that *Properties* may *inhere in one another*. In order to this, you tell the Reader that what I ſay upon this Point, "is only raiſing a "Diſpute about the Words, Figure and Shape; "but which-ever of them is the Genus [ſay you] "is nothing to our Purpoſe: Figure, or Shape, "let him take which he pleaſes for the Genus, "in its general Meaning, is a Property of Finite-"neſs, or of all finite Subſtances." * — What I ſaid was not *merely raiſing a Diſpute about the Words Figure and Shape:* My Obſervation, that *Shape* may be ſaid to be the *General* of all *Figure*, as well as *Figure* to be the *General* of all *Shape*, was to ſhew that *Shape* and *Figure* were only two different Words for the ſame Thing: That they could not therefore be ſaid to be *Modes* of *each other*. Shape or Figure muſt be conſider'd either in the *Abſtract* or *Concrete*; in the former Senſe it is a *mere Idea*, and therefore can have no *Properties* aſcribed to it. In the latter, it has Exiſtence in Body only, and therefore different *Modes* of it will in a ſtrict Senſe be only different *Modifications* of *Body*, or *Body* exiſting under *different Shapes*. To ſay that particular *Shapes* are *Modes* of *Figure* is talking of *figured Figure:* and to tell us, that "*Roundneſs* is not a Quality of Body, "becauſe it cannot be applied to *all Bodies* † " is

* Third Def. p. 42. † Ibid.

trifling:

trifling: And I might as well tell you again, that it is not a Mode of *Figure*, for the ſame Reaſon: For I would have you recollect, whether it can be applied to *all Figures*.

ARGUMENT X.

The two DEMONSTRATIONS *of the* REAL EXISTENCE *of* SPACE.

" SPACE is either *abſolutely Nothing*, or a *mere* " *Idea*, or a *Relation* between one Thing and ano- " ther; or it is *Body*, or ſome *Subſtance*, or the " *Property* of ſome Subſtance. But it is neither " *Nothing*, nor a *mere Idea*, nor a *Relation*, nor " *Body*, nor any *Subſtance*; therefore it muſt be a " *Property* of ſome Subſtance." * This is Dr. CLARKE's famous *Demonſtration* (as 'tis called) of the real Exiſtence of SPACE, which you had produced in your *Firſt Defence* †. And this *Demonſtration* you likewiſe endeavoured to ſupport, by other *Media* of your *own*, for the Benefit of Thoſe who might not ſee the Force of the Doctor's. Upon theſe I offered ſome Remarks **. You have ſince endeavoured to vindicate the Doctor, and your ſelf, from the Difficulties I had raiſed againſt you; but I meet with little or nothing, but what has been already obviated; and therefore I ſhould want the Reader's Excuſe, were I to re-examine them minutely, and particularly. But leaſt you ſhould think what you have urged to

* Dr. CLARKE's 5*th* Reply to Mr. LEIBNITZ.

† Firſt Def. p. 59.

** Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE, Examined.

be unanſwerable, were I to paſs them by without Notice, I ſhall make a few Strictures upon them.

FIRST, SPACE ('tis ſaid) *is not abſolutely Nothing*, in Proof of which you offer theſe three Things.

1. "*It has Quantity*, becauſe it has Length, "which is Quantity" * — that is, Quantity is Quantity, SPACE has Quantity, therefore SPACE has Quantity. Wonderfully edifying This! But I muſt put you in Mind, that I deny SPACE to have *Length which is Quantity*. You ſay "it is "plain that it has Length, for otherwiſe all Bo-"dies would be equal and alike." † If this Argument has any Force, it lies too deep for me to fathom it; and till it is brought to Light, I ſhall only ſay, that I never yet heard of any other Reaſon, for Bodies not being equal in Length, but that one was longer than another. The Difference is only in the Bodies themſelves.

2. *It has Dimenſions.* All the Proof you bring of This is, that "Dimenſions are only Lengths "every way, or Length, Breadth, and Depth." ** This Argument muſt therefore ſtand, or fall with the Former, for unleſs you can prove SPACE to have *Length*, it will hardly appear to have *Breadth*, or *Depth*.

3. *It has Properties* — This you tell us, "has "been ſufficiently ſhewn, and is unqueſtionable." †† But thoſe Arguments by which you think you have *ſufficiently ſhewn* SPACE to have Properties, are *ſufficiently anſwer'd* in their Place. You add theſe Words *viz.* "unleſs This, or ſome other "Author can ſhew the Impoſſibility of Properties

* Third Def. p. 45. † Ibid.
** Ibid. p. 46. †† Ibid.

"in-

" inhering in one another." * But herein, Sir, you are greatly miſtaken! for it is by no means incumbent on us here to ſhew, that Properties cannot inhere in one another: No; 'tis your Buſineſs to prove that SPACE has Properties, in order to prove its Exiſtence. We don't argue that SPACE is a *Property*, and therefore cannot *have Properties*: No; we deny SPACE to be a Property; and only urge that Properties cannot inhere in Properties, to ſhew your Inconſiſtency, who, at the ſame Time that you ſay it is a *Property*, contend for its *having Properties*.

BUT my Principles, it ſeems, *tend towards Atheiſm* †; and why? becauſe you aſſert that I ſuppoſe SPACE to be a *Property of Body* **. But what Reaſon you could have for this I know not, when I neither affirm'd, nor intimated any Thing like it. You ought, Sir, to have laid the Paſſage before the Reader, in which you pretend that I make ſuch a Suppoſition: But the Caſe is, *there is no ſuch Paſſage* as will ſupport your Charge, and if the Reader will give himſelf the Trouble to turn to p. 53. of Dr. *Clarke's Notions of* SPACE *examined*, againſt which Page, it ſeems, the Accuſation lies, he will ſoon be convinced that what you ſay is without Foundation. To ſuppoſe SPACE a *Property of Body*, would be a Suppoſition abſolutely inconſiſtent with my conſtant Deſcription of SPACE, as *mere Nothing*, or an *Idea only*, or the *Abſence* of Body; and few, I believe, will imagine, that I ſhould ſuppoſe the *Abſence* of Body to be a *Property* of Body — The Reaſon therefore

* Third Def. p. 46. † Ibid.

** Ibid.

of

of this Aſſertion of yours, is what you are ſtill to account for.

Secondly, "Space [ſays Dr. *Clarke*] is not "a mere Idea; for no Idea of Space can poſſi- "bly be framed greater than finite, yet Reaſon "ſhews that it muſt be infinite." * To which I anſwer.

Space may be conſidered, either as a *Void*, a mere *Negation of Body*; or as the *Idea* of *Extenſion*. All the *Infinity* which can be applied to it under the former Conſideration is ſuch as may be applied to *Nothing*. It may be ſaid to have *no Bounds* or *Limits*, not becauſe it is a Being *really* extended *in infinitum*; but becauſe it is *no Being at all*; and therefore has not *Reality*, or *Exiſtence*, ſo as to be *capable of having* Bounds. The *Infinity* which is attributed to Space under the latter Conſideration *viz.* as the *Idea of Extenſion*, is only the Impoſſibility of ſetting Bounds to that Faculty, which the Mind has of enlarging the *Idea* of *Extenſion*. Such *Infinity* is only a mere roving *Idea*, an indefinite Increaſableneſs †. To imagine this to be a true *poſitive* Infinity, and to attribute it to a *really exiſtent Being* is all over Contradiction, and Abſurdity; 'tis ſuppoſing it to be *poſitively infinite*, and yet continually capable of being *increaſed*, i. e. infinite and finite at the ſame Time: or elſe 'tis to find out a *Number* ſo great as to admit of no *Addition*; which is what has been always looked upon to be the greateſt Abſurdity poſſible in

* Third Def. p. 47.

† To this Purpoſe ſpeaks Mr. Locke. "Our Idea of "*Infinity*, even when applied to *Expanſion*, and *Duration*, "ſeems to be Nothing but the *Infinity* of *Number*." — Eſſay on H. U. B. 2. c. 16. §. 8.

Philo-

Philoſophy; too great for any one to maintain, till Mr. JACKSON, in a late Piece, thought fit to oblige the World with the Diſcovery *

BUT it is ſaid, that we *cannot but* conceive SPACE to be infinite; that the Mind is not only *capable of enlarging* its Idea of Extenſion *in infinitum*, but that *it cannot but enlarge it in infinitum* †. I reply, this muſt either mean in *Reaſon*, or in *Imagination*; in *Reaſon* we cannot but enlarge our *Idea* of *Extenſion* without Bounds, for otherwiſe our *Faculty* of *enlarging* muſt be *bounded*; but in *Imagination*, what *Idea* we have of SPACE or *Extenſion*, is neceſſarily finite and limited. We can think of a Yard, or Mile in length, or of the Diameter of the *Orbis Magnus*; which will be having an *Idea* of a determinate Length, *i. e.* in the Language of theſe Gentlemen, of a determinate Quantity of SPACE.

IN the *Vindication* of your *Second Defence* p. 82. you ſay, "were SPACE not truly, and poſitively infinite, there muſt be a Poſſibility of "ſtopping Somewhere, when we add finite SPACES together."—To this I reply, that the Reaſon why we cannot ſtop, in adding finite SPACES together (*i. e.* why we cannot ſtop if we try to go on, for otherwiſe we may ſtop) is becauſe there are no Limits to our Faculty of Numbering, and therefore the Faculty of Numbering being boundleſs is the Reaſon, not only why we *can* go numbering on, or *can* enlarge our Idea of Extenſion in infinitum; but why we *cannot but* do it, if we endeavour at it. But this no more proves SPACE

* See *The Exiſtence and Unity of God proved from his Nature and Attributes* — p. 87.

† See *Exiſtence and Unity* &c. p. 86.

to

to be any Thing poſitively infinite *ad extra*, than it proves *Number* to be ſo. All the Truth then that I can find in this Propoſition of Dr. *Clarke*'s (*viz.* no Idea of SPACE can poſſibly be framed greater than finite, yet Reaſon ſhews it muſt be infinite) is This. *viz.* That our *Idea* of SPACE as *Extenſion* being an Idea of *Imagination*, ſuch an Idea muſt be *finite*; yet *Reaſon* ſhews that we can repeat *theſe Ideas*, without ever finding any *Limits*, or *Bounds* to our *Faculty* of *Repeating*.

MR. JACKSON obſerves, that "we find we "cannot but add *in infinitum*, not to the *Ideas* "formed in the Imagination, there is ſoon an "End of them, but to the *Ideatum's* or *Things* "*Themſelves*." * But I think he might have known, that we deny there are any *Ideata* or *Things themſelves* in the Caſe. What he calls the *Ideatum*, in the Caſe of SPACE, is what we call a *Void*, or *mere Nothing*; and why there is no End to SPACE under that Conſideration, requires no great Sagacity to account. SPACE, conſider'd as a *Void*, or a *Negation of Body*, has no End or Limits, in the ſame Senſe as *Nothing* has no End: And conſidered as the *Idea* of *Extenſion*, has no End or Limits, in the Senſe that *Number* has no End.

BUT you charge me with *ſuppoſing Matter to be infinitely expanded*, i. e. as you explain it, that *Matter may be made infinite* †. And from hence you argue, that "if SPACE be a Poſſibility of "the Exiſtence of Matter (as *we* allow) SPACE "muſt be infinite." ** But you ſhould have been careful here to have diſtinguiſhed between

* Exiſtence and Unity &c. p. 83.

† Third Def. p. 47 ** Ibid. p. 47, 48.

poſitive

poſitive Infinity, and ſuch an *Indefiniteneſs* (improperly called *Infinity*) as is predicable of Quantity. I allow Matter may be infinitely expanded in the latter Senſe; *i. e.* a Quantity may be ſuppoſed greater than any given (for I have not as yet found out the *laſt Number.*) But to ſuppoſe it capable of poſitive Infinity, is to ſuppoſe that nothing can be added to it, that 'tis boundleſs and unmeaſurable, that 'tis more than either Imagination or Number (without the help of Mr. JACKSON's Numeration Table) can poſſibly reach to. And if any one will maintain ſuch Abſurdities, I aſſure him, he ſhall have no Controverſy with me.

YOU proceed next to argue for the *real Exiſtence* of SPACE, from the Difference betwixt *That* and *Duration.* Your whole Argument is *petitio Principii.* Becauſe we can talk of *certain Ideas* and make *Propoſitions* about them, therefore you would argue that they are *real Entities:* Becauſe we can predicate Things of *Virtue*, which cannot be predicated of *Vice*, therefore, according to you, they muſt be *real Entia.* SPACE or Extenſion has Reſpect to the *Bulk* of a Body; DURATION has not, (which is the true Meaning of the notable Difference you have found between SPACE and DURATION *viz.* "that the bigger any Body is, "the greater Part of SPACE it requires for its "Exiſtence, whereas in DURATION, it takes up "the ſame Part of it, whether it be great or "ſmall.)" * This Difference I acknowledge to be between SPACE and DURATION; but it is only a Difference of *Ideas.* SPACE and DURATION are two *different Ideas*, applied to *Body* in

* Firſt Def. p. 61.

two different Reſpects, the one as to its *Extenſion*, the other as to its mere *Exiſtence* conſider'd as *continuing*. But this does not prove that SPACE and DURATION are any *real Things* differing in Themſelves: It proves only that they are *different Ideas*; and not that either, or both of them muſt have an *objective Reality*.

THE other Part of the Doctor's Disjunction we are both agreed in *viz.* that SPACE is neither a *Relation*, nor *Body* nor ſome *Subſtance*. But in the Sequel, you carp at ſome of my Expreſſions, and endeavour to ſupport your Arguments, by a ſuppoſed Defect, or Inconſiſtency in mine. Thus you obſerve:

1. "HE calls SPACE Nothing, and yet allows "it to have a Relation to Something. Can No-"thing have a Relation to Something?" * Can you really think that this deſerves an Anſwer? Has not *Anatomy* a *Relation* to the *Human Body*, and *Botany* to *Plants*; and yet will you ſay that *Anatomy*, and *Botany* are *real Entia*? or thus; the *Quantity* of *Gold* has *Relation* to its *Bulk*, which the *Quality* has not; is *Quantity* therefore a *real Entity*? — Pleaſe, Sir, but to turn to my *Firſt Chapter* concerning the different Senſes of the Term *Nothing*; and I believe it will help you out of all your Difficulties.

2. YOU obſerve "that I ſeem throughout my "Reply, to imagine we can have an Idea of No-"thing, from the Abſence of Something." † I anſwer — we have an Idea of SPACE *from*, or *by Reaſon of* the Abſence of Body: *i. e.* We have firſt an *Idea* of *Body* from *Senſation*; and then ſuppoſing Body *away*, we have an *Idea* of SPACE:

* Third Def. p. 51. † Ibid. p. 52.

By

By reflecting on what it is for *Body* to occupy *Space*, or to be endued with *Solidity*, or *Impenetrability*, we perceive what is the *Reverſe* of This, or what *Extenſion* is *without Solidity*.

3. YOU call upon me to explain what I mean by an *Idea of Nothing* *; which I do, by explaining the Term *Nothing*, which is equivocal. If by *Nothing*, be meant a Negation of all *Things both Real and Ideal*, then an *Idea of Nothing* is *no Idea*; but if it means a Negation only of real Exiſtencies *ad extra* (in which Senſe I have always applied it to SPACE) then an *Idea of Nothing* will be an *Idea without an objective Reality*; and ſuch may be the Idea of SPACE, for any Thing you have ſaid.

4. YOU ſay that — "as he thinks that ſimple "Ideas may be Ideas of Nothings, he ſhould find "out ſome new Way to prove, that Things exiſt "without us *&c.*" †

BUT I apprehend the old one to be ſtill very ſufficient: Tho' I think 'tis pretty plain, that you make no Uſe of it. Your Way is to argue from *Ideas* to *Things*; whereas Mr. LOCKE is of Opinion, that "the having the Idea of any Thing "in our Mind, no more proves the Exiſtence of "that Thing, than the Picture of a Man evi-"dences his being in the World, or the Viſions "of a Dream make thereby a true Hiſtory." ** The Caſe is, we are not ſo to depend upon our Perceptions (be they Simple or Complex) as to conclude immediately, that every one of them muſt neceſſarily have Objects *ad extra* correſpondent to them. We muſt examine them by

* Third Def. p. 52. † Ibid.

** Eſſay on H. U. B. 4. c. xi. §. 1.

thoſe Ways which we are furniſh'd with, by Reaſon, Experience, Attention, *&c.* and I am perſuaded, that none of Theſe will ever bear Teſtimony to the real Exiſtence of SPACE.

BUT you "grant that the Idea of SPACE is "firſt got from *Body*, that is, the Idea of the "*Space or Extenſion of Body* &c."* Pray Sir what do you mean by the *Space of Body*? You are here fallen into the very Hypotheſis you was ſo lately fixing upon me; and if therefore to make SPACE a *Property of Body*, be *tending towards Atheiſm*, I hope you will remember whoſe Principles they are: And will likewiſe find out ſome new Diſtinction, to reconcile the two Hypotheſes, of SPACE being a Property of God, as well as a Property of Body — You ſee, Sir, I do not think it ſufficient to tell the Reader, that *our Author ſuppoſes* SPACE the Property of Body at the Top, or *Bottom of a Page*; but I fairly produce the Paſſage, againſt which my Exceptions lie; that any one may judge, whether I tax you falſly or not: To do otherwiſe, is an Art to which I can never prevail with my ſelf to deſcend.

I HAD ſaid that "we have no Idea, no Notion "at all of the Subſtance of which SPACE is ſaid "to be a Mode *viz.* of the Self-exiſtent Subſtance: "— how then can SPACE be affirm'd to be a "Mode of him." † In anſwer to This, you would ſhew that my Argument proves too much. You endeavour to make it follow from my Principles, that we cannot know any of the Properties or Attributes of God. The Sum of your Objection may be thus compriſed *viz.* "He af-

* Third Def. p. 53.

† Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 74.

"firms

" firms [ſay you] that we cannot tell whether " a particular Property can be applied to any Sub- " ſtance, unleſs we have ſome Idea, ſome Notion " of that Thing which we call the Subſtance. " He ſays likewiſe, that we have no Idea, no No- " tion at all of the Self-exiſtent Subſtance: How " then can he prove *Omniſcience*, *Omnipotence*, and " *Eternity*, to be Properties of God; ſince with- " out knowing his *Subſtance* (which he ſays we " know nothing of) we cannot tell whether they " belong to him or no." And then you conclude, as before, with flinging out your Charge of *Atheiſm:* " I ſhould be loth [ſay you] to en- " tertain Principles whoſe natural Conſequences " lead ſo near Atheiſm, as theſe ſeem to do." *— To this I anſwer, that there is no Neceſſity of knowing the *Subſtance* of *God*, in order to a Proof of ſuch Attributes as relate not at all to the *Modus* of the Divine Exiſtence. The *Exiſtence* it ſelf is one Thing, and the *Modus* of that Exiſtence quite another; a Perſon may know the *former*, and yet be wholly ignorant of the *latter*. We prove the *Exiſtence* of God *a poſteriori*, or by aſcending from *Effect* to *Cauſe*; and from thence we deduce *Omniſcience*, *Omnipotence* &c. Attributes which we may, and do know to belong to God, tho' under an entire Ignorance of the *Divine Subſtance*, or of the *Modus* of his *Exiſtence*. Nor when we call him Omnipotent, or Omniſcient, do we at all define his *Subſtance*, any more than we define the *Subſtance* of a King, by calling him Wiſe or Powerful. But how widely different is the Point with Reſpect to SPACE, which you call his *real Extenſion:* For in Order to know that *Extenſion* is a Pro-

* Third Def. p. 58.

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perty of God, it is not ſufficient to know that he *exiſts*; but a Knowledge is required likewiſe of the *Modus* of his Exiſtence, becauſe *Extenſion* relates to the *Modus of Exiſtence:* And therefore, ſince we know nothing at all of the *Modus* of God's Exiſtence (which is what I meant by ſaying that we have no Idea, no Notion at all of the *Subſtance* of which SPACE is affirmed to be a *Mode*) How can any one preſume to affirm, that SPACE is a *Property of the Deity?* But you pretend to be clear in Subjects the moſt dark and myſterious, and to comprehend, what all Writers whether Divines or Philoſophers, have allowed to be Incomprehenſible. The Divine Subſtance is better known to you, than what you are daily and hourly converſant with: For you ask "will any one pre-"ſume to ſay that he *knows not as much* of the "SELF-EXISTENT SUBSTANCE as he does of "MATTER?" * — Such Preſumption deſerves Rebuke rather than an Anſwer; I ſhall only obſerve with Relation to the Point in Hand, that to know that God exiſts, or to know thoſe Properties only which we prove muſt belong to God, as being the *Firſt Cauſe*, is not ſufficient to let us into the Knowledge, whether SPACE be a Property of him or no, for the Reaſons before given; unleſs SPACE be a Property of him, as being the *Firſt Cauſe*; and if it be, then there cannot be a *Firſt Cauſe*, that is a *God*, without SPACE being a Property of him. But if there cannot, then, if the Proof ſhould fail that SPACE is the Property of God, or a Property at all; it will follow, that it cannot be proved there is a God — were I diſpoſed therefore, I might retort upon you with

* Third Def. p. 58.

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the utmoſt Juſtice the Charge of *entertaining Principles whoſe natural Conſequences lead ſo near Atheiſm:* But I am ſenſible that every ſerious Debate ſhould be carried on with Calmneſs, and that calling our Adverſary an *Atheiſt* at every turn can be only to ſupply the Defect of Argument, and fill up the Vacancies of Reaſon; a Charge as trite as it is deſpicable: Nor could ſome of the moſt Learned and Religious eſcape the Cenſure, when they have fallen into the Hands of malicious and calumniating Adverſaries *.

I AM far from ſuſpecting either you, or the Perſon in whoſe Defence you are writing, to believe any of thoſe ill Conſequences to Religion, which ſeem to me to follow from your Doctrine. You contend that SPACE is the *real Extenſion of the Divine Subſtance*; now according to my Metaphyſics, this is to *Deify* SPACE, and make it *God himſelf.* For I can think of *Modes* in no other Way than theſe, either as *abſtract general Ideas* (in which Senſe they have no Exiſtence *ad extra*) or as the *modified Subſtance it ſelf.* Thus *Extenſion* is either *in Abſtracto*, or *in Concreto*; *in Abſtracto* 'tis a *mere Idea*, and *in Concreto* 'tis *Body it ſelf:* And I could never ſee any Foundation

* Jac Frid. REIMMANNI &c. Hiſtoria Uniuerſalis Atheiſmi &c. — *Hildeſiæ apud Ludolphum Schroeder* — 1725 — This Author ſhews that GROTIUS[a], CUDWORTH[b], LOCKE[c], nay even the learned Dr. CLARKE himſelf have not been always free from this Accuſation. —— His Words are theſe — "SAMUEL CLARCK S. B. D. Rector Eccleſiæ "S. Jacobi Weſtmonaſterienſis & Sereniſſimæ Reginæ a "Sacris Ordinariis, Vir in Philoſophia & Matheſi exerci-"tatiſſimus, Arianiſmi ſemet ipſum fecit reum, & *Atheiſmi* "*Infamia* ab aliis *notatus eſt.*" — Sect. 3. c. 8. §. 11.

[a] Sect. 3. c. 11. §. 9. — [b] Sect. 3. c. 8. §. 12. — [c] Sect. 3. c. 8. §. 9.

for

for that Diſtinction of Sir ISAAC NEWTON * and Dr. CLARKE † betwixt *Immenſitas* and *Immenſum*. If SPACE be *Immenſitas Dei*, if it be, as the Doctor calls it, τῦ *Immenſi*; it muſt be *Deus ipſe*, the τὸ *Immenſum*. I ſuppoſe it would be thought a too fine-ſpun Diſtinction, if I ſhould ſay that the *Deity* of the Supreme Being is not the *Divine Being himſelf*; becauſe the Divine Being is *Deus*, not *Deitas*. You ſee what your Arguments when examined will prove, if they prove any Thing: And does it not betray a ſecret Doubt, a conſcious Miſtruſt in Men, that they are wrong in a Point which yet they ſtrenuouſly defend; when they wrap up their Arguments in myſterious Expreſſions, and hang as it were a Veil over their Reaſoning? If your own Sentiments are not what your Arguments, if true, would prove; it may be neceſſary for you to explain the following Paſſage in your *Firſt Defence viz.* "It may not appear ſo proper to ſay that He "[God] is *co*-extended, or *co*-expanded with e-"very Point of the boundleſs Immenſity: For "it is *He*, *his Exiſtence*, that *conſtitutes* every Point "of this Immenſity, IT IS HE ALONE THAT "IS IMMENSE, and even *Space it ſelf* is *not in-*"*finite* independent of him." ** — Theſe are your Words, which I ſhall leave the Reader to make his own Remarks upon.

As to the Notion of *God* being *extended*; that, it ſeems, is thought a very defenſible Hypotheſis. To me it appears big with Abſurdities. In my Anſwer to your *Second Defence*, I remarked that

* See his Princ. Math. Schol. Gen.

† Dr. CLARKE's 5*th* Reply to LEIBNITZ.

** Firſt Def. p. 57.

"to

" to ſuppoſe God extended is a very groſs No-
" tion." * But in your *Vindication* of that *De-
fence*, you tell me that, " if we put any other
" Word for Extenſion that has the *ſame Mean-*
" *ing*, as Expanſion ſuppoſe, the Groſſneſs imme-
" diately vaniſhes." † But I beg of you Sir, put me not off with empty Sounds! If *Expanſion* has the *ſame Meaning* (which you here admit) as *Extenſion*; then the *Meaning* is as *groſs* as ever. I confeſs *Expanſion* is a much prettier Kind of Word than *Extenſion*; and a Poet would undoubtedly chuſe it: But Poetry is not always Truth, any more than Rhime is Reaſon. The Sound will not alter the Senſe. *Expanded God*, tho' a *ſmoother Expreſſion*, is yet as *groſs a Notion*, as *Extended God*, You may call Matter *expanded* if you pleaſe, inſtead of *extended*: But if you do, I believe every one, not excepting your ſelf, would ſtill have the ſame *Idea* of *Matter* they had before.

I SHALL next proceed to the Point of *Eternal Creation*.

* Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE Examined p. 128.

† Third Def. p. 91.

CHAP. IV.

Of ETERNAL CREATION.

LET us now proceed to enquire how the Controverſy ſtands between us, in Relation to the *Poſſibility* of an ETERNAL CREATION.

THAT a Being may have *exiſted from Eternity*, without *Beginning*, and yet have been *created by Another*, has always ſeemed to me to be an Hypotheſis which carries its own Confutation with it, and is nothing leſs than a Contradiction in Terms. But what is there, which Some will not advance? and when advanced by Some, that Others will not defend? —I ſhall endeavour to reduce the Diſpute to as narrow a Compaſs as I can. What we have to ſay, may be diſtributed under the three following Heads.

1. THE Nature of *Creation*.
2. OF *Cauſe* and *Effect*.
3. OF *Eternity*.

1. FROM the Nature of *Creation*, I argued that God could not make an *Eternal Creature*, becauſe it implied a Contradiction: For That which is created, begun to exiſt, and therefore, to make an Eternal Creature is cauſing That to exiſt *without Beginning*, Which yet, by being *created*, is ſuppoſed to *have a Beginning*. To this you anſwer by "denying that *Creation* implies a *Beginning of Exiſtence**" that is, by denying That to be the true Senſe of *Creation*, which all Writers, *Logical* and *Metaphyſical*, have ever underſtood it in.

* Third Def. p. 66.

"*Crea-*

" *Creation* (ſays one of them) is the *Production* of " Something *out of Nothing*, therefore That which " is *created* cannot be *eternal:* For there muſt " have been *Nothing* before there could be a *Crea-* " *ture.*" * And in another Place, " a *creating Cauſe* " is that which *produces* an *Effect out of Nothing.*" † In this Senſe likewiſe Mr. LOCKE underſtands *Creation:* " When the Thing (ſays he) is wholly " *made new*, ſo that no Part thereof *did ever exiſt* " *before*; as when a new Particle of Matter doth " *begin to exiſt, in rerum Natura*, which had be- " fore *no Being*,—this we call *Creation.*" ** And indeed, if this be not the Meaning of *Creation*, I would deſire to know the Difference between *Creation* and *Conſervation* †† ? It would be endleſs to mention All who have underſtood *Creation* in this Senſe: It would be more proper for you to mention *One* who ever underſtood it in any other. Since then every *Creature* muſt have had a *Begin-* *ning* of Exiſtence, it is evident that no *Creature* could have exiſted from *Eternity*, or co-eval with his *Creator*. And indeed it appears to be ſuch an Abſurdity, that one would wonder how any Man can maintain it: A *deſpiſed* and *abſurd* Tenet, as

* Creatio eſt Productio Rei ex Nihilo, ergo quod creatur non poteſt eſſe æternum: oportet enim nihil fuiſſe, antequam crearetur. — *Burgerſ. Inſtitut. Metaphyſ.* Lib. 2. c. X. N°. VII.

† Cauſa *Creans* eſt quæ producit effectum ex nihilo. *Ibid.* L. 1. c. 26. N°. IV.

** Eſſay on H. U. —— B. 2. c. 26. §. 2.

†† *Cauſa procreans* dicitur, quæ Rem efficit, quæ antea non erat: *Conſervans*, quæ efficit Rei exiſtentis Durationem. *Burgerſ. Inſtit. Met.* L. 1. c. 26. N°. II.

Mr. WHISTON, in his Reply to Lord NOTTINGHAM, juſtly ſtiles it*.

I SAID that "whatever was *created*, did once "*not exiſt*." † This [ſay you] "is true only in "a certain Senſe, that whatever was *created in Time*, "did once *not exiſt*; but That which was *from* "*Eternity*, whether it was *created* or not, *did ne-* "*ver not exiſt*." ** But this is only begging the Queſtion *viz.* That what is *created*, may yet be *from Eternity*; and aſſerting that *Creation* does not imply a *Beginning of Exiſtence*, and therefore it requires no further Anſwer.

YOU object—"If God had exerted this Power "from Eternity, and yet the Effect was not from "Eternity, it is evident that there muſt be a "whole Eternity paſs'd between the Exertion of "the Power, and the Effect conſequent upon that "Exertion; becauſe the Effect has a Beginning, "and the Exertion of the Power has none." †† I anſwer: If by the *Exertion of the Power*, you mean the *mere Act of the Will*, then I ſay, that

* "Nor do I quite deſpair of ſeeing ſuch ſhrewd and "cunning *Athanaſians*, as Dr. *W.* driven to this *laſt Eva-* "*ſion*, and of hearing them broach This other great *Atha-* "*naſian* Myſtery, how *deſpiſed* and *abſurd* an one ſoever, "that any *Creature* whatſoever may be ſtrictly ſpeaking, "in Point of *Duration*, *coeternal* with its *Creator*." — *Whiſton*'s Reply to Lord *Nottingham*. p. 30.—But it is proper that the *Remark* upon this Paſſage ſhould be here added — "Mr. *Whiſton* juſtly calls it a *deſpiſed* and *abſurd* Tenet: "only he happen'd to have his Thoughts a little wan- "dering, when he call'd it an *Athanaſian* Myſtery, inſtead "of calling it an *Arian* one. For I never heard of any "one *Athanaſian* but what deſpiſed and rejected it. — *Waterland*'s Second Defence *&c.* QUERY XV. p. 363.

† Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE Examined p. 93.

** Third Def. p. 70. †† Ibid. p. 69.

the

the *Exertion of the Power* might have been *from Eternity*, and yet the *Effect* would not have *exiſted from Eternity*. But then ſay you "there muſt "be a whole Eternity paſs'd between the Exer- "tion of the Power, and the Effect conſequent "upon that Exertion." This Confuſion ariſes from conſidering the *Eternity* of God, as *Something really flowing ſucceſſively*; whereas your Difficulty would ſoon vaniſh, if you would conceive it in that Senſe, which ſeems to me to be the only true one; and that is, "*uniform, invariable Exiſtence:* or "*ſimple Exiſtence*, joined with *Neceſſity:* by "which laſt Word we only underſtand an *Im-* "*poſſibility of having ever begun, or of ever* "*ceaſing.*" * And if this be the true Meaning of God's *eternal Exiſtence*, then the *Eternity* of his *Power of Willing* muſt be conſider'd in the ſame Light *viz.* as an Impoſſibility of its having begun, or of ceaſing: And then to ſay that God *will'd* This, or That Thing *from Eternity*, will ſignify no more, than that ſuch a Thing was the *invariable Will* of God. Let us ſuppoſe then the Exiſtence of his Creatures to be the invariable Will of God: Yet, as theſe are *external Effects* of this *Will*, they muſt *begin to exiſt:* And then in this Way of conſidering it, the *Eternity* which you conceive *Prior* to their *Exiſtence*, and to be Something *actually paſt between the Act of the Will, and the Exiſtence of the Effect*, is only the *ſimple Exiſtence* of the *Deity*.

IF by *Exertion of the Power*, be meant the ſame as the *actual Production* of the Creature (as indeed, to ſpeak properly, it ought to be: For the *Effect* ſhould be conſidered in the *Exertion of the*

* Tranſ. of ABp. *King*'s Orig. of Evil — Remark [XC.] Ed. 1. [R. C.] p. 66. Ed. 2.

Power;

Power; becauſe the *Power* is not, ſtrictly ſpeaking, *actually exerted*, till the *Creature* is *produced*) then I deny that the Power could be *actually exerted from Eternity:* For in this Senſe, the *Exertion* of the Power has a *Beginning*, namely with the Exiſtence of the *Creature*.

BUT then you "deſire to know the Difference "between having a Power from Eternity, with-"out being able to exert it from Eternity, and not having that Power from Eternity at all." * I anſwer here (as before) that if by *exerting the Power from Eternity*, be meant the *ſimple Act of the Will*, then God could exert this Power from Eternity. If the *Effect* be taken into the *Idea* of the *Exertion of the Power*, then indeed he could not exert the Power from Eternity; but then there will ſtill be a wide Difference, between not being able to *exert the Power from Eternity*, in this Senſe, and *not having the Power from Eternity at all*. For to ſuppoſe the Power of creating *actually exerted* from Eternity in *ſuch a Senſe* is, as has been ſhewn, to ſuppoſe a Contradiction: And therefore, ſince God cannot work Contradictions, the Power of creating cannot be *actually exerted* by him from Eternity *i. e.* he cannot produce an *eternal Creature*. But yet tho' he cannot make an *eternal Creature*, he has nevertheleſs the *eternal Power* of Creating: Though he cannot exert the Action of *eternal Creation*, yet ſtill he has an *eternal Power* of exerting the *Action* of Creation: The *Power* is *eternal*, or *invariable*, but the *Action*, the *Creation* muſt be in *Time*, or muſt *begin*. And ſurely it is not difficult, to ſee the Difference between having an *eternal Power* (tho' the *actual Exertion*,

* Third Def. p. 69, 70.

or

or *Effect* of this Power would be in *Time*) and not having the *Power* from Eternity at all.

I ARGUED that "the very Suppoſition that "God had a Power from Eternity to *create*, or "bring any Thing *into* Being, implies that What "he had a Power to *create*, or bring *into* Being, "muſt be once *out* of Being." * "That is [ſay "you] in other Words, The very Suppoſition "that God had a *Power* from Eternity to *create*, "implies that he could not exert that Power from "Eternity *i. e.* he had not that Power from E-"ternity." † — I anſwer: *Power* is one Thing, The *Exertion* of the Power is another. The Exertion of the Power is (ſtrictly) the *actual Creation*, and *Creation* implies a *Beginning of Exiſtence*: Therefore the Suppoſition that God had a Power from Eternity to *create*, is that he had the Power from Eternity of *giving Beginning to what was not*; *Ergo* the very Suppoſition that he had a Power to *create*, implies that What he had Power to *create* was not from Eternity. The very Power of *doing* ſuppoſes the Thing *not done*; becauſe if the Thing be *done*, it cannot be ſaid, that it is in the Power of any Being to *do* it: For to have a Power of *doing* that which is *already done*, is a Contradiction. Thus if any *created* Beings *always* exiſted, it cannot be ſaid, that it was ever in the Power of any Being to *cauſe* them to exiſt: For they were never *in Potentia*, but always *in Actu*. The *voluntary Power* of *doing* muſt be *Previous* to the *Thing done*: And therefore God might *from Eternity have the Power of doing* what, in the Nature of the Thing, could not be *actually done from*

* Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE Examined p. 121.

† Third Def. p. 83.

Eternity.

Eternity. But it does not follow, becauſe the *actual Exertion* of the Power, *i. e.* the *Thing created* was not from Eternrty, *therefore* God had not the *Power* from Eternity of *creating*. The *Power* of *creating* he had from Eternity, but the *Thing created* muſt begin to exiſt. But it ſeems you can ſee no Difference in that Diſtinction, which I made between a *Power from Eternity* of creating, and a Power of *creating from Eternity*. I argued thus "that God had in himſelf a *Power* "*from all Eternity* of creating whatſoever, and "whenſoever he pleaſed, is moſt undoubtedly true: "But that he had a Power of *creating Beings from* "*all Eternity*, i. e. that he had a Power *to create* "*eternal Beings*, is undoubtedly falſe." * To this you anſwer "I beg leave to obſerve here, that "This is undoubtedly inconſiſtent with his own "Notion; for if God could create *whenſoever* "he pleaſed, he could create *from all Eternity*, be-"cauſe he could certainly pleaſe from all Eternity, "otherwiſe he had not free Will from all Eter-"nity." † To which I reply.

FIRST, God could not *create from all Eternity* i. e. he could not make an *eternal Creature*, becauſe it is a Contradiction; yet he had a *Power from Eternity* of creating *whenſoever*, that is, at what *Time* ſoever he pleaſed: But *creating in Time* is not *creating from Eternity*, therefore I am undoubtedly conſiſtent.

SECONDLY. God had always the *Power of creating*, and could create *whenſoever* he pleaſed; but yet he could not *create* a Being, which ſhould nevertheleſs *exiſt from Eternity*; becauſe *Creation* is an *Action*, and has Relation to an *external Effect*,

* Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE Examined p. 91.
† Third Def. p. 67.

and

and therefore muſt be *in Time*; and although God was always free to exert this Power of creating, yet he could not exert it ſo as that this *voluntary Exertion* (in which I include the *Effect*) ſhould be without *Beginning*. "The ſuppoſing an Action "(ſays a late judicious Writer) ſuch as the effect-"ing of Matter muſt be, deſtroys the Idea of "*Eternity* in the *Thing effected* by that Action. "Every Action muſt have a *Beginning* and an "*End*, theſe are included in the Conception of "Action; for if it were without a Beginning, "the Thing is not yet begun; and what was "never begun cannot be now ended, as the Pro-"duction of Matter is. The denying *theſe Li-"mits* to Action, amounts ſtill to an abſolute "Negation of it. And to ſay Matter was pro-"duced without Action, is as much as to ſay, "it was effected without Agency or Efficiency. "— Tho' it be certain that the *Agent* is eternal, "it will never follow that any *particular Act* is "eternal. It is the Nature of any particular Act "to be circumſcrib'd and temporary, that is, in "other Words to be limited both *before* and *be-"hind*, which is a Condition inconſiſtent with E-"ternity."* — In ſhort there may be an *eternal Power*, yet not an *eternal Action*. For as the *Agent* is *eternal*, the *Power* muſt be ſo too, becauſe *Power* is one of his *eſſential Attributes*, and therefore that Being whoſe Attribute it is, cannot be ſuppoſed to exiſt without it. But then the *actual Exertion* of this Power relates to Something *external*, the *actual Exertion* of the Power of creating,

* Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul — Sect. VIII. N°. XIII. p. 357.

conſider'd as the actual *Creation*, muſt have a Beginning.

2. FROM the Nature of *Cauſe* and *Effect*, I argue that an *eternal Creation* is impoſſible. *Cauſes* may be conſidered, either as *Voluntary*, or *Neceſſary*. The Cauſe which we are here concern'd with is a *voluntary* Cauſe: For it is admitted, that God is the *voluntary* Cauſe of thoſe Things which he has *created*, that is, that he did not create them *neceſſarily*, but out of his own *free Will* and Pleaſure: that they did not flow from him as *Light* from the Sun, but that they were the *Effects* of a *free Agent* *. If then the *Exiſtence* of a *voluntary Cauſe* muſt be *prior* to the *Exiſtence* of the *Effect*, then it is plain, that the *Effect* could not *exiſt from Eternity*, or *coeval* with the *Exiſtence* of the *voluntary Cauſe*. There is indeed a Senſe, in which an *Effect* may be ſaid to be *coeval* with its *voluntary Cauſe* viz. as No Thing is ſtrictly ſpeaking a *Cauſe*, till it produces an *Effect*. Thus if I put a Body into Motion, I am not properly a *Mover* till the other Body is *moved*; or, a Father is not a *Father*, till he has a *Son*. The *Cauſe* and *Effect*, in this Senſe, may perhaps be allowed to be *coeval*, conſider'd *merely* as *Cauſe* and *Effect*: For this is a *Relation* which equally depends upon *both*, and cannot ſubſiſt in *one alone*: The Effect is not an *Effect*, before it be *cauſed*, nor can the *Cauſe* be ſtrictly a *Cauſe*, till it produces an *Effect*. But this will be of no Service to you in the preſent Queſtion, nor prove that a *Creature* may *exiſt coeval* with its *Creator*: For in the forementioned Senſe, every Effect muſt be coeval with its voluntary Cauſe: Every Thing

* See *Third Def.* p. 74.

which

which God has created, or will create, muſt be *coeval* with him conſider'd merely as *Creator* of thoſe Things. If God ſhould create a Being to Day, this Being would be *coeval* with God conſider'd merely as the *Cauſe* of it, for he was not the *Cauſe* or *Creator* of this Being, till the Being was *produced*. But this I ſay makes nothing for you in the preſent Debate: For the Queſtion here is, not whether an *Effect* may be *coeval* with its *Cauſe*, conſider'd merely as *Cauſe* and *Effect*, but whether the *Exiſtence* of the *Thing effected* can be *coeval* with the *Exiſtence* of the *voluntary Agent*, which *produced* it, not conſider'd in the *relative* Senſe of *Cauſe*, but in the *abſolute* Senſe of *Being*: If it cannot, then the *Exiſtence* of a *Creature* cannot be *coeval* with the *Exiſtence* of its *Creator*, and conſequently no *Creature* could *exiſt from Eternity* i. e. there could not be an *Eternal Creation*.

To all thoſe Arguments which I urged againſt you, founded upon the Suppoſition that the *Exiſtence* of a *voluntary Cauſe* muſt be *prior* to the *Exiſtence* of the *Effect*, you only anſwer by calling upon me to prove it †. But that it muſt be ſo, is ſo very evident, that I believe there are Few, who will think it *requires* any Proof. However I ſhall endeavour to give you one.

IT is admitted, that God is the *voluntary Cauſe* of thoſe Beings which are ſuppoſed to be created from Eternity. *Ex Hypotheſi* then, God could *chuſe* whether he would have created theſe Beings or not; therefore it was in his Power *not* to have created them; from whence it follows, that there

† See *Third Def.* p. 68, 70, 71.

muſt be a Time *pre-ſuppoſed* to their Exiſtence; For *after* they *are created*, it is not in the Power of God not *to have* created them: If therefore it was ever in his Power not to have created them, it muſt be *before they exiſted*, and conſequently there was a Time when they did *not exiſt*: For to ſuppoſe that thoſe Things *might not* have been, which *always actually were*, or that there *was a Time* when theſe Beings *might not* have been created, and yet that there *never was a Time* when they were not *actually in Being*, appears to be a manifeſt Contradiction. — Again, I would ask, whether theſe *Creatures*, which you ſuppoſe never to have been *out* of Being, might have been created any way *different* from what they were? If you ſay, no; you limit Omnipotence, and in Effect overturn the Suppoſition of God's being their *Creator* in any proper Senſe, or the *voluntary Cauſe* of their *Production*. But if you anſwer in the Affirmative, then there muſt have been a Time when they were *not in Being*: For if God could have created them in any *Manner different* from what he did create them, it follows, that there was a Time when their *Modus* of Exiſtence was *contingent*: But as nothing can *exiſt* before it exiſts in *ſome Manner*, ſo that whoſe *Modus* of Exiſtence was *contingent*, muſt be *contingent* as to its *Exiſtence* alſo: For if the *Modus* of it was *contingent*, and the *Exiſtence* not ſo, then it muſt have once *exiſted* without *any Modus of Exiſtence* i. e. it muſt have *exiſted*, and *not have exiſted* at the ſame Time. Whatever then was *contingent* as to the *Modus* of its Exiſtence, was *contingent* likewiſe with Reſpect to *Exiſtence it ſelf*; and that whoſe *Exiſtence* was *contingent* i. e. which *might* or

might

might not have exiſted, could not have *exiſted from Eternity* *.

YOU grant that—"God is a free active Being; "and therefore it depended upon his own good- "Will and Pleaſure, whether *any Effects at all*, "or *at any Time*, ſhould proceed from his Pow- "er." † Now this is in Conſequence granting the Queſtion. For That which *exiſted from Eternity* could not depend upon the *Pleaſure* of any *other Being*, whether it ſhould *have exiſted or not*, becauſe it *always actually did exiſt*. If it *depended* upon the *Will* of God, whether *any Effects at all*, or at *any Time ſhould proceed* from his Power, is it not a neceſſary Concluſion, that there muſt have been a Time when there *were not any Effects at all*. Does it not plainly ſuppoſe a *prior Time* for God to chuſe?

I HAD argued, that whatever *exiſted from Eternity* would be *neceſſarily-exiſting*, and therefore, if *created Beings* might have been *Eternal*, there might have been *neceſſarily-exiſting Creatures*, which I looked upon as an Abſurdity **. In anſwer you ſay, that I have "not yet ſhewn, that what was

* It is certain that *ſome other Being* determined the *Manner* of Matter's Exiſtence at firſt, and therefore the *Exiſtence it ſelf*, or gave it Exiſtence, ſince Exiſtence without a Manner is impoſſible. Now let a Man anſwer it to his own Underſtanding, if when Matter *got Exiſtence*, that doth not plainly imply that it *had it not before it got it*. And if it ever was without Exiſtence, whether its Exiſtence can be Eternal. It appears to me, that to ſay, an Effect may be Eternal, is the ſame as to ſay, a Thing which had a Beginning may want a Commencement. — *Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul.* Sect. VIII. N°. XIV. p. 357.

† Third Def. p. 74.

** See Dr. *Clarke's* Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 94.

"from

" from Eternity, muſt therefore be neceſſarily " exiſting." * If the Proof which I have already given be not ſufficient, take the following *viz.* Whatever *always exiſted* did never *not exiſt*, and That which did *never not exiſt* was *never* under a Poſſibility of *not having exiſted*, therefore What *exiſted from Eternity* muſt be *neceſſarily exiſting*. If you ſay that what did *never not exiſt* may be under a Poſſibility of *not having exiſted*; I ask, *When* was it under ſuch a Poſſibility? and by that Time you have furniſhed out an Anſwer to this Queſtion, you may perhaps ſee the Abſurdity of your Suppoſition.

UPON the whole — Your Errors upon this Head ariſe from not diſtinguiſhing between *willing* and *acting*, or between *determining* to create, and *actually creating*. God's Will, Pleaſure, Determination, or Choice are *eternal* as his Exiſtence (becauſe he is immutable) for they are not the ſame as *Action*, but follow neceſſarily from his being endued with ſuch or ſuch Attributes; but the *actual Execution* of his Will muſt, from the Nature of the Thing, be in *Time*: *Acts* flowing from *Choice* muſt be *ſubſequent* to ſuch Choice; and conſequently God muſt have the Power, before it could be exerted. This I take to be little leſs than Demonſtration, and therefore is not to be encounter'd with Difficulties, which muſt neceſſarily attend our Endeavours to explain the *Manner* of the Divine Exiſtence. You may go on objecting that he muſt, according to This, have exiſted a *whole Eternity*, without being able to exert his Power; yet this will have no Force, when the Arguments are clear and convincing,

* Third Def. p. 70.

that

that he could not *create* but *in Time*. The Difficulty you throw in the Way, ariſes from our want of knowing the *Manner* of the Divine Exiſtence; or I ſhould rather ſay, that your Difficulties are owing to your conceiving his Exiſtence in a *wrong* Manner, and talking about it in improper Language. You are conſidering the Divine Exiſtence in the Way of *ſucceſſive Duration*; you are ſpeaking of a *whole Eternity*; whereas 'tis evident that *Succeſſion* cannot poſſibly be applied to God, nor *whole* to Eternity, *Whole* and *Part* being only Relations of *finite Exiſtences* *. But we ſhall ſee the Abſurdity of This ſtill more evidently by attending, as I propoſed,

3. To the *Nature* of ETERNITY; which evinces beyond all Queſtion the Impoſſibility of Eternal Creation. I had ſaid enough upon this Head in my laſt Piece † to have convinced any attentive and unprejudiced Reader. Every Argument againſt an *Infinite Series* will prove as ſtrongly againſt an *Eternal Creation*. For every *created* Being is *changeable*, and muſt therefore exiſt *per Modum ſucceſſionis:* But *Succeſſion* implies *Beginning*; therefore a *Creature* cannot be *eternal*. Here the *minor* Propoſition only is (I think) what you will call in Queſtion; and this has been ſo fully proved by Dr. CUDWORTH **, Dr. BENTLEY ††, and Mr. LAW *†, in their Arguments againſt an

* See Mr. LOCKE's Eſſay on Hum. Underſtand. B. 1. c. 4. §. 6. — Edit. 9.

† See Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 83. *&c.*

** Intell. Syſt. p. 643. — & 843.

†† Boyle's Lect. Serm. 3.

*† Tranſlation of ABp. *King*'s Origin of Exil. Note 18.

Infinite

Infinite Series; that it muſt be needleſs to add any Thing more to what They have ſaid. But let us ſee what you have offer'd in Objection.

YOU had advanced in your *Firſt Defence*, what I call'd a *Riddle*, but as you don't like that Term, let it be call'd an *Abſurdity*, a Word which ſuits it better. It ſtands thus: "There is a Time to "come which never will be preſent": and "there "is a Time now actually paſt which never was "preſent." * This you defend, by urging that "there is no Abſurdity in ſaying that all *future* "Time is *to come*; and that all Time that *has* "*been*, is *paſt*; for *to come*, means no more than "*future*." † Be it ſo: What is *future* then, is *to come*; and what is *not future*, is not *to come*. But then, what *never will be preſent*, is *not future*, and conſequently *not to come*. Again — all Time, ſay you, that *has been*, is *paſt*; right! But what has *not been*, is not *paſt*. Now that which *never was preſent*, never *has been*; and therefore is *not actually paſt*. A little lower you have given an Inſtance by way of Illuſtration *viz.* "ſuppoſe, a "Man to move from any given Point directly "forward, and to move on infinitely; it is plain "that there will be SPACE for him to go through "for ever; and the SPACE which he is to go "through, will be before him; and as SPACE is "Infinite, there will be SPACE which he never "will arrive at." ** Now what SPACE is *That*

p. 45. Ed. 1. — N. 10. p. 46. Ed. 2. *Remarks* referr'd to in Note 18. [X *b*] Edit. 1. — *Remarks* refer'd to in Note 19. [R. *b*] Edit. 2. N. 5. p. 13. Edit. 1. — N. 3. p. 16. Edit. 2.

* Firſt Def. p. 27.

† Third Def. p. 75. ** Ibid.

which

which the Man *will never arrive at?* I preſume it is the *End:* I ask then, again, what is the Reaſon that he will *never arrive at the End* of SPACE? I know not any Thing you can ſay, but that it is, becauſe there *is no End* for him to arrive at. To ſay then, that there *is* SPACE which he never will arrive at, and by That SPACE to mean the *End*; is ſaying that there *is an End* which he will *never arrive at:* and ſince at the ſame Time you ſuppoſe, that the Reaſon why he *will not arrive at the End* is, becauſe *there is no End*; it is plainly ſaying, that there *is an End*, and *no End* at the ſame Time. By ſaying that *there is* SPACE *which never will be arrived at*, you mean the ſame as you do when you ſay, that *there is a Time to come, which never will be preſent.* By the SPACE which *never will be arrived at*, and by the *Time* which *never will be preſent*, you mean the *End* of SPACE, and the *End* of DURATION: But as you ſuppoſe both SPACE and DURATION to have *no Ends*, it is evidently abſurd to talk of their *Ends*, or of their being *to come.*

" To *come*, [ſay you] with Reſpect to TIME " or DURATION, means only the ſame as *before*, in " a Motion through SPACE; and *paſt*, with Re- " ſpect to TIME or DURATION, may be taken in " the ſame Senſe as *behind*, in a Motion through " SPACE, ſuppoſing a Perſon to have moved from " Infinity in SPACE." * But remember, Sir, that if DURATION be ſuppoſed never to have *begun*, and never to *end*; then neither a *Beginning*, nor an *End*, can be ſaid to be *behind* or *before*, or any where elſe, any more than to be *to come*, or to be *paſt.* So if SPACE be allowed to have neither *Be-*

* Third Def. p. 75.

ginning nor *End*; no *End* or *Beginning* can be ſaid to be *behind*, or *before* the Man in Motion.

THE Learned Dr. BENTLEY, in ſhewing that to ſuppoſe *infinite Generations of Men already paſt* is a Contradiction, began with obſerving, that "whatſoever is now paſt, was once actually pre-"ſent." * This Argument you charge with e-qually proving "againſt the Exiſtence of the Dei-"ty from all Eternity"; and your Reaſon for it is This; *viz.* "Becauſe, if there is not a *Time*, "or a *Part* of Duration *paſt* which never was "*preſent*, then there was a *Beginning of the Exiſt-*"*ence of God.*" † Now, Sir, the Difficulty re-turns upon your ſelf: For I beg Leave to affirm, that not Dr. BENTLEY'S, but YOUR Arguments will prove againſt the *eternal Exiſtence* of the *Deity*. For you ſay "there is a Time now actually *paſt*, "which never was *preſent*." But if ſo, then *That Time* could not be *preſent* to the *Exiſtence of the Deity*; conſequently the *Exiſtence of the Deity* was *not preſent* to *that Time*; therefore *there was a Time*, to which the *Exiſtence of the Deity* was *not pre-ſent*; i. e. There *was a Time* when God did *not exiſt*. This Argument is concluſive, and the Con-ſequences unavoidable by Thoſe, who imagine the *Eternity of God* to be an *Infinite Series* of *ſucceſſive Duration:* Nay, the Notions of theſe Gentlemen will ſtill appear more abſurd, if we conſider, that they ſuppoſe this *Succeſſion of Time* to be the *Flow-ing of God's Exiſtence:* For if it be, and there be likewiſe a *Time* now actually *paſt* which never was *preſent*; then it follows, that there is a *Period* of *God's Exiſtence* now actually *paſt*, which *never*

* Boyle's Lect. Serm. 3.

† Firſt Def. p. 27.

was

was preſent; that is, God's Exiſtence was not preſent to every Period of his Exiſtence *i. e.* he did exiſt, and did not exiſt at the ſame Time. —— You ſee into what inextricable Difficulties, and Abſurdities your Notions will precipitate you! and when you have endeavour'd to diſperſe theſe Clouds, you will perhaps have Light enough to diſcern, that *Succeſſion* cannot be applied to the Deity.

BUT this Objection, and that which you bring againſt Dr. BENTLEY'S Arguments, affect thoſe, and thoſe only, who ſuppoſe the *Eternity* of *God* made up of *ſucceſſive Parts*; and you ſhould have remember'd, that this is what we conſtantly deny. 'Tis a Difficulty which lies, and will for ever lie, againſt your Manner of conceiving the Divine Eternity; and ſuch a Difficulty, as I am perſuaded not all the Wit of Man can get over. *Eternity*, and *Succeſſion* appear to me to be *Ideas* quite as *incompatible*, as *Infinity* and *Finiteneſs*: *Succeſſive Eternity* is juſt as good Senſe as *red Sound*, or *loud Colour*. 'Tis in the very Nature of *Time* to admit of a conſtant *Increaſe*, and therefore it can never arrive at *Compleatneſs*, or a *real poſitive Infinity*, and conſequently it can never be applied to God, whoſe *Exiſtence* is *perfect*, whoſe *Continuance* is *ſtable* and *permanent*, without *Beginning* or *End*, without Poſſibility of receiving any *Addition* or *Increaſe*, "comprehending in the *Stability* "and *immutable Perfection* of his own Being, his "*Yeſterday*, and *to Day*, and *for ever*." * "The "Duration of every Thing (ſays the very Learned and Judicious Dr. CUDWORTH) "muſt of "Neceſſity be agreeable to its Nature; and there-

* CUDWORTH Intellect. Syſt. p. 644.

" fore, as That whoſe *imperfect Nature* is ever
" *flowing* like a River, and conſiſts in *continual*
" *Motion* and *Changes* one after another, muſt needs
" have accordingly a *ſucceſſive* and *flowing Dura-*
" *tion*, ſliding perpetually from *preſent* into *paſt*,
" and always poſting on towards the *Future*, ex-
" pecting Something of its ſelf, which is not yet
" in Being, but to come: So muſt That, whoſe
" perfect Nature, is *eſſentially Immutable*, and al-
" ways the *ſame*, and *neceſſarily exiſtent*, have a
" *permanent Duration*; never loſing any Thing of
" it ſelf once preſent as ſliding away from it;
" nor yet running forward to meet Something of
" it ſelf before, which is not yet in Being: and
" it is as contradi[illegible]ious for it, ever to have begun,
" as ever to ceaſe to be." *

I SHALL quote one Paſſage more from a very Learned Writer, which by the Way, had you read, might have hinder'd you from making that Objection to his Arguments, that they equally proved againſt the Exiſtence of the Deity from all Eternity. After he has ſhewn by thoſe Arguments, the Impoſſibility of ſucceſſive Duration being actually, and *poſitively Infinite*; or that infinite Succeſſions ſhould be already gone and paſt; He well, and judiciouſly obſerves, " Neither can theſe Difficulties be applied to the
" eternal Duration of God Almighty. For tho'
" we cannot comprehend Eternity and Infinity:
" yet we underſtand what they are not. And
" Something, we are ſure, muſt have exiſted from
" all Eternity; becauſe all Things could not e-
" merge and ſtart out of Nothing. So that if
" this pre-exiſtent Eternity is not compatible with

* CUDWORTH Intellect. Syſt. p. 645.

" a

" a ſucceſſive Duration, as we clearly and diſtinct-
" ly perceive that it is not; then it remains that
" ſome Being, though infinitely above our finite
" Comprehenſions, muſt have an identical, inva-
" riable Continuance from all Eternity; which
" Being is no other than God. For as his Na-
" ture is perfect and immutable without the *leaſt*
" *Shadow of Change*; ſo his eternal Duration is
" permanent and indiviſible, not meaſurable by
" Time and Motion, nor to be computed by Num-
" ber of ſucceſſive Moments. *One Day with the*
" *Lord is as a Thouſand Years, and a Thouſand Years*
" *as one Day.*" *

THERE remains one Argument more to be taken Notice of. You endeavour to prove, not only that it was *poſſible* for God to *create from Eternity*, but that it is *probable* he *actually did* ſo. Your Argument is This. " Since God always acts upon
" ſome Ground or Reaſon, from thence it follows,
" that he had ſome Reaſon for Creation, other-
" wiſe he never would have created at all. If
" then he had any Reaſon, that Reaſon certainly
" was the ſame from all Eternity, that it was at
" any particular Time: For Inſtance, ſuppoſe
" Goodneſs was the Ground of his Creation, it
" follows that if it was good at any particular
" Time, it was equally ſo from all Eternity. For
" as he himſelf is, and always was immutable, and
" invariable, every Thing was the ſame with Re-
" ſpect to him from Eternity; and before the
" Exiſtence of any Thing but himſelf there can
" be no external Cauſe to determine it either ways.
" It is therefore very probable, that as it was al-
" ways good in him to create, that he always did

* Dr. *Bentley*'s Boyle's Lect. Serm. 3.

" create

" create, and did therefore never exiſt alone." * This Argument muſt be reſolved into the following Principle *viz.* That *whatever God created, 'tis probable he created from all Eternity*; for " whatever it was good for God to create in Time, " it was equally good from all Eternity." But if this be admitted, then it will follow, that it is probable that he actually created the *World*, and all Things in it *from all Eternity*, and therefore, that, not only *Angels* and *Men*, but that *every other Species of Creatures*, every *Planet* with *all its Inhabitants* were *eternal*. It likewiſe follows from your Principle, that God *cannot ever hereafter create any new Species of Beings*; becauſe, whatever it is good for him to create in Time, it was equally good from all Eternity, and therefore it is probable, according to you, that he *cannot create any Beings but what he created from Eternity*. —— If your Principles were purſued in all their Conſequences, I know not where they would ſtop: But if theſe already mentioned, ſhall be thought extravagant, the Argument from which they are deduced muſt be thought ſo too.

I HAVE now, Sir, gone through your *Third Defence*, and have anſwer'd your ſeveral Arguments, and Objections. I am afraid the Reader will think I have been too particular, in taking Notice of ſome Quibbles, which, in Reality, deſerve no Anſwer: but as *Sophiſtry may prevail with a great many Perſons*, I thought it might not be wholly unneceſſary to detect it. With Relation to SPACE, it appears, that you have deſcended to the loweſt Shifts in order to ſupport your Hypotheſis; and in Reſpect to the *Poſſibility* of an ETERNAL CREA-

* Firſt Def. p. 56.

TION,

TION, you have been forced to deny the Truth of two Maxims, as ſelf-evident, and univerſal as any in Philoſophy *viz.* that *Creation implies a Beginning of Exiſtence:* and that the *Exiſtence of a voluntary Efficient muſt be prior to the Exiſtence of the Effect it produces.* I ſhall now, Sir, take Leave of you for the Preſent, hoping, if you ſhall hereafter think proper, to oblige the World with any more *Defences*, and me with any more *Anſwers*, that you will take a Method different from what you have hitherto done; and endeavour (if you can) to ſupport your Cauſe, by Rational, and Philoſophical Arguments.

REMARKS

REMARKS ON Mr. JACKSON's EXCEPTIONS TO Dr. *Clarke*'s *Notions of* SPACE *Examined.*

MR. JACKSON, at the end of a Piece not long ſince by him Publiſhed, entitled *The Exiſtence and Unity of God* &c. has thought proper to add, as he calls it, a *Short Conſideration* of *Dr. Clarke*'s *Notions of* SPACE *Examined*; which *Short Conſideration*, he tells us, he thinks to be a *ſufficient Reply*. The whole is ſlight, and ſuperficial; and the Author takes great Care always to ſpeak with *moſt Aſſurance*, where his *Reaſoning* ſeems to be the weakeſt: As if a *Declamatory Style* was to ſupply the *Defect* of *Proof*, and the Reader was to be put off with *Words*, inſtead of *Arguments*. I find ſcarce any Thing in it but what has been already obviated, and had not the foregoing Papers been preparing for the Preſs, I ſhould not have thought it worth my Time to have taken any Notice of it: But I ſhall now fling out a few brief Remarks upon what he has ſaid.

THIS

THIS Gentleman opens his Performance with wiſely obſerving that "This Author's Notion of "SPACE, is, that it is a *mere Nothing*, a *mere Ne-* "*gation* and *Abſence* of Things; yet he perpetu- "ally talks of it as a *real Exiſtent*." * And what then? We are under a Neceſſity of ſo doing, from the very Nature of Language. We talk of *abſtract Ideas*, as if they were *real Beings*, juſt as the Poets talked of *Fortune* as a *Goddeſs*, of *Virtues*, *Vices*, *Diſeaſes* &c. as if they were *real Perſons*. And if he will turn to my *Second Chapter* p. 14. *&c.* he may receive farther Information.

I SAID that "the bigger any Body is, the *more* "SPACE it requires for its Exiſtence, is true —— "The larger any Body is, the *more* SPACE we "ſay it requires for its Exiſtence." † Theſe Sentences Mr. JACKSON quotes from me, and then obſerves that "Theſe Inconſiſtencies and Contra- "dictions are the neceſſary Conſequence of deny- "ing the *Exiſtence* of SPACE." ** The Contradiction here meant, I ſuppoſe, is that I ſhould talk of *more* SPACE, and yet call SPACE *Nothing*: But this Gentleman ſhould not have left out the Sentence which immediately follows one of thoſe he has quoted: For that would have ſhewn him the true Meaning of the Expreſſion. The Sentence runs thus *viz.* "The larger any Body is the more "SPACE we ſay it requires for its Exiſtence: "*that is, in plain Engliſh, the larger any Body is the* "*more or the farther it muſt be extended.*" †† In this I ſee neither Inconſiſtency, nor Contradiction,

* Exiſtence and Unity *&c.* p. 145.

† Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE Examined p. 61, 62.

** Exiſtence and Unity p. 148.

†† Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 62

any more than there is, in affirming ſome Bodies to be heavier than others, and denying *Weight* to be any thing more than an *abſtract Idea*.

"THE Idea of Abſence [ſays he] is not the "Idea of *Quantity*, or Extenſion, as the Idea of "SPACE evidently is." * I anſwer, the Idea of SPACE is *Ideal Extenſion*, and ſo is the Idea of the *Abſence* of *Body*; and *Ideal Extenſion* is *Ideal Quantity*. He obſerves, that "we have the *ſame Idea* "of SPACE, or Extenſion, when Matter is pre-"ſent, as when it is abſent, and even as exiſting "*in* and *between* the Parts of ſolid Matter." † To this I reply, that we have the *Idea* of *Extenſion* when Matter is *preſent*, but not of SPACE; and therefore it is not, as this Author imagines, the *ſame Idea* of *Extenſion* when Matter is *preſent*, as when it is *abſent*: For in the former Caſe, it is *real Extenſion*, our Idea has a real Archetype; but in the latter Caſe, it is only *Ideal Extenſion* i. e. SPACE. But what does this Author mean by SPACE exiſting *between* the Parts of ſolid Matter? For if there is SPACE *between* the Parts of ſolid Matter, which I preſume he will allow to touch, and two Bodies do not touch when there is SPACE between them; I may ask, where is the Difference between touching and not touching?

"THE next Thing (ſays Mr. JACKSON) to "be taken Notice of, is a Piece of Reaſoning, "which this Gentleman ſeems to value himſelf "upon." ** He then quotes a Paſſage from me, where I endeavour to ſhew, that the Reaſon why the *Idea* of SPACE, when all Matter is ſuppoſed

* Exiſtence and Unity p. 148.

† Ibid.

** Ibid. p. 149.

to be annihilated, ſtill *ruſhes* into the Mind is, becauſe SPACE is *Nothing*. But pray how came this Author to imagine, that I valued my ſelf upon this Reaſoning? If he means that I think it a Piece of Reaſoning which he cannot confute, he is much in the Right of it. All the value that I know in it is, that (as it ſeems to me) it is true, and Truth is valuable every where. But Mr. JACKSON hus remarks upon it *viz.* "I am "ſorry I cannot help thinking, that all this fine "Reaſoning is *arrant Nonſenſe*." * – To which I have nothing more to ſay, than that I am ſorry this Gentleman, above all Men, ſhould not remember that *Calumny* is no *Conviction* †.

"CAN any Thing [ſays he] be more abſurd, "than to talk of a *mere Nothing* ruſhing into "our Minds, and forcing its Idea upon us whe-"ther we will or no." ** It does not ruſh into our Minds whether we will or no, in one Senſe, that is, we may chuſe whether we will think at all about it; but when we do think of it, and try to ſuppoſe it annihilated, then it is that the *ſame Idea* ſtill ruſhes into our Minds: And let any one try if he can, even in Thought, ANNIHILATE *Nothing*. – By Nothing ruſhing into our Minds, I only meant, that when we ſuppoſed every Thing *annihilated*, we could not help having an *Idea*, that Nothing would remain: And therefore it would be Nonſenſe to talk of any farther Annihilation.

I HAD remarked, that we could ſay the ſame of *Nothing* as of SPACE – "Let him ſay (then

* Exiſtence and Unity p. 149.

† The Title of a *calumniating* Book written by Mr. JACKSON.

** Exiſtence and Unity p. 150.

" ſays Mr. JACKSON) and be conſiſtent, that " Nothing, a *mere Nothing* is *neceſſarily Exiſtent*, " *Eternal*, *Infinite*, *Immoveable*, *Incomprehenſible*, " comprehends all *Matter*, and all *finite Things*; " that *in Nothing* we *live*, *move*, and *have our Be-* " *ing* &c." * To all which I ſtill anſwer, that we may full as well talk thus of *Nothing*, as of SPACE: One is as proper as the other, that is, they are both Nonſenſe alike.

HE takes Notice that my Expreſſion *viz.* " *God* " *is Omniſcient*; *he could not be Omniſcient unleſs* " *there were Things for him to know*, is very raſh " and inconſiderate; as if the Omniſcience of God, " who made all Things, depended on the Exiſt- " ence of Things for him to know." † This Charge of Raſhneſs, and Inconſiderateneſs, proceeds from his not underſtanding my Meaning; I meant no more, than that if there were not *certain Truths*, ſuch certain Truths would not be Objects of God's Omniſcience: Thus, if *Virtue* was not different from *Vice*, and *Vice* from *Virtue*; then, that *Vice is not Virtue* and that *Virtue is not Vice*, would be no Part of God's Omniſcience. And therefore he may be pleaſed to read what he objects againſt over again.

I HAD urged, that " to ſay any Thing which " is *Infinite*, has *Quantity*, and *Dimenſions*, is not " far from ſaying, it is *Finite*, and *Infinite* at the " ſame time." ** To this he replies. " *Infinite* " SPACE is as real *Quantity*, as *finite* SPACE is; " and an *infinite* Body is as real *Body*, and has real " *Quantity*, as well as *finite* Body. *Infinite* Quan- " tity, and Dimenſions are, and cannot but be

* Exiſtence and Unity &c. p. 152. † Ibid. p. 153.
** Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE Examined p. 54.

" ex-

"existent: Nothing is plainer.*" If calling a Thing plain will make it so, then all is plain enough: But he that knows an *Infinite Series* to be *absurd*, will *plainly* see the Absurdity of an *infinite Body*, *infinite Dimensions*, *infinite Quantity* &c.

HE tells us that to say SPACE is an *imaginary Substratum of imaginary Extension*, "is a Definition "as full of *mere Imagination* as one shall meet "with." †—I suppose the Author imagines this to be Wit: It may be so; 'tis certainly no Argument. It is not I, but Mr. JACKSON who is deceived by his *Imagination*. I *imagine* SPACE to exist, and believe its *Existence* to be *imaginary*; Mr. JACKSON imagines it likewise to exist, and believes its Existence to be *real*. 'Tis plain then which of us is the fuller of *Imagination*.

"BEFORE [says he] SPACE was Nothing but "the Absence of Matter; and what has Absence "to do with Extension, or Substratum either? "Now it has got a Substratum (though an ima-"ginary one) to make it look like *real* SPACE." ** —I answer no; but to make it look like what it is, an *imaginary Substance*.

HE proceeds—"But if SPACE is only an *ima-"ginary Substratum of an imaginary Extension*, how "comes it that, as he owns and supposes,—the "Idea of its Existence rushes into his Mind, "whether he will or no.—— How comes his "*Imagination* to have gotten so much the better "of his *Reason* &c.—" †† This is another of our Author's Flowers of Rhetorick; but how-

* Existence and Unity &c. p. 153.

† Ibid. p. 154.

** Ibid.

†† Ibid.

ever

ever it may perhaps be thought more proper to ſay, that his Imagination has got the better of his Reaſon, who takes Things for *real* which are *imaginary*.

HE asks—"What greater Difficulty is there in "ſuppoſing the material World to have exiſted "*from Eternity*, than there is in ſuppoſing it to "exiſt *to Eternity*?" * The Difference lies here. For the World to have exiſted *ab æterno*, implies the Abſurdity of an *Infinite Series*; but to exiſt *in æternum*, is only to exiſt (after it has once exiſted) without ceaſing, which is no other than a *Negative Infinity*.

"IT can never be proved [ſays he] that a "Cauſe muſt neceſſarily be prior to the Effect, "in Reſpect of Time" † — If not, then *Cauſe* and *Effect* mean Something elſe than what they did among antient *Logicians*, by whom this was allowed as an Axiom.

"ARISTOTLE &c. (continues he) who ſup-"poſed the World *Eternal*, ſuppoſed it notwith-"ſtanding, to be produced by God, as the Ori-"ginal Cauſe and Former of it." ** But Mr. JACKSON ſhould have remember'd that *Ariſtotle* did not conſider the World as a proper *Effect* of the Divine Power, but as a *neceſſary Emanation* from him.

SPEAKING of the Ideas of *Extenſion* and *Indiviſibility* being incompatible, "Having Parts [ſaid I] "—is *conſiſting* of Parts joined together, and Parts "that are joined together, I ſhould fancy might

* Exiſtence and Unity p. 156.

† Ibid.

** Ibid.

"be

" be ſuppoſed *aſunder*, *i. e.* might be diviſible." * To this Mr. JACKSON replies, " The Author " here ſeems diffident of his Anſwer being to " the Purpoſe, ſaying firſt, whatever has Parts, " *muſt* have *diviſible* Parts, then in Concluſion, " that being *joined together*, he *fancies* they *might* " be ſuppoſed aſunder." † — This was a Remark too curious for me to paſs over: But the whole State of the Matter is, that my *Diffidence* happen'd to be *Ironical*, and Mr. JACKSON could not ſee it.

HE next endeavours to ſhew how *Parts* do not imply *Diviſibility*, even in Reſpect of *Matter*. " Suppoſe [ſays he] God to have created the " *leaſt* Body or Piece of Matter, which he can " create, or which is the *leaſt* poſſible to exiſt, " which is probably true of the ſolid Parts of " ſome Body: I ask then, has this Body, or " Piece of Matter, *Extenſion* and *Parts*, or not? " He will ſay, it has *Extenſion* and Parts; and " yet to ſuppoſe the Parts *diviſible* is an expreſs " Contradiction, becauſe then the Body will be " *leſs* when divided, than it was before, though " it was, before it was divided, the *leaſt* poſſible " for God to create, or exiſt." **

I NEED give no other Anſwer to This, than that the *Suppoſition* is one of the greateſt Abſurdities in Philoſophy. 'Tis to ſuppoſe that there may be a *leaſt Particle of Matter*, or one *infinitely ſmall*, that is, of no magnitude; that it is *extended*, and has *Parts*, and yet is of no *Quantity*.

* Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 125, 126.

† Exiſtence and Unity p. 158.

** Ibid.

Does

Does not he know, that Matter (like all other Quantity) is diviſible *in infinitum*, and conſequently that a *leaſt Particle* is Nonſenſe? — God can't create a *leaſt* Particle of Matter, becauſe he can't work *Contradictions*; So all is foreign. — But it is pleaſant enough to ſee, how theſe Gentlemen are put to it, to give us an Inſtance of an *extended indiviſible Thing*. Mr. CLARKE and Mr. JACKSON have both endeavour'd at it, and very curious ones have they preſented us with. One tells us of a Piece of Matter, ſurrounded with Something that hinders it from being divided, *ergo* it is indiviſible: The other informs us of the *leaſt Particle* of *Matter*: A Diſcovery which no one could make, but he that could find out the *laſt Number*.

I SHALL take Notice but of one Thing more, and that is that Mr. JACKSON every where ſpeaks as if he thought (what I always imagin'd was a neceſſary Conſequence of theſe Gentlemens Opinions) that SPACE is the very Subſtance of GOD. For he tells us in one Place, that "the Idea of "SPACE is not the Idea of a mere Nothing, *un*-"*leſs* the Idea of the infinite Preſence and *Exiſt*-"*ence of God* is the Idea of a mere Nothing." * In another Place he obſerves, that *whoever denies the Exiſtence of* SPACE *ſuppoſes the* Exiſtence of God *to be the Exiſtence of Nothing* †. What is this leſs than deifying SPACE, and making it God himſelf? But not content with This, he ſtill plunges deeper, for he not only believes SPACE to be the *Extenſion of God* but the *Extenſion of Matter* too. For he acquaints us that "the internal Quan-"tity of SPACE pervading the Bodies, and poſ-

* Exiſtence and Unity p. 151.

† See Ibid. p. 150.

"ſeſt by them, *is their true Extenſion.*" * Mr. CLARKE indeed talks of the *Space of Body*, from whence I *imagin'd* he thought SPACE to be a Property of Body; But this Gentleman ſpeaks out, at leaſt his own Sentiments, and tells us that it is the *true Extenſion of Body*; and He likewiſe holds it to be the *true Extenſion of God.* —— If then the *true Extenſion of Matter*, be the *true Extenſion of God* ——— I leave the Reader to draw the neceſſary Conſequence.

* Exiſtence and Unity p. 68.

FINIS.